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Market-based Task Allocation in Distributed Satellite Systems
by Johannes Gerhardus van der Horst
This thesis addresses the problem of task allocation in a distributed satellite
system. These spacecraft specialise in dierent functions, and must collaborate
to complete the mission objectives. The energy available for task execution
and communication is, however, extremely limited, which poses a challenging
design problem. I propose the use of a market-based, multi-agent approach to
achieve the necessary macro-level behaviour. The development and verication
of this allocation mechanism constitutes the rst major objective of this thesis.
Although numerous examples of task allocation in related systems exist, I
found a worrying disconnect between our general, theoretical knowledge of task
allocation, and the specic application thereof. General analyses of abstracted
task allocation exist, and specic implementations have been constructed in a
heuristic way, but very little work navigates between these two extremes. My
second major objective therefore contributes to mapping the problem space.
The proposed task allocation mechanism is based on human labour markets
in order to obtain similar robustness and exibility. It uses fully distributed
auctions to eciently allocate tasks in volatile networks, without any global
knowledge of the system state. The energy required for communication is con-
stant, irrespective of the size of the network, resulting in a highly scalable
allocation mechanism.
To nd the area in parameter space where market-based control is the more
suitable solution, when compared to a centralised approach, I characterised the
allocation mechanism in terms of network size, node failure rate, and robust-
ness. The relationship between communication cost and topology is explored
by looking at the overheads associated with dierent static topologies, and the
impact of communication distance. The ability of the allocation mechanism to
cope with realistic Keplerian dynamics is also conrmed. Finally, I investigate
the dierence in performance between the allocation mechanism, as an exam-
ple of a cooperative market, and a competitive scenario where adaptive agents
compete to maximise their revenue. Results show that competitive markets are
subject to positive feedback loops which can result in inferior performance for
sparsely connected and heavily loaded networks.
This exploration of the system parameters is treated as a traversal of the
problem space, resulting in an emergent taxonomy of both problem and solution
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Introduction
This thesis is about coordinating a group of satellites that need to collaborate to
complete mission objectives. It may come as a surprise then, that my discussion
does not start with satellite design or orbital mechanics, but rather with the
work of Adam Smith on markets, because the challenge of managing such a
group of satellites is fundamentally a labour allocation problem.
In Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations he identies the division of labour as the
driving force behind increased productivity in economies. Specialisation also
results in greater interdependence: individuals in the economy have to rely on
others in their vicinity to supply the skills they don't have (Slater and Tonkiss,
2001, Chapter 1). This leads us to the problem of the allocation of labour:
given the choice of a number of potentially suitable specialists, which one is best
suited to the task that needs allocating? Even if they are identical in terms of
skills, factors such as location, availability, reputation and coordination eort
can inuence the decision. This is, in a nutshell, what this thesis investigates.
Given a dynamic community of specialised individuals and a stream of incoming
work, what system can we devise that would allocate tasks in an ecient and
eective manner?
Although an economy is perhaps the most obvious example, it is by no
means the only system where the allocation of tasks is a challenge. Social
insects, such as ants, termites and bees, display specialisation into dierent
castes with dierent roles. Tasks are clearly not allocated in any centralised way,
and yet an eective division of labour is achieved through the parallel activities
of largely autonomous individuals and the use of rather simple communication
mechanisms, e.g., for the recruitment of foragers to a new food source. The
colony as a whole can thus be viewed as a superorganism: an intelligent agent
in its own right with lifespan and abilities far exceeding that of its component
individuals (Oster and Wilson, 1979).
While the above examples display distributed coordination, many human
approaches to task allocation, such as governments and military organisations,
11. Introduction
rely on centralised or hierarchical command structures. In these systems knowl-
edge is transmitted to and analysed by a central authority | or multiple points
in the case of a hierarchical system | before the optimal course of action is
decided upon. Individuals are of limited autonomy and have tasks assigned to
them by a superior who is assumed to be in a more information-rich position.
The above systems vary in their structure and implementation, but they all
have task allocation as a core function, and as such have served as models for
designers facing similar allocation problems in the construction of technological
systems. The centralised approach has traditionally dominated in this sphere;
it may be that the idea of a single mind or coordinator ts most comfortably
into the patterns of Western thought (Resnick, 1997). In recent years interest
in decentralised systems has increased signicantly with the hope that they
can provide us with ways of coping with our own increasingly complex and
interdependent technological systems. Interest in market-based coordination
(Smith, 1980; Huberman, 1988), swarm intelligence (Bonabeau et al., 1999) and
ant colony optimisation (Dorigo et al., 1996) has been growing steadily since the
1980s. These techniques are not only useful for solving existing problems: they
can also provide us with control methodologies for systems that have yet to be
realised, where scalability, robustness and self-organisation are highly desirable
characteristics.
1.1 The problem
This study is primarily motivated by the challenge of managing one such tech-
nological system; namely distributed satellites. Spacecraft have traditionally
consisted of monolithic structures. A positive feedback loop has driven these
designs to grow ever more complicated: to maximise value and reliability of al-
ready expensive projects, progressively more complex designs were developed.
This in turn increased development time, which further increased cost. To
counter this trend, the use of a number of modular, free-ying spacecraft has
been suggested (Brown et al., 2006; Barnhart et al., 2007). Costs are kept down
by keeping the spacecraft simple; this in turn means they can only complete
mission objectives by collaborating. Some of the spacecraft provide infrastruc-
ture, such as data processing or communication with the ground station, while
others full payload functions, e.g., earth observation.
This approach oers numerous benets, most of which translate to a greater
return on the money invested. The system as a whole is made more robust by
using redundant units, eliminating single points of failure and thus providing
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graceful degradation when component satellites fail. Resource sharing increases
eciency by optimally utilising redundancy in the system. Risk can be lowered
by using multiple launches to deploy the system. Very large formations can
be formed in orbit, providing much larger structures than are feasible using
conventional approaches, which allow novel approaches to sensing. Signicant
progress is being made in miniaturisation (Vladimirova et al., 2006; Barnhart
et al., 2006) and formation ight (Mueller and Thomas, 2005; Ferguson and
How, 2003) but a number of challenges still remain, including the question of
how to manage such an organisation of spacecraft.
Mission objectives can be decomposed into tasks that are executed by dier-
ent satellites. These tasks need to be allocated eciently, while taking satellite
capabilities, their limited power and constrained communication into account.
Allocation is further complicated by changes in the group topology due to or-
bital mechanics, as well as the possibility of failure of individual nodes. The
scale of the system, ranging from tens to hundreds of satellites, may necessitate
spacecraft autonomy, but the system must still reliably complete the desired
mission objectives.
The complexity of this problem suggests the use of techniques based on bio-
logical or social complex systems. Market-based mechanisms oer a promising
solution to this allocation problem, in particular, the model of a labour market
seems very well-suited. In both distributed satellite systems and real-world
markets, individuals have to deal with limited information, changing communi-
cation topologies, and spatially distributed agents. In addition, the robustness
gained from having no central controller and the adaptive nature of the market
are extremely attractive properties for a satellite application. With this ap-
proach, component satellites bid for jobs that they are capable of completing.
By using their energy levels to calculate the bid value, they communicate their
relative tnesses to the allocating satellite. Topological information is added
to the bid price by the spacecraft that relay bids, thereby helping to localise
allocation and minimize the amount of energy spent on communication.
This problem of how to manage such a system is what originally attracted
me to this area. However, I soon came to realise that the eld of multi-agent
systems is not yet at the stage where a reliable, over-arching methodology has
been dened and validated, resulting in an alarming proliferation of systems
that are of relatively little use to others facing similar problems (I was by no
means the rst one to come to this conclusion; see e.g., Chapter 10, Wooldridge,
2002). This led me to view my design process as part of the exploration of a
greater problem space. By understanding the implications of design decisions
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and constraints, we can relate dierent systems in this space, thereby contribut-
ing to the development of a responsible methodology for the eld.
1.2 Traversing the problem space
The challenge of task allocation in a distributed satellite system sounds like a
traditional engineering problem: a number of physical and technical constraints
need to be taken into account by making a series of design decisions to satisfy a
set of operational requirements. One approach, popular in practice in the eld
of multi-agent systems, would be to treat this as eectively a stand-alone prob-
lem. We begin with such theory as is available, and proceed guided by intuition
and experiment until we have a system that works well enough. The pressure
to produce a working system often precludes eorts to relate the particular case
to a more general theory of multi-agent systems.
But what happens if a similar, but slightly dierent problem needs to be
solved? Intuition suggests that a signicant portion of one solution should be
applicable to closely related problems. But which portions? Will the design
decisions that had a satisfactory outcome in one context necessarily do the same
in another?
In surveying the literature relevant to the problem of task allocation in
distributed satellite systems, a large number of closely related applications came
to light. Spanning the elds of mobile robotics, distributed computing, wireless
sensor networks and logistics, these applications all share some characteristics
with the problem at hand. Given this multitude of specic cases, one would
expect to nd a layer of work relating these solutions and abstracting them into
a generalised set of design guidelines and tools to better understand problems
and engineer applications. This space is, however, remarkably empty.
Of course the eld of multi-agent systems is not devoid of theory, but the
most successful theoretical contributions are extremely abstract and concerned
with underlying principles, e.g., rational choice theory, game theory and logic.
However, mappings from abstract algorithms and mathematical performance
proofs to actual implementations that take into account the messiness of the
real world are few and far between.
Thus the eld has a bimodal distribution of work, some of it very spe-
cic and some of it very general. This is graphically represented in Figure 1.1.
The management of data in the distributed databases system Mariposa (Stone-
braker et al., 1994) is an example of a specic problem, while a microeconomic
explanation about the optimality of markets would be a corresponding entry
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on the general side of the spectrum. We could describe work that progresses
from top to bottom as science, while moving in the opposite direction, from the
general to the specic, is engineering.
Specific
(Application)
General
(Theoretical)
Engineering
Science
Figure 1.1: Work related to task allocation in multi-agent systems can broadly
divided into two categories: application specic engineering problems (small
circles), and abstract, general theories and proofs (large circles). The space
between these poles is quite empty, apart from some taxonomies and a few
attempts at agent design methodologies: we still do not really know how to
design these systems. The work in this thesis traverses a section of this space,
as indicated by the blue arrow. This allows the design process to be utilised as
a way of exploring this space, as shown in more detail in Figure 1.2.
The central area is not completely empty; work that falls into this sec-
tion includes some taxonomies (Dudek et al., 1996; Gerkey and Matari c, 2004;
Lau and Zhang, 2003) that seek to generalise from specic problems, as well
as attempts that start from the theoretical end, e.g. Wooldridge (2002) and
Ehrentreich (2007). These eorts can be visualised as a slow vertical creep
from both the lower and upper clusters, in the hope that they will eventually
meet in the middle. The sparsity of the central zone implies that we still don't
really know how to construct a good multi-agent system for a specic prob-
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lem. The vast majority of currently constructed systems appear to be based on
what the designers know, which intuitive approaches are naturally suggested
by the problem, what is currently fashionable, and what is readily fundable.
This approach does not contribute as much as it could to developing a prin-
cipled design methodology. However, a design methodology for such a large
and diverse problem space can not be developed overnight; instead it must be
preceded by diligent mapping of relationships between problems and solutions,
and other closely related problems and solutions. This map forms a necessary
rst step towards the design methodologies that we need.
1.2.1 The design process
In designing a task allocation process for a distributed satellite system a portion
of the space in Figure 1.1 needs to be traversed, as represented by the marked
arrow. Figure 1.2 displays an abstraction of the process in more detail. An
initial model is constructed by drawing on available theory (e.g., social models
of task allocation, theory of auctions, etc.).
This model is general and can be applied to a number of related problems
in the eld. The design process involves rening it by focusing in on a specic
problem | we take into account successively more detailed constraints and
commit to favoured design decisions at each stage. If we traverse Figure 1.2
from bottom to top, the breadth of our coverage narrows and we see that whole
families of systems are progressively eliminated from our consideration. If we
were to follow any one of these branches, we would reach a dierent point in
problem space. One of the outcomes of this approach is thus an emergent
taxonomy of closely related problems and suitable solutions.
The targeted problem of task allocation in distributed satellite systems is
very much a point on the specic side of this spectrum. I believe a signi-
cant contribution can be made to the sparsely populated space in the middle
of Figure 1.1 by the design process outlined above. Even though this thesis
works up to a specic application, the contribution of signicance to the wider
community is through exploring a problem space.
1.3 Objectives and overview
In the discussion thus far, I have identied the two major objectives of this
thesis, namely:
1. to develop a market-based task allocation solution for managing a dis-
tributed satellite system
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Abstract model
Target
Application
Design decision 1
Design decision 2
Design decision 3
Constraint 1
Constraint 2
Constraint 3
Related
Application 1
Related
Application 2
Figure 1.2: The design process can provide an emergent taxonomy of related
problems. As we rene a general model to be more specically applicable, we
make design decisions and take constraints into account. These branches can
lead to dierent, but related points in the problem space.
2. to position my specic solution in a larger problem space describing the
allocation of complex tasks in dynamic environments with costly commu-
nication.
The rst objective is primarily a design and engineering problem, but I believe
the design process can be used to help bridge the gap between our abstract
models of task allocation and the numerous applications where it is required
| this will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. We can now proceed to
a detailed discussion of how these objectives are met.
In Chapter 2, I explore the background literature relevant to this study.
An overview of the current state of distributed satellite systems is followed
by a discussion of task allocation in multi-agent systems. An important point
noted in this chapter is that work on task allocation in systems consisting of
multiple interacting agents seems to fall in either the abstract or specic camps
in Figure 1.1, with relatively little work falling between them. Completing my
second objective above is synonymous with providing analyses at intermediate
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levels of abstraction.
The specic design problem, namely task allocation in a multi-satellite sys-
tem, is addressed in Chapter 3. I develop a reference mission which allows us
to clearly identify the constraints on the system and the requirements for the
task allocation mechanism. An abstracted model of a human labour market
is used to develop an allocation model. This model is then mapped back to
the satellite problem, to dene the market-based allocation model that is used
extensively throughout the rest of the thesis.
The behaviour of the market-based model is explored in more detail in
Chapter 4. By working through the allocation process and testing it on simpli-
ed problems, we verify that the system is indeed well-suited to the problem at
hand. The simplicity of the scenarios tested facilitates understanding of how
and why this approach is successful.
The subsequent three chapters are all concerned with what happens when
we change major parameters in the system. This realises the methodological
approach explained in Section 1.2.1. Essentially, what I am working towards is
a characterisation of which parts of a solution could stay constant and which
parts would have to change as we move along various axes in problem space.
Specically, Chapter 5 describes the process used to nd the space where
decentralised market-based control should be preferred above using a central
allocator, and vice versa. It is widely assumed that centralised allocation is
better suited to small systems, while distributed approaches make more sense
in large systems. Distributed satellite systems, however, fall between these two
extremes, with neither approach obviously superior. In this chapter I explore
this grey area by using an analytical description of the task allocation cost in
combination with simulation. The focus is not on proving the market-based
task allocation approach absolutely superior, but rather to acknowledge that
dierent approaches are required for dierent regions in the problem space.
The role of network topology is investigated in more detail in Chapter 6, as
it has a signicant impact on task allocation success and the resulting allocation
overhead. I measure the costs associated with dierent spatial topologies. I then
explore the trade-os between connectivity, system performance and energy
costs. The focus then shifts to the satellite domain to develop a mobility model
of a network subject to orbital mechanics. This is used to verify the performance
of the allocation mechanism in a realistic, dynamic environment.
The nal modelling chapter, Chapter 7, addresses the fact that all the mod-
els up to this point have been cooperative. This is in contrast to real-world
markets, where agents are self-interested. I therefore compare the performance
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of the proposed task allocation mechanism against allocation in a competitive
market. This requires the development of an autonomous trading agent for
single-sided auctions in distributed markets with limited information. Experi-
ments show that the positive feedback integral to a competitive market results
in a worse allocation, especially for sparsely-connected communication topolo-
gies.
Chapter 8 reviews the results of the modelling chapters and considers the
implications for distributed satellite systems in particular, and for multi-agent
systems in general.
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Background
This chapter reviews the background literature applicable to task allocation in
distributed satellite systems. It provides an overview of the related work and
motivates the methodology employed, but most importantly it serves to arm
the relevance of the primary objectives of this thesis. Firstly, the allocation of
labour in distributed satellite systems is a real problem that needs addressing:
traditional approaches to control as generally used in spacecraft engineering
fall short for various reasons. Secondly, it illuminates a serious shortcoming in
the literature relevant to task allocation in multi-agent systems, namely that
very little work bridges the gap between the general theories relevant to task
allocation and the specic application examples: we still don't really know
how to construct these systems. I propose using the design process of a task
allocation mechanism to help connect these extremities.
The discussion starts with literature directly relating to satellite technology
to identify the constraints of the problem. It then moves on to a discussion
of multi-agent systems, positioning this thesis as using a multi-agent paradigm
to address a problem. A market-based approach to task allocation appears
very well suited to the specics of the situation. The chapter concludes with a
discussion of the state of task allocation as a eld, identifying the shortcomings
we are currently facing.
2.1 Distributed satellite systems
Since the launch of Sputnik in 1957 spacecraft sizes have been pushed up by
steadily increasing requirements. This has been accompanied by a correspond-
ing increase in development time, complexity, risk and cost (Barnhart et al.,
2007). To escape this trend, a drastic shift in mindset is required: instead of
treating a spacecraft as a monolithic structure, we can split it into a group of
smaller, simpler and less expensive satellites that collaborate to achieve mission
objectives. The advantages oered by such a conguration include improve-
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ments in performance, cost and survivability when compared to missions that
use single satellites (Brown and Eremenko, 2006).
2.1.1 Types of distributed satellites
Shaw (1999) denes the term distributed satellite system to be a system of many
satellites designed to perform a specic function in a coordinated way. This
includes several dierent types of mission congurations. \Distributed satellite
systems"(Bridges and Vladimirova, 2008) can be used as an umbrella term for
all of them, including:
Formation ight: Keeping spacecraft ying together with high accuracy, for
example as required for synthetic aperture radar applications (Mueller
and Thomas, 2005; Thanapalan and Veres, 2005; Ferguson and How,
2003).
Satellite clusters: Spacecraft that y together in loose proximity to collabo-
rate on a mission (Lee et al., 2005). The exact position of the spacecraft
is not critical, but the individual spacecraft all contribute to the mission.
Fractionated spacecraft: The subsystems of a spacecraft are divided into
separate craft. These units have limited, but specialised capabilities, but
by cooperating can they perform as a single \virtual spacecraft" (Brown
and Eremenko, 2006).
The dening characteristic of all these systems is the use of multiple, interacting
satellites to satisfy a global demand. As soon as the satellites become inter-
dependent, the problem of task allocation in the multi-satellite environment
needs to be addressed.
2.1.2 Missions
TechSat-21 was a U.S. Air Force program that aimed to investigate the bene-
ts of a distributed satellite system. By distributing functionality over system
components, it was hoped to reduce costs and increase reliability. The pri-
mary mission objective was space-based radar, moving target indication and
geo-location (Burns et al., 2000; Chien et al., 2002). The program was can-
celled when funding was stopped. As part of the research, the \ObjectAgent"
infrastructure for distributed ight software was developed. Control is divided
in a hierarchy of agents, with increasing intelligence for higher level agents. The
agents exert centralised control over their respective domains; for example task
allocation, formation ight or sensing decisions. Redundant instances of agents,
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which are maintained on other spacecraft, are activated in case of component
failure (Mueller and Brito, 2003; Schetter et al., 2000; Zetocha et al., 2000).
DARPA's System F6 program | Future, Fast, Flexible, Free-Flying, Frac-
tionated Spacecraft united by Information eXchange | serves to demonstrate
the technological and paradigmatic aspects of the responsive nature of frac-
tionated satellites. In a fractionated satellite the functional components of a
monolithic satellite, such as payload, power systems, data processing, com-
munication, etc., are separated onto free-ying spacecraft. These component
spacecraft have to share resources transparently to appear functionally equiv-
alent to the original design. The use of heterogeneous, interacting spacecraft
modules makes management of the system signicantly more complex than
the relatively simple TechSat-21 mission. This should provide mission exibil-
ity and responsiveness, as well as further improvements in robustness (Brown
et al., 2006).
The available information indicates that the System F6 program is pursu-
ing a networking model similar to that of the internet, with high power and
high bandwidth connections between satellites, which will greatly simplify the
control strategy (DARPA, 2010; Lobosco et al., 2008). Although System F6
is extremely promising as a potentially disruptive technology that can change
the face of the space industry in years to come, its strong focus on the benets
of fractionation itself appears to overshadow consideration of the advantages
that collaborating spacecraft can provide. The relatively generous capabilities
of the rst generation of spacecraft might lead to a management strategy that
limits its relevance to smaller spacecraft.
Bekey (2005) proposes the use of 1000 to 100000 free-ying pico-satellites
to form a radiometry antenna in geostationary orbit. A central receiver satel-
lite serves as a communication link to the ground. The control issues created
by the satellites are not explicitly addressed, but the design implies minimal
intelligence and decision-making on the part of the pico-satellites.
The von Karman Institute for Fluid Dynamics has initiated the QB50
project, an international network of 50 pico-satellites for multi-point measure-
ments of the thermosphere (QB50, 2010). The three to six month duration
makes the use of traditional spacecraft prohibitively expensive, instead they
plan to use the low-cost CubeSat platform (Heidt et al., 2000). A single Cube-
Sat has limited capabilities due to its small size (10 cm x 10 cm x 10 cm),
however, by equipping a group of satellites with identical sensors, they can still
be used for scientic purposes. The reliability of individual satellites is not a
critical concern, due to the large number deployed.
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2.1.3 Systems engineering
A major challenge is raised by these systems: how should we go about designing
them? Some attempts have been made in this direction, but in my mind the
matter yet is to be satisfactorily addressed. Part of the problem, I believe, is
that we still have not decided how the component satellites should interact.
Jilla (2002) investigates a systems engineering approach that can be applied
to distributed spacecraft systems. A large parameter space needs to be searched
to nd a good solution; this makes enumeration and analysis impractical, and
multi-objective heuristics are used instead. This provides design teams with a
tool that can identify the most promising areas of the design trade space. Al-
though not explicitly addressing task allocation, the team composition question
covered here is important to my work.
An alternative view, suggested by Shaw (1999), is to treat the group of
satellites as an information network: all satellites are essentially involved in
collecting, processing and publishing of information. By analysing the system
in terms of the information ow, cost metrics can be developed. These metrics
provide a valuable tool for engineering these types of space systems. This
view shares some similarities with the task allocation approach suggested in
chapter 3, although my focus is more on energy consumption: all spacecraft
are networked individuals that process information.
2.1.4 Task allocation
A limited amount of literature exists that deals explicitly with task allocation in
a distributed satellite system. One example is the stigmergy-based task man-
agement system proposed by Tripp and Palmer (2010). The ground station
publishes a number of tasks to all satellites in the system, they then select
which ones to execute based on their own workload, the tasks that had been
earmarked by other satellites for execution, and the tasks that had been ex-
ecuted in duplication during the previous round. No direct communication
exists between the satellites, but they all need to interface to the ground sta-
tion. This approach results in a performance trade-o between decreasing the
duplicate execution of tasks and minimising the response time. The weighting
of these factors can however be changed rapidly while the system is online, to
respond to changing mission objectives. The ad-hoc task allocation also makes
the system robust to satellites joining or leaving the group. The authors argue
against the use of negotiation-based allocation mechanisms on the grounds that
the communication cost of negotiation is too high. I will show in chapters 3
and 5 that this is not necessarily true. Despite the potential of this approach it
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falls short in a number of ways, some of which will be addressed in this thesis.
The question of increasing the number of spacecraft in the system is, in my
opinion, only partially addressed. Although the authors suggest the use of a
hierarchy of spacecraft to cope with scaling, the behaviour of the allocation ap-
proach in systems with more than 18 agents is not demonstrated. In addition,
the spacecraft considered were fairly homogeneous: variation in individual be-
haviour was allowed, but the capabilities of the spacecraft were the same. Tasks
have dierent priorities, but are not constrained in where they are executed.
These aspects will be addressed more completely in this thesis.
The work of Si-wei et al. (2010) is also relevant, although limited information
is available: they present an extension of the contract net protocol (Smith, 1980)
for managing the behaviour of observation satellites. The bids are calculated to
take the available resources (energy, memory, abilities) and task characteristics
into account. To decrease communication cost, auction announcements are
only propagated to a subset of the satellites in the system. Allocation success
is demonstrated through simulation in a system consisting of seven satellites.
The use of a market-like mechanism appears well-suited to task allocation in
these systems, as discussed in section 2.4. However, the contribution made
by this paper is limited: the implementation overlooks a number of potential
problems such as local communication and true scalability.
2.1.5 Formation ight and control
In contrast to the relative absence of work on task allocation, the formation
ight and control problems have received signicant attention. Wu et al. (2008)
use a multi-objective evolutionary algorithm to develop a routing scheme that
minimises signal delay and transmission power for communication between
satellites. It requires global knowledge of the system and is computationally ex-
pensive, limiting the responsiveness of the actual formation. Fully distributed
formation ight has been described by Pinciroli et al. (2008), where an arti-
cial potential eld is used to align satellites to a lattice. It achieves autonomy,
robustness and scalability by using a bottom-up approach. Self-organisation
has also been proposed in the in-orbit assembly of large structures (Ayre et al.,
2005; Izzo et al., 2005). None of the above work explicitly addresses task allo-
cation.
Mueller and Thomas (2005) use a multi-team framework for distributed
satellite cluster control. The cluster is divided into a hierarchical team struc-
ture as a compromise between fully centralised and decentralised approaches,
to decrease communication cost. Formation ight is managed in a distributed
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fashion using team level information instead of an accurate global state. For-
mation changes are handled by transmitting the desired state to all spacecraft
using the hierarchical structure. They reply with a cost vector that relates
to the remaining fuel percentage: the best assignment is determined by the
top-level node. However, team formation is not discussed (it is apparently con-
sidered static), nor is the control architecture applied to anything more than
formation ight | the payload functions of satellites are not considered.
2.1.6 Miniaturisation
The technologies used in construction of satellites determine the capabilities
of the resulting system. In recent years the use of products and processes de-
veloped for the consumer market in small satellites has increased dramatically.
Miniaturisation and integration of components decrease costs and reduce the
satellite mass (Vladimirova et al., 2006). This reduction in cost makes these
access to space much more aordable and accessible for small companies, ed-
ucational institutions and developing countries (Sweeting, 1992). Spacecraft
with a mass below 5kg have therefore become a realistic and much researched
goal | the extreme case of a satellite designed to be etched on a silicon wafer
is presented in Barnhart et al. (2007).
The capabilities of these satellites are necessarily more modest than those
of their larger cousins, both in terms of the mission possibilities and satellite
reliability. However, if these satellites are utilised in the distributed satellite
paradigm, they can also ll commercial and scientic niches, complementing
existing monolithic satellites (Barnhart et al., 2007). Currently, miniature
satellites serve as valuable educational tools: the low cost and relative simplic-
ity of a smaller spacecraft allow universities to expose students to the entire
spacecraft design cycle. For example, several universities have used CubeSats
as part of their curricula (Heidt et al., 2000). The low development and launch
costs of these satellites have also made them attractive as testbeds for ight-
testing new technologies and components without endangering high-value mis-
sions, as in the case of the QB50 mission described above, or as discussed by
Vladimirova et al. (2006).
However, the whole system does not scale equally well: power remains a
signicant concern. Batteries are still heavy and relatively bulky, and with
decreasing surface area the availability of solar energy is also decreased. A
certain transmission power is still required to communicate with the ground
station, especially to download payload data.
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2.1.7 Discussion
The literature conrms that distributed satellite systems have an important
role to play in the space arena. Although the rst steps towards these systems
have already been made, many challenges still remain. While mission design,
orbital dynamics and technological aspects have received some attention, ques-
tions surrounding the management of these systems have not been satisfactorily
addressed, thus conrming the relevance of my previously stated objective of
designing a task allocation mechanism for these systems.
In my opinion, a distributed system that consists of heterogeneous miniature
satellites holds great promise as an aordable paradigm for a signicant segment
of the space market. However, this type of system requires an autonomous,
robust and adaptive management strategy that takes the constraints on the
system into account. Individual spacecraft have limited energy, which limits
their ability to communicate, both in transmission range and data volume.
Because wireless transmission consumes a signicant amount of energy, it can
decrease the ability of the satellite to do useful work. However, it also needs
to communicate as collaboration is key to completing mission objectives. A
successful management strategy will allocate tasks in a manner that balances
these factors.
2.2 Multi-agent systems
In designing a mechanism that can manage such a distributed satellite system,
it may be tempting to focus on the characteristics of the individual satellites:
every one is a complicated electro-mechanical system in itself. While the en-
gineering of the spacecraft undoubtedly matters, I believe the design of the
system of spacecraft is even more important. The communication and interac-
tion between spacecraft to form an autonomous and robust whole is what makes
the distributed approach attractive in the rst place. To design a distributed
satellite system, the design process should be focused on the system, not the
spacecraft.
The paradigm of multi-agents systems (MAS) provides a promising ap-
proach to constructing such a system: we dene the interactions between agents
to achieve a global behaviour. Before rushing to the task allocation problem, I
would like to rst situate it in a space populated by related systems. I rstly
show that task allocation is a very general problem encountered in a number of
natural systems: it should not be seen as conned to the technical realm, nor
should it be associated with a particular application. Despite these systems
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being apparently unrelated, the task allocation problems encountered are rec-
ognizably similar to that faced in a distributed satellite system. I then proceed
by classifying the multi-agent research area into three distinct directions, each
driven by a dierent motivation. Task allocation in distributed satellite systems
falls rmly into the segment interested in problem solving, but the overlap with
the subject matter in the other areas lend them some relevance.
2.2.1 A broad view
To encourage a system level view of the task allocation problem, I briey discuss
three systems that accomplish it. Despite dierences in function and organi-
sation, they all consist of a number of individuals, interacting with each other
and their environment, much like a distributed satellite system. These examples
come from biological and social systems; their variety illustrates the diversity
in possible solutions, ranging from highly decentralised control to strongly hi-
erarchical command structures.
In all of these systems task allocation is woven into the functioning of the
system. We are particularly interested in the structure and communication
mechanisms that allow these systems operate successfully. All of them have
evolved in response to specic environmental stimuli and the associated coordi-
nation problems. I deliberately chose non-technical systems to discuss here, to
place the focus on task allocation as a problem that is frequently encountered
in a variety of scenarios.
2.2.1.1 Social insects
Social insects, such as ants, termites and bees, present examples of societies that
are organised in a fully distributed manner, but manage to forage, reproduce
and survive, despite the lack of a single coordinator. Individuals interact locally,
based on local information, with complex group-level behaviour emerging at
a higher level. The colony as a whole can be viewed as a superorgansim: an
individual in its own right with survival and information processing capabilities
far exceeding that of its constituent parts (Oster and Wilson, 1979; Wilson and
Sober, 1989).
Individuals display morphological dierentiation into castes, which each
caste fullling a specic role in the community. We also nd task allocation
within castes, where specic members full roles of varying complexity. An-
derson (2001) divided these into individual tasks, where an individual operates
alone; group tasks, where everyone is doing the same; team tasks, with distinct
subtasks that must be completed concurrently; and partitioned tasks, when
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subtasks must be completed concurrently. Communication is predominantly
local by using pheromone-based stigmergy, although more complex signalling
with higher informational content is also used, e.g., the waggle dance of honey
bees (De Marco and Menzel, 2005).
2.2.1.2 Markets
Markets allow buyers and sellers to exchange goods, labour and services. As
human society increased in complexity, with higher population densities and
better communication, markets have developed from physical places into a wide
variety of more abstract exchange structures. Some traditional mechanisms
such as Dutch ower auctions were retained, but we now also have markets that
are decoupled from physical goods and a physical location: modern derivative
markets, for example (Slater and Tonkiss, 2001). The properties of specic
markets are determined by the goods they trade and the communication and
transport connections between the traders. The market can be regarded as
\calculating" the allocation: for some problems and markets, optimal allocation
is possible. Markets encourage specialisation: by focusing on doing something
well, an individual can increase his returns. Economic agents in the system
therefore form a network of interdependencies, where everyone is reliant on the
other agents in the system.
Individuals are self-interested as they trade to primarily serve their own
needs, but this still results in an ecient global allocation of resources. If
unsatised demand exists in the market, a supplier will rise to provide it. This
lack of central control results in an extremely scalable system.
Money is a key enabler in this system. It facilitates exchange by being
highly substitutable, provides a standard for expressing value and allows for
storage of wealth. Additionally, through prices, it provides a level of infor-
mational abstraction between consumers and the chain of production (Cagan,
1958; Brunner and Meltzer, 1971). The abstraction allows us to, for example,
buy a cup of tea without having to take into account the long chain of suppli-
ers, from the tea plantation in India, through various intermediate agents that
provide shipping and packaging, to local retailers. All we do is decide whether
our valuation of a cup of tea is more than the asking price. By buying it we
then increase our personal utilities.
2.2.1.3 Military organisations
Organisations exhibit a wide variety of dierent forms of organisation, I focus on
military organisations because they are the polar opposite of the self-organising
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systems described above. Classical military command and control structures
generally display a strongly hierarchical topology. This structure relies on in-
stitutional authority, where one party perceives his or her relationship with
another to be institutionally established, where the appropriate interaction is
based on obedience. Information is transmitted to a central point (a higher
ranking ocer), where it is combined with other information to make deci-
sions which in turn ow down the hierarchy for execution. Filtered information
is passed higher up the tree | the highest-level individual therefore has an
overview of the system, without having to cope with the large amounts of data
generated all over the organisation. To allow this abstraction, the lower-level
individuals are treated as being functionally equivalent and therefore largely
substitutable. The motivation behind this structure is to allow the deployment
of a vast number of units, while still maintaining the associated supply and
command chains.
Of course, this structure assumes good communication channels exist be-
tween the dierent levels of the hierarchy, even when units are spatially sepa-
rated. In fact, units with higher autonomy, such as special operations or guerilla
forces, usually operate in scenarios where communication is dicult or unreli-
able. To improve the reliability of the system, a line of succession is established
to maintain a command structure. If a high-level individual is killed or other-
wise prevented from making decisions, one of a predened series of successors
assumes authority (Coakley, 1992).
2.2.2 Directions in multi-agent research
The above systems can all be regarded as multi-agent systems in the broadest
sense of the term: they consist of multiple agents that interact to form a greater
whole. A narrower denition of multi-agent systems is however more frequently
used, a denition that refers to the research eld in computer science that arose
from distributed articial intelligence.
The concept of an agent is fundamental to this eld. As the name sug-
gests, the concept of agency is central, but a universally acceptable denition
is still under debate. The denition suggested by Wooldridge (2002, p.31) in
his introduction to the eld provides a useful starting point:
\[an agent is] a computer system that is situated in some environ-
ment, and that is capable of autonomous action in this environment
in order to meet its design objectives."
The most literal interpretation of a multi-agent system is therefore a system of
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such agents, interacting with each other and their environment. I will be using
this denition throughout the rest of the thesis when referring to a multi-agent
system.
Although it grew from an articial intelligence (AI) base, the wide scope
of the eld has also drawn researchers from the economics, distributed com-
puting, biology, political science and sociology communities, amongst others.
They brought with them a number of dierent perspectives on how multi-agent
systems can be utilised | e.g. Axelrod (2006) describes how agent-based mod-
elling builds bridges between dierent elds, with reference to his work on the
evolution of cooperation. While the dierent backgrounds provide a rich set of
ideas, they have also introduced some confusion: the objectives of multi-agent
systems for one research application are not necessarily the same as for another.
To address this, I have divided work in the eld into three segments, accord-
ing to the motivation behind the research: intelligent agents, problem solving,
and agent-based modelling. These divisions are not exclusive, instead a large
amount of overlap exists between them. This thesis falls into the category
of problem solving, but some the work in the other segments is nonetheless
relevant.
2.2.2.1 Intelligent agents
At the time of writing, intelligent agents probably represents the most visible
portion of multi-agent systems research. The interest here lies in the intrinsic
properties of the agents themselves: how to manage with limited information,
how to force agents to be truthful, and how to respond to dierent environ-
mental signals. These agents are seen as representatives for their human owner,
and need to make similar decisions for them. When viewed in this manner, it
seems like a natural extension of traditional articial intelligence research. A
fundamental assumption is that agents are self-interested, as introduced in the
seminal paper by Rosenschein and Genesereth (1985). This leads to a research
perspective that seeks to maximise the personal utility of a specic agent in a
multi-agent setting. The selsh nature of agents means game-theoretical ap-
proaches have been widely used to model and control the behaviour of agents.
Game theory has therefore become the dominant tool in this area; however, the
computational complexity of resolving large, multi-agent games can limit the
tractability of game-theoretic approaches.
The variety of multi-agent scenarios makes direct comparison of the dierent
agent strategies and implementations hard. The Trading Agents Competition
(TAC) (Wellman et al., 2003) presents a common ground for comparing agent
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performances. Having a published problem coordinates research eort and
provides a common metric for measuring performance. The classical variant of
TAC involves a travel shopping game, where traders combine ights, accom-
modation and entertainment into packaged trips for probabilistically generated
clients. The agents' objective is to maximise the value of each trip. The re-
spective goods categories are traded in separate auctions through the day.
A wide range of agents have been developed, varying greatly in complexity
and specialisation. On the relatively simple end of the spectrum, we nd agents
which result in realistic system dynamics, but with understandable interactions
| these types of agents therefore frequently also appear in agent-based mod-
elling work (Cli and Bruten, 1998; Gjerstad and Dickhaut, 1998; Bagnall and
Toft, 2004). More complicated agents usually have strategies that are tailored
to specic scenarios, e.g., Gerding et al. (2007); Niu et al. (2008).
A more complete introduction to agent architectures is given in Wooldridge
(2002) and Shoham and Leyton-Brown (2008), while Kraus (2001) provides a
useful overview of dierent negotiation approaches.
2.2.2.2 Problem solving
An alternative approach to multi-agent scenarios is more interested in the ways
such a system could be used to address specic problems. In this approach the
functions of the individuals in the system do not interest the researcher as much
as their combined eect: it is the group-level behaviour that is the ultimate
measure of success.
In situations where the individuals cannot be fully controlled or trusted,
incentive-based approaches such as mechanism design (Hurwicz, 1973) can be
employed. This has been applied to real world problems, for example to de-
crease carbon dioxide emissions (Ellerman and Buchner, 2007). The diculty
in doing it well is perhaps best illustrated by the auctions for wireless spectrum
licences, where governments wanted to maximise revenue. The allocation of 3G
licences in the United Kingdom was very successful (Binmore and Klemperer,
2002), while a similar auction for spectrum in Europe had a much smaller rev-
enue (Klemperer, 2002). The same principles have been used in markets of
electronic agents to encourage selsh agents to behave in a predictable manner,
primarily by incentivising truthfulness. However, the design of such mecha-
nisms remains an apparently delicate art, in many cases relying on assump-
tions such as individual rationality and complete information to succeed. In
some cases mechanism design is denitely needed to help order an otherwise
uncontrollable system, although in situations where the designer can control all
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functions a more direct approach to control is frequently sucient.
A variant of the Trading Agent Competition Mechanism Design Tournament
focuses on market design. It is named CAT: an abbreviation for catallactics,
the science of economic exchange (Cai et al., 2009), and also the inverse of TAC
(the Trading Agents Competition). The tournament organisers provide a set of
traders that interact through a number of markets entered by competitors. The
traders decide in which markets they want to trade depending on the market
characteristics such as fees, pricing and clearing policy. The observations of the
2007 tournament are discussed in Niu et al. (2008).
In many technological systems the system designer is in the unique position
of being able to specify the behaviour of agents in the system. Although less
open than the systems described above, such systems are frequently easier to
manage. These agents can be seen as benevolent: although they may be self-
interested, they are as honest as the designer wants them to be, reveal as much
information as desired, and they follow the rules stipulated by the designer.
Of course, some independence is required to deal with the environment and
unforeseen events, such as failures, but the agents do not actively work against
the system designer. These systems can be managed using similar tools to
the open systems above (e.g., Rogers et al., 2004), but have also inherited the
legacy of distributed AI and distributed computing systems.
I believe the task allocation problem for distributed satellite systems can be
successfully addressed using the latter approach: a multi-agent system, where
nodes are autonomous and make selsh decisions, but work towards an im-
proved system state. Distributed task allocation is discussed in more detail
in section 2.4. Multi-agent systems as an approach to problem solving has
also been applied to coordination of robots, coordination of wireless sensor net-
works, routing in telecommunication networks, process control (Voos and Litz,
2000), as well as operations research. Some the more relevant applications are
presented in Section 2.5.
2.2.2.3 Agent-based modelling
The third component of research on multi-agent systems uses it as a tool to bet-
ter understand complex interactions in real-world systems. Researchers from
social systems (Moss, 2001; Gilbert, 2004), economics (Krugman, 1996; Tesfat-
sion, 2002) and biology (Emonet et al., 2005) are using simulated models to
test hypotheses and explore system-level behaviour.
One example of work in this area is the famous iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
contest run by Axelrod and Hamilton (1981). The contest sought to under-
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stand how cooperation can arise in biological systems, between apparently self-
interested agents. Researchers from a number of elds submitted agents with
strategies that were pitted against each other.
In a broader sense, Gilbert (2004) argues for the use of agent-based mod-
els to simulate, investigate and understand complex social phenomena. Moss
(2001) similarly believes that agent-based models allow us to capture the source
of the properties observed at system level, unlike game-theoretical approaches
that primarily model these properties. Bedau (1997) makes probably the
strongest claim about multi-agent simulation: it is a necessary tool if we want to
study emergent system characteristics, as traditional mathematical or empirical
tools cannot be successfully employed. Agent-based models allow a construc-
tive approach to systems | instead of describing the behaviour of the system in
terms of abstract equations, low-level interactions between agents are dened
which lead to emergent global eects.
The work of systems modellers is of relevance primarily because it conrms
that man-made systems can exhibit desirable macro-level characteristics. In the
case of distributed satellite systems, we are particularly interested in robustness,
self-organisation and scalability. This also suggests that designing complex
technological systems requires simulation as part of the design process, to test
and understand the interdependencies between dierent components.
2.3 Decentralised task allocation
Task allocation is the process whereby a job is assigned to a particular agent
for execution. The challenge lies in matching the right agent to the right job,
to maximise global system performance.
The literature relating to decentralised task allocation spans several dierent
disciplines: multi-robot coordination, distributed computing, wireless sensor
networks, and operations research. The history and constraints of these elds
have largely determined the approaches followed. Task allocation in satellite
networks shares this problem space: in surveying the related work, I have
focused on the similarities and dierences between the systems.
A few attempts at classifying this space have been made, but usually these
are eld specic. Casavant and Kuhl (1988) composed a hierarchical struc-
ture of scheduling in distributed computing systems, while Dudek et al. (1996)
classied according to the architecture of multi-robot systems (e.g., communica-
tion topology, team structure, and team organisation). Seuken and Zilberstein
(2008) analysed ve dierent formal frameworks to sequential decision mak-
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ing for distributed cooperative agents in decentralised problems, with an in
depth discussion of the performance and complexity of dierent optimal and
approximate techniques. I found the taxonomy of the underlying problems of
multi-robot task allocation by Gerkey and Matari c (2004) to be most aligned
with my objectives. They dened the following three axes:
Single-task vs multi-task agents: Agents can execute a single or multiple
tasks simultaneously.
Single-agent vs multi-agent tasks: Some tasks can be completed by one
agent, while others need multiple agents.
Instantaneous vs time-extended assignment: Instantaneous assignment per-
mits only instantaneous allocation of tasks, with no information about the
future. In time-extended allocation more information is available, such
as the distribution of future tasks or the set of all possible tasks.
These dimensions are satisfactory for multi-robot systems, but in reviewing the
literature I found the following additional parameters to be useful in describing
the more general problem space of task allocation in multi-agent systems.
Communication cost: In some networks bandwidth is eectively unlimited,
which makes communication costs negligible, while in others communi-
cating more than is necessary decreases system utility. The cost of trans-
mitting information therefore determines the amount and accuracy of
available information.
Group size: The number of agents in the group and the granularity with
which it is viewed determine the rules and behaviour that apply: there
is a non-linear relationship between the size and the laws that dominate
in a group, as argued elegantly by Anderson (1972). A small group (less
than ten agents) can feasibly be controlled either individually, or using
centralised control; neither of which will work for a large group (in the
hundreds to thousands range). The space in-between is an area where the
appropriate control mechanism can be contested.
Agent heterogeneity: Diversity in agent types allows role specialisation, while
homogeneous agents typically have greater redundancy. Heterogeneity
complicates the abstraction process because the specic properties of in-
dividuals must be taken into account when making decisions, which in-
creases the information content of the system.
252. Background
Distributed satellite systems span a portion of this space. The majority of
missions will involve single-task agents, with tasks requiring multiple agents to
complete (either consecutively or concurrently). In some cases task assignment
can be regarded as time-extended in the sense of Gerkey and Matari c (2004).
However, the exibility allowed by the distributed satellite paradigm suggest
tasks will often be handled using instantaneous assignment, because the de-
tails of future tasks are unknown and roles may change at any time due to
component failure or changing mission objectives. For most applications, com-
munication costs will be high due to the power it requires. Initially group sizes
will be moderate, in the range of tens to hundreds, although massive systems
have also been proposed (e.g. Bekey, 2005). The component spacecraft will be
heterogeneous, but with some redundancy.
2.4 Market-based control
Market-based mechanisms provide an attractive set of tools for controlling task
allocation in multi-agent systems. Note, however, that a market-based ap-
proach to task allocation is just one option from a number of possibilities: co-
ordination using scheduling algorithms (Casavant and Kuhl, 1988), distributed
constraint optimisation (Modi et al., 2006) and coalition formation (Shehory
and Kraus, 1998), amongst others, all have a role to play in dierent scenarios.
My decision to focus on markets is motivated by their relevance to complex
systems, as well as my interest in developing socially-inspired approaches to
computing problems. In this section I provide an overview of market-based
control, and motivate why it is well suited to address task allocation in dis-
tributed satellite systems.
Markets and prices allow modern economies to allocate resources between
competing users (Begg, 2005, Chapter 1). Self-interested users trade labour
and resources to maximise their own gains, which simultaneously result in an
ecient global distribution of goods. In recent years researchers have started
to apply these principles to the control of multi-agent systems (Clearwater,
1996). By using an articial currency, the relative value of resources and tasks
in the network can be established to nd the best allocation. The market can
be regarded as calculating the allocation: for some problems and markets, the-
ory indicates that optimal allocation is possible. If we construct a market in
this manner, from the bottom up, it ts happily into the multi-agent systems
paradigm. It is closely related to agent-based computational economics and
automated trading, and requires use of knowledge from both disciplines (Tes-
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fatsion, 2002). Cli and Bruten (1999) argue that these market-driven systems
display collective social adaptive behaviour, allowing autonomous adaptation
to a dynamic environment.
Kraus (2001) reviews game-theory and economics-based techniques used in
automated decision making and in negotiation for multi-agent systems. The
taxonomy by Gerkey and Matari c (2004) also deals with some aspects of market-
based task assignment, comparing it with combinatorial optimisation. Dias
et al. (2006) evaluated the status of market-based control, specically for multi-
robot systems. They dene market-based coordination in multi-agent systems
as having the following characteristics:
 The group has an objective that can be subdivided and spread between
components. The units in the group have a limited set of resources that
can be used to address the problem.
 A global objective function describes the system's behaviour and quality
of solution.
 Every agent has an individual utility function, that quanties the gain
(or cost) for executing a certain task. This function can use only local
information, but can take multiple factors into account, some representing
the cost of task execution, others representing the quality of the result.
 A mapping exists from the individual utility functions to the global ob-
jective function. It denes how individual actions will inuence the global
objective.
 Resources and objectives can be redistributed between agents, using a
cost-based negotiation mechanism, such as an auction. Bids are computed
as a function of individuals' utilities, and allocation is made to the agent
whose bid will maximise the global objective function.
Just as myriad types of human markets have developed, with dierent rules for
dierent applications; so a great variety of market models are used in control.
Although we are interested in articial markets, contributions from mechanism
design and auction theory provide a link to the theoretical basis that validates
the approach.
A major challenge is the denition of individual rules that will lead to
the desired global behaviour. In the case of distributed satellite systems, this
means being sensitive to the capabilities and utilisation of individual nodes,
and minimising energy spent on communication, while still achieving robust
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system-level task throughput. I therefore review related literature with the
objective of identifying the denitions of utility functions and the types of
markets employed, and how this relates to emergent behaviour.
The contract net protocol (Smith, 1980) is a seminal, high-level protocol
for task distribution using a sealed-bid, rst-price auction, which relies on con-
tracts. Tasks are announced in the system, agents place bids with valuations
based on their perceived utility, and the auctioneer node collects bids until the
task can be awarded. Davis and Smith (1983) further explore the use of the
protocol, with application to an area surveillance problem. Although no ex-
plicit economic notions are included in the bidding, the contract net protocol
inspired a signicant amount of work that includes stronger market implemen-
tations. Miller and Drexler (1988) further explored the market-based approach,
with specic emphasis on the computational environment. Wellman (1996) in-
troduced \market-oriented programming", where a computational economy is
used to derive the activities and resource allocations of a set of agents. By
using a framework that allows denition of a market structure and protocols
for deriving price equilibria, it is applied to a multi-commodity ow problem.
The generality of the implementation is attractive, due to the freedom it allows
in exploring the problem space.
Auctions present a particularly compelling type of market for our purposes:
they evolved to allocate goods and labour eciently, and to function well with
limited communication and inaccurate information. The low communication
requirement is demonstrated in sealed-bid auctions, where agents do not know
the value of bids placed by other agents, yet can deduce the equilibrium price
of a commodity over repeated auctions. Gerkey and Matari c (2003) analysed
the communication complexity of sealed-bid auctions, nding that they are
well-suited to applications where communication is expensive, such as space
applications. The extreme case was demonstrated by Blumrosen and Nisan
(2002): the eciency of auctions where only one bit of communication was
allowed was only slightly lower than completely unconstrained auctions. In
contrast to the work in this thesis, communication had no eect on the utility
of agents, nor was topology considered.
The eect of costly bids on the dynamics of sequential English auctions is
analysed in Daniel and Hirshleifer (1999). When bidding is free an incremental
increase in bid values is expected, which results in many bidding rounds before
bidders drop out. This is however at odds with the behaviour of bids in cor-
porate acquisitions, where bidding often proceeds in large jumps, signicantly
decreasing the number of bidding rounds before a winner is found. They as-
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cribe this behaviour to expensive bids, due to the regulatory and administrative
costs associated with corporate deals. If bidding in the auction is treated as
a learning process, with bids as a costly signalling mechanism, an equilibrium
that maximises the rate of learning will economise on bidding.
Babaio et al. (2009) investigated spatially distributed markets. For com-
puterised markets the physical location is irrelevant, but the transferral costs
of moving goods between dierent markets are signicant. They present a wel-
fare maximising mechanism that takes the cost of these transfers into account.
The allocation calculation can be done in polynomial time. Although spatial
distribution is of relevance to my work, this work assumes negotiation is free
and therefore transfer costs and topology are known.
2.4.1 A note on terminology: market-based control
The label market-based control has been used to describe a variety of systems,
ranging from the open-ended markets envisioned by Waldspurger et al. (1992)
and Wellman (1993) to those that rather use markets as a metaphor for decision
making. The former class of systems implement a very real market, where ev-
erything is dened by the negotiation and exchanges between agents. Although
undoubtedly potentially very powerful from self-managing and robustness per-
spectives, the complexity of these systems makes them very hard to control
reliably and predictably. Some, such as Huberman (1988) and Brooks and
Flynn (1989), would argue that the lack of direct control is at least part of
the exibility of these systems. We give up some veriability and optimality
to increase robustness and adaptability. However, this paradigm shift still sits
uneasily with the current engineering establishment.
A more moderate view of market-based control is used in the second group,
where the market serves as inspiration, but the primary concern is still the
control of the system. I believe we can retain some of the attractive character-
istics oered by markets by borrowing the information ow and decision making
mechanisms. By limiting the strategic capabilities of agents and not allowing
prices to oat freely, the volatility of the system can be limited. The market
then serves as a negotiation mechanism: bids are communication messages and
auctions a way of determining allocation. Most importantly, prices and money
provide a way of representing information upon which decisions can be based.
One obvious limitation of this approach is that the system can be susceptible to
exploitation by malicious agents, because the market environment is designed
to be safe. Systems where the designer does not have complete control over the
agents therefore require additional mechanisms to enforce compliance with the
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expected behaviour.
The proposed task allocation approach should be seen as market-based,
therefore falling into the second class of approaches. Although undeniably
inspired by the power of the open market, restricting some of the degrees of
freedom allows for more predictability as required for real-life problems. The
primary aim is to allocate tasks successfully, not to emulate a market accurately.
2.5 Applications
The market-based task allocation work described above relies heavily on the
theoretical grounding oered by economics, using analytical methods and game-
theoretic approaches to understand system behaviour. The literature does,
however, also provide a number of application examples. I will review a few of
the more signicant ones here, in an attempt to identify approaches that can be
of use in the distributed satellite system problem. Note how relatively insular
these are: many acknowledge theoretical work as inspiration, but successful
implementation involves a combination of trail and error, experience and luck.
The characteristics of these applications are compared with a distributed
satellite system in Table 2.1.
2.5.1 Distributed computing
A large body of work exists that deals with the management of distributed
computing systems: high-performance computing (HPC), grid and cloud com-
puting. In these systems a large number of machines must be coordinated to
perform on-demand program execution. The resource availability on dierent
systems varies due to the allocation of tasks, or dissimilar underlying hard-
ware. The denition of optimal allocation varies according to the application:
in grid computing fair resource utilisation is important, while HPC data cen-
tres consider turn-around time and reliability as critical. Although the systems
can consist of a large number of geographically dispersed servers, high speed
communication channels exist between them, which allows more accurate in-
formation for decision making.
The management of such systems has traditionally been based on a queu-
ing theory approach, which assumes a central scheduler (Streit, 2001; Hoves-
tadt et al., 2003). These approaches have been largely successful, due to the
availability of communication and ample processing power. However, as ar-
gued by Bullock and Cli (2004), the increasing complexity of information and
communication technology systems results in the emergence of unpredictable
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system-level behaviour. They claim that complex adaptive systems present a
suitable paradigm for managing these applications.
Chakravarti et al. (2006) proposed the use of a biological metaphor for
coordination: strongly mobile agents colonize under-utilised machines on the
network. The distributed computing system Spawn uses a market to allocate
computing tasks in a heterogeneous network (Waldspurger et al., 1992). The
system self-organises to distribute loads fairly by mapping idle resources into
currency. Another example is Mariposa, a distributed database system that
also uses an economic paradigm to address query execution and storage man-
agement (Stonebraker et al., 1994). Huberman and Hogg (1995) argue that a
computer network can be viewed as a \community of concurrent processes", or
a computational ecology (Huberman, 1988). They further show that local rules
can lead to globally stable allocation behaviour (Hogg and Huberman, 2002).
Robinson (2002) presents the development of a market-based control sys-
tem to manage the workload in a simulated utility data centre. ZIP-trading
agents are used to allocated jobs in a continuous double auction; this achieves
ecient computational load-balance performance under a variety of scenarios.
Evolutionary algorithms are used to tune both the parameters of the individ-
ual agents, and the marketplaces through which they interact. A particularly
relevant feature of this work is the use of distributed markets | interactions be-
tween agents occur on topologically local markets. The topological constraints
are treated as a given, with no explicit mention of communication costs.
Autonomic computing appears to the currently fashionable incarnation of
adaptive, distributed computing. Kephart and Chess (2003) describe the vision
of autonomic computing as consisting of heterogeneous hardware from dierent
vendors, that can congure, pro-actively optimise, heal and protect itself in a
dynamic and unpredictable environment. This would be in contrast to the sta-
tus quo, where conguration and management are time-consuming procedures
requiring detailed knowledge of the other components in the system. The large
number of interdependent but manually-tuned parameters results in fragile sys-
tems that are vulnerable to cascading failures and external attacks. Dierent
approaches to achieving these goals are being explored, including agent-based
approaches (Jacyno et al., 2008; Kota et al., 2009) and heuristics inspired by
nature (Shackleton et al., 2004).
Although much of the work in distributed computing systems incorporates
the characteristics of the underlying infrastructure | such as servers, routers
and a communication network | the problem of distributing jobs and data
is very similar to the task allocation problem in distributed satellite systems.
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The most prominent dierence is the relatively inexpensive communication in
most ICT systems: although bandwidth needs to be considered, the physical
topology of the network has little impact on its operation. The self-management
objective of the autonomic computing community is very relevant to our system,
as are the requirements of robustness and graceful degradation.
2.5.2 Wireless sensor networks
Literature relating to wireless sensor networks (WSNs) constitutes another in-
teresting domain. These networks consist of spatially distributed modules that
cooperatively measure the environment. Each module can sense information,
perform limited processing and relay data to other modules. The accumulated
data from all the nodes in the network provide a system-level view of the envi-
ronment. These networks usually consist of hundreds of sensing nodes, with a
central sink to extract data. Nodes often have a limited power supply, therefore
unnecessary communication shortens the node lifetime and decreases network
performance. Nodes function in dierent ways, depending on their position in
the network. Nodes near the perimeter have a sensing role, while those closer
to the source need to spend a greater proportion of their energy relaying the
measurements of others.
These networks are challenging to manage eciently due to the scale of
the system, the high cost of communication, the frequently unknown topology,
the multiple roles nodes can assume, and node failures | all problems that
are faced by distributed satellite systems too. The main dierences lie in the
information ow in the two systems: for satellites tasks are allocated to specic
individuals, while WSNs frequently rely on group measurements.
In many cases retrieving data is more important than knowing which node
measured it (Jamal and Kamal, 2004). This has led to the adoption of a
data-centric routing protocol by Intanagonwiwat et al. (2003), named directed
diusion. A sensing task or subtask is publicised through the network, specify-
ing the data of interest. This sets up gradients along which measured data ows
back to the sink. Reinforcement is used to select the shortest paths, while data
aggregation (duplicate measurements are not propagated) and in-node process-
ing minimise communication. A negotiation-based routing scheme is presented
in Heinzelman et al. (1999): nodes use meta-data to eliminate the transmis-
sion of redundant data. Rogers et al. (2005) and Rogers et al. (2006) used
mechanism design to balance the conicting needs of data sensing and data
routing in the network. Nodes need to transmit their own data to the sink, but
also spend some of their energy relaying measurements by other nodes. The
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described payment rule rewards the relaying of data from distant nodes, while
still encouraging locally sensed data. This gives a local decision rule that deliv-
ers good results. Hassanein and Luo (2006) improved communication reliability
by taking the remaining energy in nodes into account to prevent depletion, in
eect spreading the routing cost over the ttest nodes. The routing of data in
WSNs is analogous to task allocation in the distributed satellite network, as
the cost of routing needs to be distributed in a way that maximises network
utility. Furthermore, several of the energy optimisation approaches in WSNs
can be useful in satellite applications too (Vladimirova et al., 2008).
2.5.3 Multi-robot control
From a computational point of view, a multi-spacecraft system can be treated
as group of interacting robots that need to be autonomously coordinated. Re-
searchers of distributed robot coordination have extensively drawn on natural
metaphors, with varying levels of sophistication. Garnier et al. (2005) demon-
strated cockroach-like aggregation, while collaborative stick-pulling is discussed
in Lerman (2004). Minimisation of energy expenditure in a foraging task was
investigated by Campo and Dorigo (2007): a multi-foraging strategy was iden-
tied where eciency is dened as a function of energy; robots then base their
behaviour on the expected global energy gain from foraging. Stigmergic com-
munication has also been used in task allocation (Bonabeau et al., 1999). White
and Helferty (2005) applied this to robotic soccer in the RoboCup competition
(Kitano et al., 1998), where robots choose their roles based on environmental
stimuli.
The information that can be extracted from the environment is, however,
limited. Explicit communication is necessary where knowledge of the internal
state of other agents, or the global status of the system, is required. This can
range from relatively simple signalling, such as used by Vaughan et al. (2000) for
resolution of spatial interference, to exchange of a signicant volume of data, for
example in collaborative exploration where partial maps are shared (Konolige
et al., 2006). The use of markets, where robots base their bids on their tness
for a task, lies between these extremes. An articial currency allows robots
to make decisions based on their internal state and global information, which
is encapsulated in a single price gure, while relatively little communication
expenditure is required.
Gerkey and Matari c (2002) used a variant of the contract net protocol
(Smith, 1980) to coordinate embodied agents in \loosely coupled" and box-
pushing tasks. Roles are allocated using an auction, but the communication
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protocol assumes sucient bandwidth to allow ooding of packets. Tasks are
randomly introduced to the system over time and assigned to the ttest robot
available. Zlot et al. (2002) presented the use of a market to manage ecient
exploration of an unknown area: robots compare their own cost of visiting a
waypoint against trading the task with a potentially better situated vehicle.
This is an instance of time-extended assignment, as robots can trade tasks
that need to be completed in the future. Target detection and allocation using
miniature aerial vehicles is presented by Sujit and Beard (2007). A distributed
auction is used to make decisions that take the kinematic and sensing con-
straints of the vehicles into account. In some of the above systems, attempts
at minimizing communication are made. However, in none of them is commu-
nication treated as an expensive resource, as is the case in distributed satellite
systems.
2.5.4 Operations research
Lessons can also be learned from operations research. Human organisations
typically consist of a heterogeneous collection of specialised agents that collab-
orate on larger problems. Communication can be inexpensive in small organi-
sations, but bureaucracy in large organisations or transport costs in physically
distributed systems can become prohibitively expensive. Chang and Harring-
ton (2000) compared centralised and decentralised organisation in retail chains.
They found that centralisation performs best in markets that are relatively ho-
mogeneous, while greater variation favours a decentralised approach because
local adaptation is necessary. Local variations in markets can in turn be as-
cribed to their isolation, either absolutely or due to high communication cost.
System reliability is the result of interaction between policy and investments
in infrastructure: Hsieh (2003) investigated the relationship between hardware
redundancy and optimal task allocation in a distributed computing network by
using a genetic algorithm and local search hybrid. Hardware cost and commu-
nication time are unied in a mathematical cost model, which is then minimised
while taking system reliability into account. Although the exploration of task
allocation, reliability and the system component space has great relevance to
management of a distributed satellite system, the level of abstraction in the
model fails to take many real-world aspects into account, such as allocation
overhead, topology changes, communication delays and imperfect information.
2.5.5 Call routing
Gibney et al. (1999) presented the use of market-based control for routing in
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telecommunication networks. Two sealed-bid auctions are used: slices of band-
width on links between nodes on the network are sold to path agents, while
a path market sells the slices of bandwidth to call agents to connect calls. A
rst-price and Vickrey (second-price) auction are compared to a conventional
static routing algorithm. The rst-price auction performed as well as static
routing, while the Vickrey auction did not show an improvement in eciency
over the rst-price auction. Vickrey auctions were originally introduced to pre-
vent counter speculation between agents, resulting in more ecient auctions
Vickrey (1961). However, as this model shows, in many closed articial sys-
tems Vickrey auctions do not improve eciency and are eectively unnecessary,
because the designer denes the agent strategies.
2.6 The state of task allocation in multi-agent
systems
In the preceding sections I presented the literature that is of relevance to the
task allocation problem. This literature spans a number of elds, because task
allocation is a problem common to many dierent applications. In this section
I would like to take a step back and analyse the shape of the task allocation
landscape and discuss its deciencies. My most important observation is that a
gap currently exists between the work on the theoretical end of the spectrum,
and that dealing with applications: we, in eect, still don't know how to build
these systems. I conclude by arguing that this shortcoming can be partially
addressed by using responsible design practices, thus motivating the second of
my major research objectives.
2.6.1 Where are we?
The vast majority of multi-agent task allocation cases cited above involve spe-
cic problems, for example multi-robot exploration or management of auto-
nomic computing systems. The specic nature of these examples encourages
solutions that deal with the characteristics of these problems. It can therefore
be hard to separate the task allocation component of the solution from the
additional infrastructure that allows it to function correctly.
At the other end of the scale is the portion of literature that deals with
high-level ideas that are more generally applicable. Most of these are derived
from economic theory or operations research, with much stronger mathematical
or theoretical bases. The generality is achieved through abstraction, so in the
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Specific
(Application)
General
(Theoretical)
Engineering
Science
Figure 2.1: Work related to task allocation in multi-agent systems can broadly
divided into two categories: application specic engineering problems (small
dots), and abstract, general theories and proofs (large circles). The space be-
tween these poles is quite empty, apart from some taxonomies and a few at-
tempts at agent design methodologies: we still don't really know how to design
these systems. The work in this thesis traverses a section of this space, as indi-
cated by the blue arrow. This allows the design process to be utilised as a way
of exploring this space, as shown in more detail in Figure 2.2.
process the application level detail is lost. This could be seen as a fair trade-o:
after-all, we need the abstraction to better comprehend the system.
When I initially encountered this apparent wealth of related subject matter,
I was optimistic. Surely, with so many applications and a general theoretic
basis, the design process should be straightforward? However, I soon realised
that a vast gulf exists between the two extremities. For example, we have
elegant abstract models that can tell us much about the ner points of market
design, and we have extremely complex physical systems doing our bidding,
but we have no bridge connecting the two. My initial excitement quickly faded
when I realised that we still have no principled methodology for moving from a
specic problem to a trusted solution.
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This situation is graphically represented in Figure 2.1, reproduced from
Chapter 1. The large number of specic applications is represented using the
small dots at the top of the diagram, while the more general theorems can be
found at the lower end. Distilling the specic examples into something more
general can be seen as science, while movement in the opposite direction can
be described as engineering. The distribution of work is bimodal: we have a
large cluster at the top and another one at the bottom. The centre is, however,
noticeably empty, implying that a severe disconnect exists between the two
poles. I am not the rst to make this observation: Wooldridge (2002, chapter
10) similarly concludes that the existing methodologies for designing agent-
based systems are \rather tentative". The techniques he discusses are largely
derived from current software development methodologies. As such they oer
descriptions of the process, but do not oer any guidance in selecting the \right"
solutions.
We nd ourselves in a situation where applications are \legitimately" de-
veloped without a glance at the theoretical side of things, as many designers
feel the gap is too great to be crossed. Another symptom of the problem is
that even those who would like to build on theoretical principles are faced with
a vast array of general concepts, with no map of which ones are applicable to
their specic problems. This is once again due to the fragmented nature of
our knowledge: we need paths linking the general side to specic applications.
Only by focusing on lling the empty space, can these issues be resolved.
The central area is luckily not completely empty. Over time the work on
either side will slowly grow towards the opposite end, hopefully meeting some-
where in the middle. Some taxonomies already provide an analysis of related
problems, such as the work by Dudek et al. (1996), Matari c et al. (2003) and
Gerkey and Matari c (2004), dealing with their specic domains. The compari-
son of dierent decentralised decision-making processes by Seuken and Zilber-
stein (2008) also falls in this space. A few engineering examples exist that
use a theoretical grounding to design multi-agent systems, as demonstrated
by Rogers et al. (2004), while Ygge and Akkermans (1999) identied the need
for empirical comparison of market-based control and other systems. These
examples are unfortunately few and far between.
2.6.2 How did we get here?
This state of aairs can be ascribed to a combination of a number factors; I
will describe the ones I nd most relevant here.
The argument can be made that we are involved in a young discipline.
382.6. The state of task allocation in multi-agent systems
Computer science is but a few decades old, and multi-agent systems have only
become a realistic prospect in the last twenty years. Operations research, as
a research eld, has only existed since the Second World War. In comparison,
disciplines such as physics and chemistry can lay claim to a coherent narrative
developed over hundreds of years. The central ideas and methods of mature
academic elds were established by a combination of vigorous debate, careful
experimentation and categorisation. In the process core concepts were tested
again and again, and initially promising ideas were disproved and discarded.
While the perimeters of these elds are still contested, the base is sound. Given
this lack of time, it is therefore no wonder that our multi-agent task allocation
knowledge looks pale in comparison. Over time, we will hopefully continue to
ll in the empty parts of the space.
Or will we? I suspect that the modern incarnation of the academic system
also plays an important role in polarising this distribution. The basic problem
lies in the inter-disciplinary nature of the task allocation domain. Those work-
ing on the application end are generally specialists in their respective elds,
where task allocation is but one problem they encounter. These researchers
have little incentive to relate their work to the bigger picture in a disciplined
manner, as this requires a substantial investment of time and eort. In the
meantime it is still expected of them to be experts in their respective elds,
which results in relatively few people exploring the commonalities between dis-
ciplines.
On the general end of the spectrum, task allocation is usually encountered as
a more abstract concept. To enable themselves to generalise, these researchers
avoid the specics. This too is understandable: the returns from having a work-
ing implementation is limited as we cannot use one example to prove a theory
correct. Then there is the time investment to consider: physical systems are not
trivial to implement. In both cases the academic system rewards specialisation
in existing elds; the attractions in becoming a task allocation specialist, with
knowledge of both theory and application, are slim. If the wide variety of goals
of people doing multi-agent research is added to this, then the scenario becomes
even more bleak. (Games such as TAC, CAT and the RoboCup competitions
do oer some relief here by providing a common problem and focusing research
eort, which results in a thorough exploration of a particular area in problem
space.)
Finally, we, the researchers, cannot be absolved of all blame. We are after
all the ones who make up this system. Perhaps we nd it easier to add new
points to the space in Figure 2.1 than we do to order the space, connecting
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the already existing dots? The claim that something is \novel" is after all
much more exciting than saying \the space has been tidied up". It is also often
easier to address a new problem than it is to spend days ordering the existing
literature.
2.6.3 What can be done?
To bridge the gap between the general and the specic, a two stage process
is required. Initially, similar problems and applications need to be identied
and related to each other. Once we have a better idea of problem space, we
can move on to formalise a design methodology. This methodology will allow
system designers to select an approach from the numerous options available.
This is the grand eort towards principled design of multi-agent systems, but
where does my contribution t in? This thesis is concerned with a small part
of the problem space: I can therefore only address problems directly related
to distributed satellite systems. However, this should be done in a way that
contributes to the greater eort. By identifying the similarities and dierences
between systems that are similar, the local problem space can be mapped. At
the same time, the methodological issues of relevance to system designers are
also explored, again with application to distributed satellite systems: how do we
navigate the design decisions as we move from the general to the specic? My
contribution should therefore be seen as one brick in the bridge across the gap
in Figure 2.1 | with sustained eort from the multi-agent research community,
we can develop the understanding and tools required for principled design of
these systems.
I believe that the systemic factors discussed above will continue to inhibit
research in the space between the general and specic ends of the task allocation
spectrum. Some brave individuals might make contributions, but until a critical
mass is reached in the central area, the vast majority of work will still be focused
at either end. Things may improve over time, but this shouldn't stop us from
addressing the situation right now. This led me to pose the question: how can
we utilise our existing research work ows to improve the situation?
I therefore propose the use of my design and verication methodology to
help bring some order to this space. When designing a solution to a specic
problem, we start with a general model of the nal result. As this model
is progressively rened by making design decisions or incorporating physical
constraints, it becomes a more and more accurate representation of the ultimate
solution. A key realisation is that the original, generic model can potentially be
mapped to a number of solutions, depending on the decisions and renements
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we make. In this way we can see the design process as branching o at each
decision point, as shown in Figure 2.2 (reproduced from Chapter 1).
Abstract model
Target
Application
Design decision 1
Design decision 2
Design decision 3
Constraint 1
Constraint 2
Constraint 3
Related
Application 1
Related
Application 2
Figure 2.2: The design process can provide an emergent taxonomy of related
problems. As we rene a general model to be more specically applicable, we
make design decisions and take constraints into account. These branches can
lead to dierent, but related points in the problem space. This represents a
more detailed view of the arrow indicating traversal in Figure 2.1.
The problem this thesis is addressing is denitely a point at the specic
end of the spectrum in Figure 2.1, but in the process of moving from the
general solution to the specic one, we will encounter wireless sensor networks,
distributed computing and other types of allocation problems. The design
decisions relate these applications to our allocation problem: by traversing the
problem space in this way we are, in eect, constructing a taxonomy based on
the decision points in the design process. This forms the second of my primary
objectives: helping to order the problem space surrounding my task allocation
problem, by situating my approach relative to other work and related systems.
In short, this boils down to responsible engineering. Throughout the design
process, decisions are veried through testing. By identifying the family of
systems we are excluding with a specic design choice we are also relating that
system to ours. The communicated results should not only describe where we
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ended up and how we got there, but perhaps most importantly, what related
problems we past on along the way.
2.7 Discussion
This chapter reviewed the background literature relevant to task allocation in
a distributed satellite system. A review of current space technology conrms
the need for a mechanism that addresses the management of multi-satellite
systems in a way that is robust, scalable, and conscious of the limited energy
available to the satellites. In my opinion, approaching it as a pure satellite
engineering problem is incorrect: it is the interactions between components that
determine the dynamics of the system. I therefore propose the use of a multi-
agent approach to task allocation. Specically, market-based control oers a
promising solution to managing such a system: using an auction mechanism to
allocate tasks should allow for ecient and adaptive allocation with minimal
communication.
However, the literature also highlighted that we don't really know how to
reliably map from our abstract models to the messiness of the real world, and
still have a working system. At the one extreme we have numerous specic
applications and at the other general theories regarding task allocation, but
we lack a bridge between these two parts. A basic step towards improving
this situation involves relating dierent task allocation problems and the types
of solutions that can be used to address them. To this end I propose using
a responsible engineering approach, where the decisions made during the de-
sign process provide links to closely related problems. In this way the design
and verication process can be used to help build a taxonomy of the space
surrounding task allocation in distributed satellite systems.
The work in this thesis should therefore be seen in the context of a larger
research eort into ways in which we can borrow from social and biological
systems to nd ways of coping with our own increasingly complex technological
systems.
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Design of the task allocation model
This chapter describes the process followed to design the task allocation mech-
anism for the distributed satellite system. To better understand the challenges
of task allocation in this application, I rst describe a mission scenario that will
serve as a model of the type of system that we'd like to control. Presenting a
specic model in this way forces us to specify exactly what we mean by \tasks",
and helps to identify the constraints inherent to such a system. Furthermore,
the model provides a context for precise denitions of the objectives of success-
ful task allocation, namely maximized allocation, robustness and scalability.
With these aspects clearly dened, we then move to the other end of the design
spectrum: a series of abstract models of task allocation in human organisations
is presented. A simple model of task outsourcing is used to develop a market-
based allocation process, which is then related back to the distributed satellite
scenario, thereby dening the simulation model that is used in the rest of this
thesis.
3.1 Reference mission
The literature review showed that although several distributed spacecraft mis-
sions have been proposed, none have been own yet. I therefore construct a
generic mission scenario to serve as a reference in the design procedure.
A group of small, low-cost satellites, numbering in the tens to hundreds,
is positioned in close proximity to each other in low earth orbit. The overall
mission objective is a combination of earth observation and measurements of
the space environment. The satellites are not homogeneous, but specialise in
various roles which correspond to dierent congurations of spacecraft.
The rst two kinds of satellites form the payload component of the multi-
satellite system. In other words, they do the work the mission was designed for.
The earth observation part of the payload employs one class of pico-satellite,
where every individual is equipped with a camera which can be used for low-
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resolution photos of a wide area. Alternatively the image data can be combined
using super-resolution methods for higher resolution coverage of a narrow area
(Farsiu et al., 2003). The environmental measurements are taken with a number
of small satellites, each equipped with sensors to map the magnetosphere. The
simultaneous measurements allow for high resolution observations of spatial
and temporal behaviour of the Earth's magnetic eld | similar to Clarke et al.
(1996) and Friis-Christensen et al. (2006).
The third class of satellite provides the mission infrastructure that is used by
the payload spacecraft. Dedicated communication satellites are responsible for
communicating with the ground station: commands are uploaded to the satel-
lites, while telemetry and payload data are downloaded again. To achieve this,
the communication craft are equipped with high-gain antennas and ampliers,
as well as non-volatile memory for storing data before downloading to earth.
Redundant instances of all the spacecraft are deployed simultaneously. If, for
example, three communication spacecraft are available they can all be used to
transmit data back to the ground station. If one of these spacecraft stopped
functioning the available bandwidth will be reduced, but communication can
still proceed.
The system receives a set of high-level commands while in contact with the
ground station, e.g. \photograph Rio de Janeiro" or \return magnetosphere
measurements". Note that these commands do not have to specify the specic
satellite that will take the picture, or the satellites involved in measuring the
magnetosphere, instead just the function is specied. We need to abstract to
the functional level if we want to free the ground station from managing the
individuals in the group. It is of course possible to address the specic modules
in the system by aiming the request specically at them, e.g. \measure status
of 0xfac3b3e5", but this type of micromanagement should not constitute a
regular part of system operations.
As the group orbits around the earth, their formation varies periodically
due to individual spacecraft orbiting around the centre of mass of the earth, as
shown in Figure 3.1. In addition, non-periodic perturbations inuence dier-
ent satellites in dierent ways: atmospheric drag eects, magnetic interaction
and solar pressure all depend on the characteristics of the individual satellites
(Larson and Wertz, 1999, Chapter 8). This continual change in topology has
a signicant impact on the routing of communication within the group: main-
taining a map of the network topology requires constant communication and
processing.
Individual satellites are powered by a combination of photovoltaic cells and
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Figure 3.1: As two satellites, here labelled A and B, orbit around the earth
their relative positions change continuously due to both spacecraft orbiting
around the centre of mass of the earth. In a network of co-orbiting satellites,
the topology will change similarly.
batteries. Solar energy is collected while the spacecraft is illuminated and stored
in rechargeable batteries. When more power is needed than can be supplied
by the solar cells, for example when the spacecraft is in eclipse or while trans-
mitting data to the ground station, the accumulated energy in the batteries is
used. This raises an important constraint: allocation of tasks will substantially
decrease the energy available to a module, which regenerates relatively slowly.
This scarcity of power also implies that all communication will have a signif-
icant cost: the act of communicating decreases the energy available for task
execution. Furthermore, batteries can only store a nite amount of energy: if
they are fully charged, potentially useful solar energy cannot be captured.
3.1.1 Constraints
The distributed satellite system is subject to a number of constraints that de-
termine system operation and potential task allocation mechanisms. These
constraints range from mission design level issues, such as money, available
launch mass and mission objectives; to spacecraft design issues, for example
mechanical structure, attitude control and propulsion; to operational questions
such as ground support. When designing a multi-spacecraft system, the inter-
actions between satellites also need to be taken into account, as these play a
key role in determining the system-level behaviour. The most prominent con-
straints to be considered here are the inter-satellite data rate, processing power,
and the energy available to individual satellites.
The inter-satellite data rate determines the amount of data that can be
exchanged between spacecraft. Bandwidth is determined by the modulation
scheme, antenna design, system noise temperature, and transmission power.
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The rst three parameters are usually xed early-on in mission design, leaving
transmission power as the main factor determining the eective communication
range. A in-depth discussion on link design can be found in Chapter 14 of
Larson and Wertz (1999); for the purposes of this discussion it is sucient to
note the importance of transmission power.
The second constraint under consideration is processing power. Component
satellites require sucient processing power and memory to maintain network
information, process communication packets, and calculate allocation. The
exact amount required is determined by the allocation mechanism. Although
additional processing is relatively inexpensive, it will increase the power needs
of the spacecraft. To keep this reasonable, the computational requirements of
the task management approach should therefore be scalable.
This brings us to node energy. Satellites are self-contained entities, and as
a result all energy used is either stored or generated on-board. If we consider
smaller, simpler satellites, we nd that the available power is extremely lim-
ited1. This energy is used on spacecraft housekeeping (determining position,
orientation, etc.), payload functions (taking photos or measurements) and, in
the case of a distributed satellite system, network-level management (task al-
location, network information). Because all these components compete for the
same energy, we see that communicating decreases the energy available for pay-
load functions. In allocating tasks, we need to balance the exchange of data
needed to achieve a good allocation against actually getting work done.
3.1.2 Abstraction
With the above scenario as a reference mission, we can now develop an ab-
stracted model that captures the relevant characteristics of distributed satellite
systems. A graphical depiction of the mission conguration is shown in Fig-
ure 3.2. A number of spacecraft communicate with their local neighbours to
form a network of specialised agents. This network can be represented as a
graph of agents, where vertices correspond to satellites and edges to commu-
nication links between them. The vertices are treated as agents, as they can
behave as autonomous actors, or respond to commands received from other
agents. The agents form a spatially distributed network where nodes only
have direct access to their neighbours, while communication with more distant
spacecraft takes place via chain of local connections. These agents need to
collaborate to complete complex tasks. A network representation of the same
1For a 100 mm x 100 mm x 300 mm cubesat, the orbital average power is approximately
6 W.
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Figure 3.2: Distributed satellite system consisting of three dierent types of
satellite: communication satellites to provide the interface with the ground
station, remote observation satellites and the space weather sensing payload.
scenario is given in Figure 3.3. Dierent colours are used to represent the types
of agents, each with a particular set of skills.
To allow better comparison to other multi-agent allocation problems, the
characteristics of the task allocation problem can be summarised as follows:
Multi-component tasks: Tasks consist of multiple, interdependent compo-
nents and are executed by a number of agents, each performing the task
component that it is equipped for.
Distributed task origins: There is no central source of all tasks; instead,
tasks can spawn at any node. Although tasks initially originate from the
communication nodes, subsequent task components can be generated by
any node, depending on the task structure.
Ad hoc task assignment: The sequence in which tasks will arrive is un-
known at design time. The structure of tasks is however assumed to
be known.
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Task execution: Agents are characterised by a current energy level. Suc-
cessful task execution will lower their energy levels, and agents will only
attempt a task if they have sucient energy available.
Heterogeneous agents: No two agents are exactly the same: agents dier in
terms of the types of tasks they can execute, their resources (available
energy) and their location in the network.
Autonomous agents: Large systems are hard to manage at an individual
agent level; instead the agents need to autonomously manage themselves.
Benevolent agents: The agents are presumed to be self-interested and max-
imise their own gain, but they are also benevolent. They do not try
to exploit other agents by cheating, nor do they attempt to exploit the
system.
Limited energy: Agents have limited energy available to execute tasks and
communicate. By measuring the energy available on-board, they can
calculate their capacity for work. Energy can regenerate over time (e.g.
by using solar panels).
Agent failure: Agents can stop functioning at any time, due to lack of energy
(temporary) or physical failure (permanent). This has an impact on the
available resources in the system, and also inuences the communication
topology.
Local communication: To conserve energy, most communication is with lo-
cal neighbours. Multi-hop routing is required to transmit messages to
more distant agents. Agents therefore rely on local information to make
decisions.
Communication cost: Communication requires a signicant amount of en-
ergy, but the same energy could instead be used to perform payload func-
tions. A balance must be found between negotiation and doing work.
If an agent's energy falls too low, it will be unable to communicate. We
distinguish between the cost of negotiation, which is signicant but small,
and task transfer cost, which involves much more data and is therefore
up to several orders of magnitude larger.
Broadcast communication: Messages are transmitted to all the neighbours
of an agent, as a result of the wireless communication medium. The
energy cost to an agent is therefore the same whether it transmits to one
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Figure 3.3: Equivalent network for the distributed satellite system shown in
Figure 3.2. The dierent types of agents are represented using dierent colours:
brown for the ground station, grey for communication nodes, while the remote
observation spacecraft are coloured magenta and the space weather sensing
payload units are green.
or to all of its neighbouring agents. An addressed communication scheme
could be implemented on top of this, where recipient nodes lter incoming
messages and only respond to the relevant subset.
Spatial distribution Agents are distributed in three-dimensional space, which
determines the communication topology. A given transmission power
corresponds a maximum range for communication. Thus, by specifying
transmission power, we implicitly dene a communication topology in
the form of a random geometric graph. The space can be regarded as
uniform in transmission characteristics, and clear from obstruction. Note
that there is no risk of the Earth occluding some parts of the network from
others and interrupting communication, due to the relatively small com-
munication ranges (under 10 kilometres) when compared to the altitude
of the satellites (more than 500 kilometres).
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Symmetric communication As reliable communication will require trans-
mission from both parties involved in a message exchange, I restrict my-
self to symmetric communication links. In other words, if node A can
communicate with node B, then B is also able to communicate with A. In
situations with asymmetric transmission powers, the communication link
will only be treated as valid if both parties can receive the other's mes-
sages. All links in the communication graph are therefore bidirectional.
Volatile topology: The communication topology is volatile due to continuous
changes in the relative position of agents, as well as agent failures.
Scale: The number of agents in the system ranges from tens to hundreds of
agents.
The above characteristics position this problem as closely related to several
other multi-agent applications. The task allocation problem is quite similar to
resource allocation in distributed computing domains, but their communication
cost is eectively free. Wireless sensor networks have a very dierent task
structure, as they focus on measurements, but the communication cost problem
is nearly the same. Local communication is seen in social networks and mobile
ad hoc networks (MANETs). Mobile robotics can also share a subset of these
factors, depending on the application. These relationships will be explored in
more detail in subsequent chapters.
3.1.3 Task allocation objectives
At this point, with the system properties described, it is necessary to clearly
dene the desired characteristics of the as-yet-unspecied task allocation mech-
anism. When expressed in the most general sense, we would like to allocate
tasks in a manner that maximises the amount of work done by the system. Ex-
pressed dierently, the money that pays for the system should deliver the best
possible returns, despite agent heterogeneity, network scale and agent failure.
Most of the following points have already emerged from previous discussion, I
will now summarise and formalise them.
3.1.3.1 Maximising allocation
The most obvious requirement is that the number of tasks successfully allocated
is maximised. If a task consists of multiple components that are executed
separately, it can only be considered completed when all the subcomponents
have been executed. In a stable, observable system with free communication
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the allocation problem is relatively simple: it can be seen as an instance of the
bin packing problem (see Yao, 1980, for examples of algorithms). However, the
characteristics of the scenario described in Section 3.1.2 increase the complexity
of the problem.
Agents need energy for both communication and task execution. If all en-
ergy is spent on tasks, the agent will be unable to communicate, thus disrupting
the topology of the network. A fundamental problem is that agents have no
global view of the network; yet their actions can have a global impact. The
preferred allocation involves spreading tasks across the system in a manner that
takes the cost of remote communication into account.
This dependency on energy led me to use two dierent metrics for allocation.
Firstly, the number of tasks allocated is an obvious measure. However, if tasks
have dierent sizes or priorities, this approach does not capture the whole
picture. In addition, it is possible for two dierent systems to allocate the
same number of tasks | in this case a second metric of energy eciency is
required. For two approaches that allocate an identical number of tasks, the
one that requires a smaller energy overhead is regarded as better, because it
has the potential to complete more tasks. In mission design terms, higher
eciency translates to lower cost, with smaller power systems and lower launch
mass. Energy overhead is thus used to provide a more nuanced view of task
allocation performance.
3.1.3.2 Robustness
As the system becomes larger and more diverse, the probability of unforeseen
events in the network increases: agent failures, topology changes, changing work
loads and new mission objectives, for example. We dene robustness as the
ability of the system to successfully allocate tasks, despite these disturbances.
In measuring robustness, I therefore look at the allocation performance, in
terms of tasks and energy, in the presence changes in the network structure.
3.1.3.3 Scalability
Network sizes will be in the range of tens to hundreds of nodes for the dis-
tributed satellite application, but larger systems are not impossible. To scale
well in this range, the task allocation mechanism should function autonomously,
while the total communication cost remains reasonable. Direct management of
agents by humans becomes prohibitively complex and expensive in larger sys-
tems. The ideal would be a system that acts as a superorganism: despite the
multitude of autonomous parts, the system as a whole is managed as a single
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individual. The detail of which module performs which component of the task
should be abstracted away from the operators and decided transparently by the
group of satellites.
The proportion of the energy budget devoted to communication is one of
the most visible indicators of the scalability of the system. A greater number
of agents can lead to more messages sent during negotiation; to avoid spending
all energy on communication, the communication overhead needs to grow in
sub-linear fashion with the number of nodes in the network.
3.2 Tasks
Before we can decide how to manage job allocation, we need to dene a lan-
guage we can use to discuss tasks. The term task is generally used to specify a
unit of work that must be completed by the system, with dierent task types
corresponding to dierent operations. Tasks can be decomposed into subtasks:
atomic units that are executed by agents with dierent skills. I will assume
that this decomposition is known a priori, but that the order in which tasks
will arrive is not known. The work on task allocation in multi-robot systems by
Zlot (2006) informed much of my thinking around the representation of tasks,
although I will restrict myself to a simpler set of tasks. Instead of considering
boolean relations between task components, I will use deterministic task def-
initions, where one task component always results in a specic set of further
task elements.
3.2.1 Command ow example: building a house
The command structure of tasks can best be illustrated using a simple allocation
example: suppose a man wants to build a house. As the owner, he does not
know how to construct it, so he decides to contract someone to do the building.
The building process can be split into three dierent components:
 laying the foundations,
 building the walls, and
 constructing the roof.
These task components must be executed in sequence, but the command
structure can assume several dierent forms: one option using a single builder
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Figure 3.4: Graphical depiction of dierent command ows for the house-
building example. In (a), the owner assigns responsibility for the entire con-
struction to a monolithic entity with all the necessary skills. The case where
the manager manages every component is shown in (b), while the recursive
subcontracting command ow is shown in (c).
with multiple skills, and two alternatives which rely on specialists. When viewed
in the satellite domain, the rst case is very similar to using a monolithic
satellite, while the last two cases are architecturally similar to the distributed
satellite problem, where specialised units need to be coordinated. A graphical
representation of the dierent command ows is given in Figure 3.4.
3.2.1.1 A single builder with multiple skills
In the rst conguration, the owner approaches a number of builders to obtain
quotes. He selects one based in a combination of cost and promises of quality,
who then proceeds to build the entire house. Employing someone who is very
good at all the aspects of building is very expensive though. This cost is largely
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due to the number of skills and amount of equipment the builder must maintain
to be procient in all aspects of construction. Most of it is underutilised |
only a single task is performed at one time, yet all the builder's resources are
allocated to one building project.
This approach is analogous to using a single, complex satellite: to be good
at everything a highly advanced system is required, but the entire system is
dedicated to a single objective. If the satellite is isolated and completely self-
reliant, this can be justied, but if others are around who could share resources,
a more ecient and robust allocation can be made.
3.2.1.2 Direct management
An alternative approach sees the owner contracting labour to dierent special-
ists. When the rst contractor completes the foundation, the owner enlists a
builder who specialises in walls, after that one who is good at constructing
roofs. This works out less expensive than the single builder approach, because
everyone in the chain of construction is only occupied for the portion of time
where they are actually used | if another job becomes available after the foun-
dations have been laid, the rst contractor can start work there while the walls
are still being erected. Dierent task components are therefore pipelined which
allows a higher throughput.
The owner still acts as building manager throughout: he communicates
all the information about the status of the foundations (e.g., dimensions, load
capacity, etc.) to the wall builder, and again all the wall information to the
one who constructs the roof. Although this allows a very high level of control,
this requires signicant time and eort on the part of the manager. He needs
to select all the contractors and communicate with them in sucient detail to
serve as interface between them. The greatest benet of this approach is that
it oers ne-grained control over the construction process, however, this incurs
signicant overhead on the part of the owner.
If this approach is applied to managing a distributed satellite system, we
will nd a central manager spacecraft that can control a number of simpler
workers. The manager can use global information to realise optimal (or near-
optimal) system performance; however, the manager presents a single point of
failure, and the information processing requirements will be signicant in larger
systems.
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3.2.1.3 Recursive outsourcing
In the nal control ow model the owner contracts the specialist in foundations
to build the entire house. After laying the foundations, this specialist calls in
a wall specialist he trusts and contracts him to complete the house. When
his component is complete, the wall builder again nds a roong specialist to
complete the remainder of the structure. At every stage the responsibility for
the task is transferred to the next person in the construction chain.
This approach utilises the skills of the individual builders to the full, both
in a technical and an informational capacity. On the technical side, all builders
can be specialists, which allows investment in their skills and equipment. In
addition, because one type of task component is usually followed by another
specic type, they learn about the next contractor in line: where they are, what
information they need, and how much they will cost. This \local information" is
potentially very useful: over time everyone builds up a model of their immediate
neighbourhood, which is used in quoting for new jobs.
The result is a robust system, mainly due to the following three factors:
1. Individuals are modular, which makes them substitutable. The function-
ality required is procured on an ad hoc basis, with no commitment to or
reliance on specic individuals.
2. There is no central control, therefore no single point of failure.
3. If demand for a new type of task were to arise, units can change their
associations (the links along which tasks are outsourced), which is signif-
icantly easier than developing new competencies.
This model is frequently seen in complex manufacturing contracts. For
example, a small engineering company is paid to build the test equipment that
is used to verify an instrumentation dial, constructed by another company, for
the cockpit of a passenger airliner. If the airliner constructor had to oversee
component procurement at the lowest level, the amount of administration would
completely swamp the whole construction process.
This distributed, self-organising command ow is very attractive when ap-
plied to the multi-satellite task allocation problem: it allows for specialised
units, an adaptable execution ow, scalability and robustness. I will combine
this approach with a labour market mechanism in 3.3 , but we rst need to
dene a notation that allows us to discuss tasks.
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3.2.2 Notation
Although relatively simple tasks, such as the construction example in sec-
tion 3.2.1, can be adequately described using natural language, we are quickly
pushed beyond the bounds of what can comfortably be expressed. Researchers
have therefore used directed graphs (Kota et al., 2009) or trees with logical
operators (Zlot, 2006) to describe the transitions between task components.
I have however found production rules, as used in context-free grammars, to
provide a clear and concise description of tasks at a level of detail suited to
this study. Note that this is primarily a descriptive tool: it contains the same
information captured by directed graphs or task-trees. The main attractions of
using a grammar are the brevity with which task structures can be described,
as well as the ease with which complex tasks can be generated. The reader is
not assumed to have any previous knowledge on formal grammars; the main
objective of this section is to convey the manner in which task elements will be
described in the rest of the thesis. If a more in-depth discussion to context free
grammars is required Kakde (2007, Chapter 5) provides a good introduction.
At the highest level, we use a task to denote a sequence of operations that
delivers a result. These operations are known as task elements or task compo-
nents (the terms task elements and task components are used interchangeably
in this thesis). The task elements can be seen as commands, for example \take
picture" or \build walls". Every command has an action associated with it (the
taking of picture, or laying bricks to form a wall), and sometimes one or more
further commands that result from the action (e.g. \download photo data" or
\construct roof"). These ospring task elements are usually associated with
the transfer of control and of data that resulted from the previous action.
We can dene the relationship between task elements formally using a con-
text free grammar described by the four-tuple G = (V;T;P;S), where:
1. V is a nite set of non-terminals that correspond to task elements (e.g.,
the command to execute a task element such as \build walls" in the house
building example).
2. T is a nite set of terminals representing the actual execution of the task
(building the walls).
3. P is the set of production rules that specify the relationship between
dierent task elements (e.g., the walls have been completed, now the roof
must be constructed).
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4. S is a set2 of start non-terminals, dening the tasks that are visible from
a position external to the system. The command \build a house" is an
example which then starts with the task element \lay the foundations".
In our task allocation case, non-terminals correspond to task elements, i.e., the
command to do something; while the terminals represent the actual execution
of the task. Task elements are indicated using capital letters (A, B, C, etc.);
execution terminals use lower case (a, b, c, etc.). The production rules describe
the tree of hierarchical dependencies.
In referring to a task, we therefore refer to such a grammar and the resulting
execution tree. The possible tasks that can be executed by a system correspond
to the set of starting tokens, S. Allocation of a task Ti results in the execution
of one or more non-terminal task components (W):
Ti ! W
As our main focus here is on how one task element generates further task
components, we restrict production rules to have the following structure:
X ! xS
The execution terminal is the leftmost character of the generated string (x),
optionally followed by one or more further task elements (non-terminals) in the
string S. This format is well suited to the outsourcing model used in this thesis:
an agent executes a task element then passes the result on to one or more other
agents for further processing. If an agent has the ability to execute a task x,
we will refer to that ability as the skill x.
As an example, we can now describe a task that consists of the elements a,
b and c which are be executed sequentially, such as the house building example
above. The production rules for this task are given by:
A ! aB
B ! bC
C ! c
with S = fAg. The execution ow is graphically depicted in Figure 3.5.
A dierent task description might require a to lead to both b and c:
A ! aBC
B ! b
C ! c
2Here I deviate from convention in having multiple starting points; these correspond to
dierent tasks.
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Figure 3.5: Sequential task execution, where task elements follow each other
in a linear manner.
again with S = fAg. The resultant branching and parallel execution is shown
in Figure 3.6.
a
b
c
A B
C
Figure 3.6: Branching task execution, which results in two tasks elements
executed simultaneously.
Note that if we focus purely on the produced terminal sequences (abc) these
two grammars appear equivalent. However, if we take into account that the
execution of b and c in the second example eectively occur in parallel, the
resulting string can be either abc or acb. It is therefore important to keep in
mind that our interest here lies in the transitions that make up the task tree,
because that is what needs to be allocated.
Using production rules can easily describe an execution tree, but it can also
be used to describe more complex graph-like task dependencies where tasks
converge to a point. If data from several nodes needs to be merged by a single
unit, this can be accomplished by initially allocating a task that denes which
node will serve as the convergence point. When the individuals that generate
data allocate the subsequent task components, only the convergence node is
seen as suitable, and receives all components. The skill set of the convergence
node is therefore temporarily modied to allow convergence.
3.2.3 Task size
The last point in the description of tasks that needs to be dened is that of
task size. Two tasks of similar structure can have dierent sizes: building a
small cottage requires less work than a large villa. The size is an indication
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of the amount of resources (e.g., time, processing power, bricks, cement, fuel)
required for a particular instance of a task type. When considering a task
consisting of multiple components, I will assume the size relationship between
the task elements remains constant. If T2 is double the size of T1, and both
are instances of the task in Figure 3.5, the size of the task elements (a1;b1;c1)
of T1 will be double that of the corresponding elements (a2;b2;c2) of T2. The
work capacity of an agent is the sum of the task sizes it can execute.
When expressed in a satellite context, the task size reects the amount of
energy required to execute a task element. For example, using the execution
ow in Figure 3.6, a task size of 1 will require 1 unit of energy to execute the
a component, and another unit for each of the b and c components. The total
cost of executing the task is therefore 3 units. The task size is set for every
instance of a type of task: a dierent instance of the same type of task might
have a size of 2, which will therefore result in a total energy expenditure of
6 units of energy. This convention focuses on the task execution cost for an
agent, and is therefore independent from the complexity of the task tree.
3.3 Task allocation in a labour market
In previous sections I described an abstracted model of the system we are
interested in and discussed tasks, skills and the task elements we use to dene
the process. With these prerequisites covered, we can now develop the task
allocation mechanism. I will base my discussion on the dynamics of a human
labour market. Why a labour market? The use of a social metaphor is not
purely a pedagogical tool | I believe that when both systems are viewed from
a task allocation perspective, they are remarkably similar.
Human markets have certain characteristics due to the environment in which
they operate. Markets encourage specialisation to increase eciency. Individ-
ual self-interest results in inherently decentralised systems: a large number of
individuals can therefore take part. These individuals have limited information,
but still manage to make decisions that are good enough and their interactions
result in a highly dynamic system. Similarly, for task allocation in distributed
satellite systems, we would like to handle large numbers of heterogeneous space-
craft, employ distributed control to enhance robustness, and work eectively
despite real-time changes in task load and mission objectives.
The market system that evolved in human societies resulted in characteris-
tics that are highly desirable for the satellite task allocation problem. I therefore
propose to recreate a similar mechanism in our technological system, to benet
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from the same dynamics. The command ow will be similar to the recursive
outsourcing allocation described in section 3.2.1.3.
The discussion starts with a basic auction, which is then rened to more
accurately reect the abstracted system in section 3.1.2 by including the topo-
logical and associated communication constraints.
3.3.1 Basic auction
The rst, and most abstract, example uses a basic auction to determine alloca-
tion. Picture a fully-connected network of agents, one of which is an auctioneer
with tasks to assign, while the others are workers that will be assigned tasks.
The agents are initially homogeneous: there is no topology to distinguish be-
tween nodes, they have the same skills and work capacity, and therefore all are
equally capable of completing tasks.
A single-bid reverse auction is used to allocate tasks. To initiate the al-
location of a new task, the auctioneer announces it to the network. For the
moment, let's assume the task consists of a single subtask:
A ! a
The auction announcement is most eciently communicated using a broad-
cast message to all the workers, thereby utilising the one-to-many broadcast
channel between agents. The workers return bids that communicate their suit-
ability for the allocation. The auctioneer then selects the lowest bid to identify
the best agent for the job and transfers the task to it. When the agent receives
the task, its work capacity decreases, but it is also rewarded nancially. We
will use capacity as a general term to describe the availability of an agent in
terms of time and resources.
This approach relies on bids reecting some system cost: if the auctioneer
assigns to the lowest bidder the global cost is minimised. But how should
worker agents calculate their bids? As our objective is to maximise the total
system utilisation as discussed above, the desired allocation would distribute
tasks evenly across the available workers. One way of achieving this is by having
the bids reect the available capacity of the agent and the size of the task:
bid = size  capacity 1
This causes a task to be allocated to the agent with the greatest capacity: idle
agents (with capacity at 100%) will place lower bids than agents with lower
capacity (due to previously assigned tasks). Initially, all agents are equal, so
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allocation can go to anyone. The agent that receives the task has its capacity
decreased, so in the next allocation round, someone else will receive the task. As
a result the allocation resembles round-robin assignment, where all agents are
evenly utilised. Note that in economics literature, the terms \quote" or \ask"
would be preferred to \bid", as this is a reverse auction. However, to maintain
consistency with the terminology used in the denition of the Contract Net
protocol (Smith, 1980), I will use \bid" to indicate the price quoted by worker
agents.
If we were to start with a range of initial capacities, this approach will start
by assigning tasks to the highest capacity workers rst. As their capacity is
decreased to the level of other workers, these workers will also be assigned tasks:
having the bid structure communicate work capacity encourages equalisation
of resources across the network. Large tasks require more energy to complete,
the quoted price will therefore be scaled accordingly.
Note that the workers are not trying to outbid each other or mislead through
incorrect information. They are selsh in the sense that they try to maximise
a private utility function, but also benevolent in the sense described by Rosen-
schein and Genesereth (1985). Despite their benevolence the agents are all
still trying to maximise the amount of work they receive, but only by staying
within the dened rules of interaction. The dierences between this cooperative
market and one where agents are truly selsh, with no regard for system-level
performance, will be explored in more detail in Chapter 7.
If more than one type of task needs allocation, we will need a community
of workers that have the necessary skills, but the allocation mechanism itself
is still valid with the added condition that workers only bid on tasks that they
are capable of completing. This basic auction is illustrated in Figure 3.7 for a
task of type a. Note how the bid value abstracts the network information: the
network topology, skills of workers and their capacity are all communicated in
the bid price.
We now expand the scenario to a multi-component task, which is sequen-
tially assigned to dierent agents. To determine the next allocation, an agent
can assume the role of auctioneer, eliminating the need to transfer the task
back to its origin. By allowing any node to be an auctioneer, this approach is
equivalent to the recursive outsourcing example in section 3.2.1.3.
The outsourcing costs of the future task components need to be taken into
account when bidding. The resulting bid calculation now assumes the form:
bid = (size  capacity 1 + outsourcing cost)
To determine this outsourcing cost the workers could perform a dummy auction,
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Figure 3.7: The view of the network that results from the basic auction. In (a)
the network topology, skills (a or b) and capacity (in percentage) of the workers
are given. (b) represents the auctioneers perspective of the network, where all
the information has been abstracted to bid values.
where potential contractors state what they will bid; however, it is expensive
from a communication point of view and not guaranteed to be accurate when
allocation eventually happens. Alternatively, and more simply, the worker can
use his history of outsourcing attempts to estimate the expected outsourcing
cost. The reduced communication and faster turnaround time makes this the
preferred approach in my model.
3.3.2 Spatial distribution
We now increase the complexity of the problem by introducing a network topol-
ogy that limits agents to only communicate with a subset of the other agents
in the system. The greatest dierence between this scenario and the previous
one is that an auction will not reach all workers involved. Instead, messages
need to be relayed through other agents.
Imagine an auction, as described above, that fails because none of the work-
ers can accept the task, either due to insucient capacity or due to lacking the
requisite skills. The task could be discarded as impossible to assign, but in-
stead the scope of the auction is enlarged: everyone noties a few of their friends
about the pending task. Some of these friends are available, so the interme-
diate workers return to the auctioneer with a solution: they can facilitate the
allocation of the task by acting as middlemen. As a result the auctioneer will
now receive valid bids, despite none of his direct neighbours having capacity
available.
Two routes can be followed from here. In many human examples, a meet-
ing between the auctioneer and the prospective bidder would be arranged to
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complete the allocation. This can be seen as creating a new connection be-
tween these agents. The second route involves cases where connections cannot
be changed quickly, or creating the link is expensive (for example, when new
equipment must be acquired and people trained). In these cases the inter-
mediate agent serves as a conduit between the auctioneer and the successful
bidder.
We can take it even further if we assume that the auctioneer is not interested
in who is executing the task, merely in assigning the task. The auctioneer then
treats the facilitating neighbour as if he was the nal task destination, trans-
ferring both task and payment to him. The facilitator subsequently transfers
the task to the actual bidder. The usage of a middleman is not limited to only
one intermediate hop; we can expand it to form allocation chains across the
network. This approach is very attractive, as it allows us to abstract away the
topology of the network, thereby simplifying processing and allocation. Note
that this allocation process is task-centric: the objective of the auctioneer is
not to assign work to someone specic, instead he simply wants the work to be
completed. The allocation process in a spatially distributed auction is shown
in Figure 3.8, (a) to (c).
The relaying of auction messages has improved the allocation of tasks, but
has also resulted in increased communication. As stated before, communica-
tion decreases the capacity of agents to do what we really care about, namely
complete tasks. The rst aspect of communication cost is on an agent level:
workers now spend time and resources facilitating deals that do not benet
them, not even if the task is successfully allocated due to their eort. The
second problem is that the relaying of messages makes allocation to distant
nodes possible. While it is desirable to have this functionality, we would also
like the auctioneer to be capable of distinguishing between nearby and faraway
workers, because local allocation has a smaller system-level energy cost.
Human markets have, however, encountered these problems before. To ac-
count for the negotiation expenses, agents charge a commission fee for facilitat-
ing successful allocations. The commission addresses both the above concerns:
the intermediate agent is rewarded for resources committed to facilitating al-
location, and the auctioneer has an incentive to prefer nearby nodes because
distant nodes are more expensive. The eect of commission on the bid values
of Figure 3.8 is shown in Figure 3.8d. Note the dierence in received bid val-
ues: without commission the $10 bids appear equivalent, even though the more
distant node will result in greater communication cost. With 10% commission,
however, the auctioneer will prefer the closer node.
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Figure 3.8: Auction across a network without commission as seen by auction-
eer. The true state of the network is shown in (a) with the corresponding
bids calculated by workers for a task of type a in (b). The auctioneer has no
topology information, instead it only receives a number of bids from its neigh-
bours which includes their own bids, and bids relayed from more distant nodes.
This is shown in (c) for the case without commission, while (d) again depicts a
system where all nodes add 10% commission to the bids they relay. Note the
dierences in relayed bid values in the last two cases.
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Not all instances of nodes acting as intermediaries result in successful allo-
cation however; lower cost assignment to a dierent node is frequently possible.
The human response is to charge a generous commission: if task allocation is
successful, the facilitator receives enough money to survive a number of failed
attempts. Dierent commission calculation strategies will be discussed in more
detail in the following section, when I describe the simulation model.
The use of intermediate agents can be seen as a streamlined version of
a repeated auction to do the allocation. The rst auctioneer would assign
a task to one of his neighbours, but as the neighbour does not possess the
necessary skills to perform the task, he initiates his own auction to nd a
suitable candidate. This process is repeated until the task reaches a viable
destination. Of course, such a model relies on the intermediate auctioneers to
know enough about the network to believe they can successfully outsource the
task. If we treat these intermediate auctioneers as facilitators, they full the
same function, but with a much lower communication expenditure.
3.4 Simulation model
The labour market described above forms the abstract model at the base of the
design tree in Figure 2.2. It is a general description of an allocation process
which could potentially be mapped to a number of related scenarios. Whereas
many mechanism design problems focus on forcing agents to be truthful, the
problem here is subtly dierent. As agents are benevolent, they are also as-
sumed to be truthful. However, as system managers we do not have reliable
access to their utility valuations, i.e., how much energy they have for complet-
ing tasks. In addition, we cannot assume that their estimates of outsourcing
costs will be correct, because these are based on previous observations, not the
current state of the network. Instead of addressing various agent strategies, our
problem centres on the access to information in a dynamic environment with ex-
pensive communication. While I am interested in a distributed satellite system
application, I also need to be aware of the families of systems that are pruned o
as the design increases in specicity. As a rst step, a realistic implementation
of the allocation mechanism must be dened. This forms the simulation model
used in the rest of the thesis, and also serves as an implementation reference
for physical systems.
The labour market above is used as a metaphor that inspires the solution to
the multi-satellite task allocation problem. I describe the complete model here
to provide a single, comprehensive overview of the task allocation system. In
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the following chapters I will explore particular components of the system while
assessing the allocation mechanism. At this point I would like to reiterate that
the validity of the mapping between these two scenarios is the result of the
similarity between them. Communication, topology and task constraints are
similar in both cases, because the task allocation problem should be seen as
much broader than the specics of the respective domains.
A discrete event simulation is used to model the system: satellites are rep-
resented as independent agents, each with a set of skills that correspond to the
types of tasks it can execute. Agents measure their capacity (i.e., the amount of
work they can perform) by their available energy. They are spatially distributed
to form a network with local communication links between nodes. Tasks can
originate anywhere in the network, and can only be allocated to nodes with
sucient energy and the correct skills.
We have already identied the energy spent on communication as a major
constraint on the work completed by the system. To accurately model this, the
simulation has to start on the packet level: every transmission must be tracked
to be able to measure communication cost. All packets require a nite time
to propagate between nodes, and all packets use energy for transmission. The
packets are built into a routing framework, upon which the negotiation and
allocation logic is constructed.
3.4.1 Task allocation
The auction protocol for a single task component is described using a message
sequence diagram in Figure 3.9; the various steps and associated actions will
be explained sequentially.
When an agent becomes aware of a task element that needs to be allocated,
it sends an auction announcement message to all nodes in the network through
ooding. If an agent receives more than one auction announcement packet for
the same auction due to cycles in the network topology, only the rst packet is
propagated. This constructs a spanning tree across the network which will be
used for routing, as discussed in Section 3.4.4.
Relevant nodes, i.e., those with the appropriate skills and enough energy,
calculate bids that reect their tness: the bid value (B) is based on the ratio
of maximum (emax) to remaining energy (erem), plus the expected outsourcing
cost (cos), as discussed in 3.3.1. A scaling factor is applied to take the size of
the task component into account (z). Note that the task size also applies to
the size of the outsourced task components; the outsourcing cost is therefore
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also scaled by z as discussed in Section 3.2.3.
B = z

emax
erem
+ cos

(3.4.1)
This cost function communicates the available resources of the agents: under-
utilised agents will place inexpensive bids, while those that receive frequent allo-
cations increase their bids as their available energy decreases. By including the
expected outsourcing cost, information about the network in the vicinity of the
bidding agent is also communicated. Agents are benevolent: our objective is to
control the system by transmitting the minimum information; we are not mod-
elling bidding strategies for a competitive real-world market. Bids are routed
back to the auctioneer along the path of the original auction announcement.
The auctioneer assigns the task component to the agent with the lowest
bid and transmits an allocation-oer message. If the winning agent wants
to accept the oer, it returns an acknowledgement message, upon which the
auctioneer transfers the task and payment. If, however, the agent has changed
state since bidding by accepting another task component from a dierent source,
it transmits a negative acknowledgement to the auctioneer, who will then repeat
the auction up to three times. If no suitable agents exist, e.g., due to several
node failures or insucient node energy, allocation will fail.
The outsourcing cost is calculated by averaging over the prices paid in
the last ve outsourcing events, i.e., where the node that is currently bidding
previously acted as an auctioneer for the corresponding task type. Of course,
many other learning rules could also be used instead of this moving average lter
| the main desirable characteristic is that it rejects noise, while responding
quickly enough to changes in the system state. The moving average lter was
easy to implement and exhibited satisfactory performance. To bootstrap the
learning of the outsourcing cost, the history was populated with initial values
of 1. This is equivalent to assuming that the task can be outsourced to an
adjacent node with full capacity, i.e., the lowest cost outsourcing case. This
value is also low enough to ensure that the node does not exclude itself from
receiving an initial task by quoting too high a price. When a task is outsourced,
this value is updated to reect the learned cost.
This strategy would work smoothly when a system contains a single auc-
tioneer. However, multiple simultaneous auctioneers exist in our system: tasks
can originate with any agent, multiple tasks will be in the system at any one
time, and tasks will of course be passed around the system as each component is
executed. With multiple auctioneers we potentially nd conicting allocation:
the best available node will be allocated several dierent tasks concurrently.
673. Design of the task allocation model
Ground Station
Ground Station
Node1
Node1
Node2
Node2
Node3
Node3
Node4
Node4
New task upload
Initiate auction
Auction announcement*
Auction announcement*
Auction announcement*
Calculate bid
Bid
Aggregate bids
Bid
Aggregate bids
Bid
Find best bid
Allocate task element(Node3)
Allocate task element(Node3)
Allocation acknowledge
Allocation acknowledge
Task transfer
Subtract commission
Task transfer
Transfer acknowledge
Transfer acknowledge
Calculate bid Calculate bid
Figure 3.9: Message sequence diagram describing the market-based task alloca-
tion ow, with time increasing from top to bottom. Node 1 acts as auctioneer,
while Node 3 is the successful bidder. The auction announcement messages are
ooded through the network; nodes capable of executing the task respond with
bids that convey their suitability. Bids are aggregated on the return path: only
the best bid is forwarded. The task is allocated to the lowest bidder and the
payment and task are transferred.
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Furthermore, this strategy does not take the topology of the network into ac-
count. If the auctioneer receives equal bids from two dierent nodes, he has
to decide between them. From a global eciency point of view, we require
the auctioneer to prefer allocation to the closer node, but there is no way of
determining how far away they are.
To remedy these two concerns we need a localising force that will counter
the tendency to allocate all tasks in the system to the agent with the highest
energy level. Thus, when an agent relays a bid to the auctioneer the bid is
increased by a constant commission factor. Bids from far away will therefore
appear more expensive to the auctioneer, causing it to favour nearby nodes.
The resultant bid that is received by the auctioneer can be expressed as
Brx = z

emax
erem
+ cos

(1 + k)
dbid (3.4.2)
where k is the commission value (between 0 and 1) and dbid the number of
hops the bid has been relayed. Note that, for k = 0, distance does not make
a dierence to the received bid value. This approach does not completely
eliminate allocation collisions, but does reduce their occurrence substantially.
Note that commission does not necessarily have to be multiplicative |
I chose it based on the similarity to real-world nancial transactions, where
commission is often levied as a percentage of the transaction cost. To best
capture the system-level energy consumption, additive commission could also be
used. However, for the transfer distances used in my experiments, the dierence
between the two approaches is minimal.
In terms of communication cost, the negotiation packets (auction announce-
ment, bid, allocation and acknowledgement messages) are all relatively small,
in the order of tens to hundreds of bytes. Task transferral usually involves
more data, however, as the state of the task and any associated data must be
transferred. For example, if the task at hand involves the merging of images
from dierent sources, the image data needs also to be transferred, which re-
sults in orders of magnitude more data than the negotiation packets. In the
cost calculations in subsequent chapters I will therefore distinguish between the
cost of negotiation packets (ctx) and the cost of task transferral (ctf). To relate
these two values, we can express ctf as ctx scaled by a constant factor ():
ctf = ctx
 therefore denes the dierence in energy cost between negotiating an alloca-
tion, and transferring the task for execution.
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3.4.2 Optimisation
While the above scenario is promising in its task allocation ability, we can rene
it to more eciently utilise the communication resources available. I achieve
this by limiting auction range and by aggregating bids.
The case for limiting the auction range is argued rst. If an auctioneer
wants to allocate a task in a very large network with n workers, an auction
announcement will be propagated to all individuals (n messages). A subset of
these agents will respond, but in the worst case all n. Their bid messages are
relayed back to the auctioneer, resulting in up to
n(n+1)
2 messages. The total
number of messages sent in the negotiation phase is therefore proportional to
n2. However, due to the high commission on long distance allocations, local
workers will be preferred. We can exploit this preference for local allocation
by limiting the propagation distance of the auction message through a time-
to-live (TTL)3 mechanism, without signicantly impacting on the allocation
performance. The set of workers participating in an auction is called the auction
community, which covers an area up to dttl hops away from the auctioneer. The
number of workers participating in an auction will be n0, where n0 < n, with
the exact value of n0 determined by the network topology and dttl.
The second improvement involves aggregating bids to only relay the best
bid. If we refer back to Figure 3.8d, note that the auctioneer will receive
multiple bids from neighbouring workers that represent more distant bidders.
The relaying of these bid messages results in the n2 term identied above, which
in turn is the greatest contributor to the total communication cost. If workers
aggregate bids and only forward the winning bid for their local sub-trees, the n2
factor is replaced by n, drastically cutting the communication overhead. A more
detailed derivation of the communication complexity is given in Section 5.3.1.
Note the similarity between the aggregation of bids and data aggregation
used by Intanagonwiwat et al. (2003). In both cases only the required infor-
mation is transmitted to the destination: the auctioneer only needs to receive
the winning bid to make an allocation. An additional benet of bid aggrega-
tion is that processing is spread across the network, thereby eliminating scaling
problems in that regard.
3.4.3 The global view
When the allocation process executes concurrently across the network, we nd
that the system self-organises into zones of allocation around auctioneers allo-
3The term time-to-live is derived from the equivalent TTL mechanism used in internet
protocol packets.
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cating similar types of task components. The sizes of the zones are determined
by the distribution of bidding agents, their individual energy levels, the num-
ber of tasks injected into the system, and the topology of the network. This
auction mechanism is equivalent to a reverse sealed-bid auction, but it is truly
distributed. Not only do all agents have to act as temporary auctioneers, but
all agents in the auction area help to calculate the winner.
The topological constraints on information exchange is similar to the dis-
cussed in Robinson (2002) | the agents that make up a market are physically
co-located. One signicant dierence between Robinson's work and mine is
that my allocation mechanism uses the relaying of bids to increase the size
of the auction community, while he treats the auction community as a given
with no explicit concept of communication cost. This means that my allocation
approach will cope better with sparse networks, where the local community is
very small, because relayed bids provide an ecient mechanism for enlarging
the auction community.
Currency is primarily used as a communication metaphor; no actual money
changes hands, nor can nodes go bankrupt or get rich. Our interest lies in
the management of the entire system, not in the success of an individual agent
(although agents do try maximise utility by allocating to worker that quotes
the lowest price). This view of prices for communicating the state of the system
recalls Hayek's concept of price signals: the change in prices in a free market
communicates information to agents in the system which allows them to solve
the distributed allocation problem, even without knowing exactly what it is
(Hayek, 1945). In our case the price signals communicate the availability of
resources (agents with skills and enough energy), which in turn determines
the allocation patterns. If one area is exploited, prices will increase, causing
allocation to shift to another area. The allocation auction can therefore also
be seen as a particular type of negotiation mechanism.
3.4.4 Task-centric routing
This allocation mechanism makes no assumptions about the underlying routing
architecture and can therefore be implemented in a number of dierent ways.
However, the ad hoc information generated during an auction can be used to
implement a novel task-centric routing protocol that is closely integrated with
the task allocation mechanism.
In the majority of communication networks, routing is address-based: pack-
ets are sent from someone with a unique identier, to another node with a dier-
ent identier. To relay communication between these individuals, intermediate
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nodes use routing tables that describe how messages should be forwarded. The
information in these routing tables needs to be maintained to allow eective
packet delivery, which complicates network management in dynamic topologies.
For this reason, I propose the use of a task-centric routing for distributed satel-
lite systems; this is supported by the data-centric routing approach proposed
by Gnawali et al. (2005) for inter-satellite networks.
When it comes to task allocation we are no longer bound to using identities.
If an auctioneer wants to allocate a task, it is concerned with the capabilities
and resources of the potential bidder, not its name. In my task-centric routing
scheme communication is routed according to the task it is associated with,
which greatly limits the overhead. Paths are established on an ad hoc basis:
under normal conditions this would be prohibitively expensive, but as the re-
quired paths can be constructed using information visible during auctions, it
has no additional cost in the system. When auction announcement messages
are ooded through the network, a node will only forward the packets if:
1. it has enough energy to transfer a task,
2. the announcement message time-to-live has not been exceeded, and
3. the node has not forwarded an announcement packet for the particular
auction, i.e., the task identier associated with the packet has not been
seen before).4
Packets will therefore propagate across the network over nodes with su-
cient energy to ensure reliable communication, forming a spanning tree across
the network. By only forwarding one packet for a particular auction, cycles in
the routing network are avoided.
In terms of implementation, a task-centric approach to routing can be re-
alised if all nodes maintain two tables. By indexing these tables with the task
identier, the next hop for a packet can be determined as the packet travels
through the network. The rst table is used for \upstream" routing: it con-
tains the next hop towards an auctioneer. When an auction announcement is
ooded across the network, the address of the transmitting neighbour is added
to this table, along with the task identier. When bids and acknowledgement
messages are relayed, the node selects as destination the neighbour specied
4An alternative propagation rule relays packets if the path they followed to from the
auctioneer to the node is via higher capacity intermediaries than that followed by previous
announcement packets, with a trade-o for distance. This could help the system performance
by distributing communication to under-utilised nodes. In my simulations I only used the
shortest path propagation, as preliminary experiments did not suggest a signicant improve-
ment for more advanced route construction approaches.
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in this table. The second table is the downstream routing table. Entries are
added to this table when the node relays a bid back towards the auctioneer.
Bids that are not relayed are not entered into the routing table. If an allocation
message is received, a node can use the downstream entry of the corresponding
task to relay it to the next neighbour, because bid aggregation only requires the
winning bid to be transmitted. The same applies to task transferral messages.
Information is only stored for the duration of an auction; the maximum
sizes of these tables are therefore fairly small, and the node can safely remove
routing information when an auction is complete. The sizes of the routing
tables are largely determined by the number of simultaneous auctions in which
the node is involved, which in turn depends on the network topology and dttl.
As a result, the processing requirements on intermediate nodes are minimal:
the tables are indexed using unique task identiers, and data is only written to
the table on specic packet events.
This routing approach shares a number of similarities to the data-centric
routing approach used in directed diusion (Intanagonwiwat et al., 2003): nodes
do not need to know the topology of the network, nor what other nodes are
out there. Routing tables are constructed using only local information | the
auction announcement and bid messages provide enough information for up-
and downstream routing. Whereas directed diusion constructs a routing land-
scape in which the gradient shows the shortest path to the sink node, my routing
mechanism aims only to maintain a route between auctioneer and bidders until
the task is allocated.
3.4.5 Assumptions and limitations
As with any model, a number of assumptions are made in the abstraction
process. The model is valid for part of the parameter space for which these as-
sumptions hold. We need to clearly identify these assumptions before exploring
the model in any detail.
 The allocation mechanism assumes that a single task component needs
to be allocated per auction. If multiple tasks regularly needed concurrent
allocation multiple auctions would suce, but a more ecient mechanism
could be designed.
 Communication is treated as deterministic and pair-wise bidirectional:
two nodes will communicate successfully if they are within range of each
other. In reality though, wireless communication is more accurately mod-
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elled as a stochastic process. This will need to be considered if systems
with unreliable communication systems are investigated.
 Sucient bandwidth is assumed to be available to not warrant explicit
consideration in the model. The number of transmitted packets is fairly
low, conrming the validity of this assumption. This simulation should
therefore not be seen as an accurate model of systems with very low
bandwidth.
 This task model assumes that agents can estimate their own internal
energy cost in completing a task | this information is used in the when
bidding for task components. This is not unreasonable, as the resource
cost associated with a task can be characterised quite accurately. Note,
however, that agents still have to estimate their outsourcing costs, as this
information is unknown at the time of bidding.
3.5 Discussion
In this chapter I have described the development of a task allocation mechanism
inspired by human labour markets. A scenario of a distributed satellite system
was used as a starting point to build an abstracted multi-agent model. A subset
of the characteristics of this model is shared with other multi-agent allocation
problems, namely multi-component tasks, expensive communication, limited
energy, heterogeneous agents, a spatially distributed network, node failure, and
a volatile topology. The objectives of maximised allocation, robustness and
scalability were identied. Tasks were dened, and a task allocation model
described in terms of a labour market. This market serves as an inspiration to
the proposed task allocation mechanism for distributed satellite systems, which
was described in the nal section.
Adam Smith identied markets as encouraging the division of labour and
resulting in specialisation of skills which leads to increased productivity. In
this system I invert the causal relationship between these elements: specialised
agents are a given, as they can increase the eciency of the system. We then
dene a market-like mechanism to handle the allocation of labour. The resulting
system exhibits the desirable characteristics of \natural" markets: eciency,
robustness and scalability.
Although not explicitly designed as such, this system shows some similar-
ities with the contract net protocol (Smith, 1980) as well as the various other
market-based allocation schemes proposed over the years. The key distinguish-
ing features of my allocation scheme are the following:
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 The use of a spatially distributed auction to allocate tasks. The auction
mechanism is fully distributed, with nodes across the network involved in
calculating the winning bid.
 The inclusion of communication cost as a signicant factor in system
eciency.
 A novel commission parameter is used to localise allocation, and balance
energy expenditure between communication and task completion. This
does not require knowledge of the network size or topology.
In the following chapters I will further explore the behaviour of the alloca-
tion mechanism.
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Behaviour of the task allocation mechanism
The previous chapter presented the design process for the task allocation mech-
anism to be used in distributed satellite systems. This model is fairly complex,
with a number of interdependent parameters determined by both the applica-
tion (e.g., communication cost) and the allocation mechanism (e.g., dttl). Before
I explore the parameter space, it is necessary to discuss the basic dynamics of
the allocation mechanism. In this chapter I focus on the behaviour of the task
allocation mechanism in a number of basic scenarios. The experiments conrm
the suitability of the allocation mechanism for distributed satellite systems,
but also help us to understand how it works, thus providing a foundation for
understanding the more complex dynamics we will encounter in later chapters.
Thus, in order to gain familiarity with the allocation mechanism, this chapter
looks at both the way tasks are distributed out across the system and how the
it responds to node failure.
4.1 Task allocation
The primary objective of the system is to achieve eective allocation of tasks.
As discussed in the model design section, this requires that tasks be distributed
across nodes in a manner that is sensitive to the available energy of individuals,
while also taking the network topology and communication cost into account.
In this chapter I explore the qualitative behaviour of the allocation mechanism
through simulation.
4.1.1 Single auctioneer
As the behaviour of the system is our primary concern, I restrict the initial
scenario in a number of ways that make it easier to follow the allocation process.
The simplest allocation example is the case where we have an auctioneer at
one end of a linear network, as shown in Figure 4.1. The other nodes act as
homogeneous worker agents, with the same initial energy and skills. The tasks
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Figure 4.1: Linear network with one auctioneer, every node represents an agent.
The shaded node (1) acts as auctioneer and allocates tasks to the other nodes,
who all have the same capabilities. The task allocation mechanism favours
nodes that are located closer to the auctioneer, due to a combination of the
commission parameter and the eect of transmission cost.
are single element tasks, with the structure:
A ! a
Note that although any node could theoretically act as an auctioneer, this
simplied task structure means only the rst node will allocate tasks. The
network topology is static, without node failures or mobility. Communication
has a xed cost of 0.001 units per negotiation packet (ctx = 0:001), while task
transfer messages have a cost of 0.1 units (ctf = 0:1). One task is allocated
every 100 time steps, using the auction procedure described in the previous
chapter. Tasks initially have a size (z) of 1, at t = 5000 time steps the task
size is increased to 2, thus increasing the load on the system. Commission is
set to 5%, i.e., k = 0:05. Nodes have a maximum energy capacity of 10 units,
if it falls below this level, it regenerates at a rate of 0.003 units per time step
per node. Three distinct states can be discerned if we observe the node energy
levels over time, as shown in Figure 4.2.
In the settling phase (t < 1000), all the worker nodes start with the same
energy, and will therefore initially calculate the same bid value (B). As there
is no outsourcing cost, equation 3.4.1 reduces to give the bid value as:
B = z

emax
erem

(4.1.1)
Bid values therefore communicate the energy available to a specic agent. How-
ever, the value received by the auctioneer is modied by the commission pa-
rameter, which increases the cost of relayed bids with every hop:
Brx = z

emax
erem

(1 + k)
dbid (4.1.2)
The auctioneer will therefore allocate the task to the nearest agent (Node 2 in
Figure 4.1). This process is repeated with further tasks and other nodes; chang-
ing energy levels will mean that occasionally a distant bid is more competitive
than a local one. The net result is that the allocation tends to cluster around
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Figure 4.2: Normalised energy levels over time for worker nodes in network
shown in Figure 4.1, the auctioneer is not shown. One task is allocated every
100 time steps, at t = 5000 the size of the task is increased. The step changes in
energy show where tasks are allocated, nodes' energy levels recover slowly over
time. Three distinct allocation phases can be observed: settling (t < 1000),
steady state (1000 < t < 5000) and overload (t > 5000).
the auctioneer. The strength of localisation is determined by the commission
parameter: a high commission (more than 20%) will concentrate tasks more
strongly around the auctioneer, a lower commission results in a atter alloca-
tion over a greater number of nodes. This settling phase is usually observed as
a transient at the beginning of a simulation, or when task allocation is bursty.
The system reaches steady state when the amount of energy being added
to the system (e.g., satellites recharging their batteries using solar energy) is
equal to the energy being expended on work and communication. In this state
the tasks are allocated to nodes close to the auctioneer with an almost uniform
distribution. The energy consumption of the closer nodes is still greater than
the ones that are further away. This is because the closer nodes have to expend
a signicant amount of energy relaying messages and transferring tasks to the
more distant nodes. The number of nodes in the allocation area is enough to
allow the incident (incoming) energy to match the cost of task execution and
communication. The unused nodes remain fully charged and cannot store any
of the incident energy.
An overload condition can be caused if the workload exceeds the energy
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Figure 4.3: Linear network with two auctioneers (nodes 1 and 9). Tasks are
allocated from both ends of the network to the worker nodes in between. All
workers have exactly the same capabilities (except for position); the resulting
allocation pattern sees Node 1 utilising workers 2 to 4, while Node 9 allocates
to the workers at 6 to 8. Node 5 accepts an approximately equal number of
tasks from both auctioneers.
added to the system: all nodes will eventually be fully exploited. However,
as the node energy levels decrease, the emax
erem term grows dramatically, which
in turn decreases the localising eect of commission. As a result, we observe
a attening of the allocation distribution as the mean node energy decreases.
The number of active nodes is therefore maximised for as long as possible. If a
node's energy falls too low, it cannot accept more tasks or communicate until
it has recovered suciently. This condition can be seen in Figure 4.2 where
t > 5000.
4.1.2 Multiple auctioneers
To demonstrate the interaction between multiple auctioneers, I briey discuss
the allocation pattern that results from having two auctioneers at either end of
a linear network, as shown in Figure 4.3. The auctioneers allocate tasks at the
same rate. The other parameters of the example in Section 4.1.1 are kept the
same.
Two auctioneers cause tasks to arrive in the system from either end. The
allocation dynamics are very similar to the single auctioneer case, with alloca-
tion close to an auctioneer preferred. However, we observe that two zones of
inuence form around the auctioneers: the one on the left only allocates tasks
up to the node in the centre of the network, while the area on the right receives
tasks from the other auctioneer. If a node is positioned exactly in the centre
between the auctioneers, allocation alternates between them (this assumes a
regular rate of task allocation that is the same for both auctioneers).
Note that there is no direct communication between the auctioneers. No
global knowledge is used to calculate this partitioning, nor does the centrally
located node notify either of them of the other's existence. Instead, it emerges
from the low-level interaction between the nodes. A feedback loop is formed
by basing bids on the available energy: a node that receives work regularly is
less likely to be allocated more tasks. The bid values eectively communicate
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the state of the network to the auctioneer. The shape of the partitioning
is determined by the distribution of available skills, the energy levels of the
nodes in the vicinity, and the task load of the auctioneer. Variations in these
parameters will result in changes in the size and shape of the partitioning. For
example, if one auctioneer has twice as many tasks to allocate as the other, its
zone of inuence will be signicantly larger than the other's. The dependence
on network topology also means allocation can adapt rapidly to failure of a
node. Note that the auctioneer does not keep a map of the agents in his area,
instead their energy levels serve as a distributed memory of their utilisation.
4.1.3 The role of commission
This thesis introduces commission as a useful parameter to abstract the spatial
properties of the network into a single value that can be used to inuence
allocation. In the discussions above, I have already highlighted the localising
force of commission: it encourages local allocation by making relayed bids from
distant nodes more expensive. This can decrease the communication required
in task allocation and transfer.
Another eect of adding commission to bids is that it breaks symmetry ties.
If two tasks of the same type are auctioned simultaneously to overlapping auc-
tion communities, the ttest agent will place the lowest bids in both auctions.
With no commission, both auctioneers will allocate to this agent, but only one
will succeed. The other auction will therefore have to be repeated. While
this may seem like a minor eect, in networks that have mostly homogeneous
nodes, simultaneous tasks, multiple auctioneers, and where the auction com-
munity covers a signicant portion of the network, these conicting allocations
can occur frequently. When commission is not equal to 0%, however, many of
these conicting allocations will be avoided. For the auctioneers to still receive
equal bids, the distance in hops from both auctioneers to the agent must be
the same too.
A special case occurs when the system has no commission (k = 0) and the
transmission cost is zero (ctx = 0): the allocation changes to a round-robin
pattern. With every allocation a node's energy would be reduced to below that
of the other worker nodes, which results in subsequent tasks being allocated to
other nodes with a greater remaining energy.
Negative commission, where relayed bid values are decreased with every
hop, will amplify the distributive element of allocation, pushing task allocation
to the outer limits of the auctioneers' zones. This could serve as a useful
mechanism to facilitate long-distance distribution of tasks, but investigating it
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is beyond the scope of this work.
An optimal value of k could be determined for a particular network, but it
is dependent on the topology, workload and energy regeneration characteristics
of the system. Even then, the relative benet of dierent commission values is
small. The establishment of zones of allocation provides the largest component
of the performance gain, and this behaviour depends more on the existence
of commission than any particular value thereof. In my opinion, only stable
topologies will benet signicantly from optimising k. In the majority of cases,
a value between 5% and 20% should be sucient, or at least provide a good
starting point for further optimisation.
4.1.4 Discussion
The above examples demonstrate the allocation dynamics that result from the
proposed task allocation strategy. Tasks are preferentially allocated close to
the auctioneer, in a manner that distributes energy consumption to maximise
network lifetime. This veries the obvious primary requirement of the allocation
mechanism, namely that it must allocate tasks eectively.
Implicit groupings were observed to arise due to the spatial proximity of
specic agents, where repeated interactions can be observed. This partitioning
into zones of inuence occurs without global information or decision making; it
is the emergent result of the interaction between agents. This could be seen as
an emergent form of the transaction cost theories for the existence and structure
of rms (Axtell, 1999). The sensitivity of the allocation to topology, workload
and agent availability, means the mechanism autonomously adapts to changes.
4.2 Robustness
Tasks are allocated according to the available energy of a node and the node's
distance from the auctioneer. With the basic dynamics of the allocation mech-
anism described above, we can now consider the more challenging scenario of
node failures. The objective is once again to improve our understanding of dy-
namics that result from interactions between agents, while also conrming the
allocation mechanism's potential for robustness. It should be noted, however,
that this is but a single point in parameter space: not enough to contribute to
an emergent taxonomy. I will therefore extend this investigation in the following
chapter.
The ad hoc nature of running a new auction for every allocated task means
the system will rapidly adapt to changes in topology, such as those caused by
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.4: Task distribution shifts to reect changes in the network. In (a)
the dotted line shows the area in which the majority of tasks sold by each
auctioneer (shaded node) nd their allocation. The nodes intersected by the
dotted line receive tasks from both auctioneers. If a node fails, we lose both its
capacity to complete jobs and its routing functionality. The relative distances
(measured in number of hops between nodes) and loading of nodes will change,
resulting in a new distribution of labour in the network (b).
node failures. As an example, the linear networks of the previous section are
expanded to a more realistic two-dimensional arrangement in Figure 4.4, which
demonstrates how the zones of inuence will shift in the event of a node failure.
To quantify the robustness of the proposed market-based allocation ap-
proach, I compare it to idealised control strategies. I am specically interested
in the eect of failures on the system level behaviour | I therefore use the
number of tasks successfully allocated as a metric. Robustness can then be
measured as the change in performance due to failures.1
4.2.1 Simulation setup
The market-based allocation scheme is used in a network with 100 nodes ar-
ranged in a 10 by 10 square lattice formation. Nine of the nodes act as sources
of tasks; the remaining 91 are worker nodes. To simplify the description of
time-dependent events, and relate the simulation to a space mission scenario, I
divide simulation time into \days" of 100 time steps each. Tasks are introduced
to the system at the beginning of each day at a rate of 9 tasks per day. Initially
each auctioneer receives one task for allocation, but they may fail just as worker
nodes can. In this case tasks continue to enter the system at a constant rate,
with excess tasks distributed randomly across the pool of remaining auction-
1The work in this section formed part of my paper submission to ECAL 2009 (van der
Horst et al., 2009).
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eers. Nodes have a uniformly distributed failure probability of 0.001 per day
per node. Approximately half the nodes fail after 800 days.
Whereas previous discussions used tasks of constant size, here I vary their
energy cost according to a Weibull distribution with shape parameter  = 2
and scale  = 2. The Weibull distribution is commonly used in simulation to
represent task durations. The distribution captures the idea that most tasks
will have a characteristic duration, with some outliers taking much longer, and
the shortest possible duration being logically bounded by zero (Law and Kelton,
2000). Duration can be treated as being equivalent to size (i.e., energy cost) in
this model.
The recharging of batteries from solar panels is implemented by increasing
nodes' energy by 0.15 units per day, up to a maximum of 10 units per node.
The recharging happens continuously over the course of the day. Transmission
cost is set to 0.001 units per packet for negotiation packets (ctx), and 0.1 units
for task transferral (ctf). Commission (k) is xed at 20%. The atomic task
structure used in Section 4.2.3 is used again:
A ! a
4.2.2 Candidate allocation schemes
Three alternative allocation strategies are used to compare robustness. I have
opted for idealised versions of centralised control, as they can provide a common
reference. Although the following systems could not be built the real world,
they do provide useful measures for comparison with other systems.
The ideal case represents the best possible performance; as such it provides a
theoretical upper-bound on allocation. This assumes an omniscient controller
that has perfect knowledge of the network: both topology and the internal
states of nodes. The controller can communicate cost-free with any node, with-
out being constrained by network topology. Allocation is eectively treated as
a bin packing problem: for every task, the controller nds the worker node with
the most remaining energy and assigns the task to it. The controller is con-
sidered immune against failure. This model corresponds to the most abstract,
mathematical view of the allocation problem.
In the centralised approach, we have an intelligent central controller that
controls a network of simpler workers. The level of realism is increased by rein-
troducing the network topology and transmission costs. This allocation scheme
approximates the performance of a central controller in a realistic network, and
is subject to most of the same constraints as the market-based approach. The
single controller node is positioned in the centre of the same lattice. The re-
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maining 99 nodes are workers, as opposed to 91 workers for the market-based
control case. The controller has perfect information about the energy levels
of nodes in the network, as well as the topology of the network | we ignore
the cost of maintaining this information. Tasks are again assigned as in the
ideal case, with the additional constraint that to allocate a job to a node, a
valid path must exist between the central controller and the selected worker
node. A path is valid if all nodes along it are active and have enough energy for
transmission. Just as in the market-based control case, nodes along the path
have their energy decreased by 0.1 units when communicating the allocation of
a task, however no negotiation packets are transmitted.
As the controller node in the centralised approach is a single point of failure,
we assume that in a real mission scenario, it would incorporate redundancy to
decrease its vulnerability. I therefore model this node as being immune to
failure in the centralised with immunity (CI) case. All other variables are the
same as used in the centralised approach.
4.2.3 Performance
The system was allowed to settle into steady state behaviour, as described
in Section 4.1.1, before enabling the failure of nodes. The number of tasks
successfully assigned was measured at intervals of 100 days and normalised
with respect to the steady-state performance of the ideal allocator. This was
repeated 80 times to obtain an average behaviour; the resulting performance is
shown in Figure 4.5.
The ideal system can be seen to form an upper bound on the allocation
success. It deteriorates over time as the number of failed nodes increases and
the system's capacity to complete jobs decreases. The market-based approach
displays lower initial performance: due to the energy cost of communication it
accommodates only 76.9% of the tasks the ideal case does. The energy used on
communication could not be utilised in executing tasks, resulting in the lower
performance. Steady-state performance drops to 68.9% for both centralised
control schemes, because of the larger portion of the energy budget spent on
communication (the average path length when allocating tasks is greater than
with distributed allocation). Progressive node failure decreases the total capac-
ity of the network: allocation paths become longer and use more energy, and
the network is fragmented when all routes to functioning nodes are cut. This is
reected in the steep slope of the centralised, CI and market-based control data.
The sensitivity of the network to failure of the central controller is signicant,
as can be seen when comparing the centralised approach to CI.
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Figure 4.5: Performance and robustness of dierent allocation strategies. Net-
work performance is measured by the total number of tasks allocated, nor-
malised with respect to the steady-state performance of the ideal system. The
amount of work stays constant, while nodes fail with a uniform probability.
The ideal case provides an upper bound on the performance because it does
not take communication cost or network topology into account. The market-
based control allocation scheme (MBC) deteriorates faster than the ideal case,
but performs more eciently than the centralised and centralised with immu-
nity (CI) approaches. The error bars indicate the standard error over 80 runs.
4.2.4 Robustness
We dene robustness as the ability of the system to maintain steady-state
performance despite node failures. To compare the robustness of the dierent
systems, the results from Section 4.2.3 are normalised with regards to their
respective steady-state values (Figure 4.6).
The ideal case again provides an upper bound. The centralised case deterio-
rates rapidly, largely due to the whole network collapsing if the controller node
fails. The CI approach performs better, almost as well as the market-based ap-
proach. Both these approaches are subject to network fragmentation, but CI is
denitely more sensitive. Remember that I am proposing the market-based ap-
proach as an allocation mechanism for systems where centralised control is not
suitable. Seeing it outperform an allocator with global knowledge of the system
is therefore a strong conrmation of the viability of the distributed approach.
To express these results in terms of satellite mission reliability, we dene a
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Figure 4.6: Robustness of dierent allocation strategies. In this experiment
the ability of the system to maintain its performance despite node failures is
measured. The performance data from Figure 4.5 is normalised with respect to
the steady-state performance of the respective allocation strategies. The ideal
case shows the theoretical maximum obtainable, if topology and transmission
cost have no inuence. Market-based allocation (MBC) shows a more gradual
deterioration than either of the centralised approaches. The vulnerability of the
network due to failure of the controller node is clearly visible when comparing
the centralised case to CI case. The solid horizontal line indicates 50% of the
initial throughput, which can serve as an operational threshold for satellite
missions. The error bars indicate the standard error over 80 runs.
mission as operational while it delivers more than 50% of its initial throughput.
This is analogous to a satellite system that was designed to perform a certain
amount of work, and will remain useful until its capacity is decreased by half.
The centralised system reaches the 50% limit after 360 simulation days, the
immune-centralised at 525 days and the market-based approach at 605, making
it the most reliable of the three. In spite of having fewer worker nodes, the
performance of the market-based system is superior. This is not only related
to eciency, but also to robustness. In particular, this is a result of having
multiple auctioneers which are able to adapt their allocation to changes in the
network topology and node utilisation. These results are especially promising
for distributed space applications. Launch mass will always be the dominant
factor in total mission cost and, assuming a given launch mass and spacecraft
of equal size, our results show that more work can be done more robustly using
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a market-based approach.
Additional experiments conrmed that the qualitative behaviour of the sys-
tem is robust to variations in parameter values. The qualitative observations
still hold, although some quantitative changes occur. For smaller networks, the
centralised and market-based performance results converge, because the alloca-
tion distance is decreased. If the ratio of transmission cost to task size changes,
the performance will increase (for smaller packets) or decrease (for larger pack-
ets) accordingly. These relationships are explored in more detail in the next
chapter.
4.3 Discussion
This chapter presented the dynamics of the task allocation mechanism designed
for the distributed satellite problem. The objectives were to demonstrate the
validity of the market-based allocation mechanism in terms of eectiveness and
robustness. In addition, this chapter serves as a foundation for the more com-
plicated scenarios presented later in the thesis, by building an understanding
of the allocation dynamics that result from the interactions between agents.
The discussion rst focused on the distribution of tasks in a simple linear
network. The task allocation mechanism balances the distributive force of
energy-aware allocation against the localising eect of commission to allocate
tasks locally, but not over-exploit the nearest nodes. As a result the allocation
pattern is partitioned into zones around auctioneers, reecting the available
worker nodes, energy and task loads. The novel commission parameter plays a
signicant role in this by encouraging auctioneers to allocate tasks locally.
The second half of the chapter focused on the eciency and robustness of
the system, by measuring the behaviour of the market-based allocation mecha-
nism against a number of idealised central allocation models. Node failure de-
creases the maximum number of tasks that can be allocated through decreased
resource availability (fewer workers are available) and network fragmentation.
The market-based approach was shown to perform well under these circum-
stances, slightly outperforming a centralised allocator with full knowledge of
the network, and faring signicantly better than a central controller that is
subject to failure. The improvement in performance is a result of lower system-
level communication costs when assigning jobs, as well as improved robustness
due to the distributed and adaptive nature of the control system.
From a methodological point of view, it is important to note that the auc-
tioneers do not maintain a model of the system to keep track of where tasks are
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allocated, or how nodes perform. Instead the bid values tell them enough about
the part of the system they can inuence to achieve a good allocation. The sys-
tem itself is therefore used as a model, by accessing the states of the nodes
when required. To take liberties with Alfred Korzybski's famous expression, by
using auctions for allocation, our territory becomes the map.
When should system designers use the system as a memory? For it to be
feasible the cost of accessing the system should be low when compared to the
eort of building and maintaining a model. This implies a low communication
cost, or a highly dynamic system, or a system that requires a very complex
model. It also helps if an allocator only needs to take a part of the system into
account when calculating an allocation, as it reduces the amount of information
that needs to be transmitted. One drawback of this approach is a speed penalty:
for spatially distributed system accessing a model is always faster than accessing
the real system.
The approach is warranted in the case of distributed satellite systems, pri-
marily due to the unpredictable dynamics of the system. I would therefore
expect the approach to also be suitable to mobile robotics applications. Rout-
ing in computer networks usually relies on a hybrid model: a system model,
in this case routing tables, is used by default, but if routing fails the physical
system is queried to update the model. The model speeds up routing signi-
cantly, and the network is stable enough to make it useful. At the other end
of the spectrum we nd very stable systems that can best be managed using
detailed models, such as physical geography or telephone numbers. These sys-
tems change very slowly, and searching on the actual system is prohibitively
expensive. The use of models such as road maps and telephone directories is
therefore well-suited to help us navigate these systems.
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In this chapter I explore the parameter space between the areas where we know
centralised allocation should be used, and where we think distributed control in
the form of my proposed market-based allocation approach is applicable. This
represents an early branch in the design process described in Section 2.6.3:
the selection of a specic control process has a signicant impact on the nal
system.1
The objective is to nd ways of determining where each approach is most
suited to my generic model of task allocation, and demonstrate it specically
with the distributed spacecraft problem. I do not want to demonstrate the
absolute superiority of one approach over the other | each has its own region
of applicability which I would like to dene by mapping the relevant part of
parameter space. Although the number of nodes in the network is the most
obvious parameter to explore, performance also depends on the communication
cost and network volatility. This contributes to the exploration of the problem
space: the work in this chapter relates problems that are controllable using
centralised mechanisms to systems that are better suited to distributed control.
5.1 Motivation
Robustness and scalability are frequently used to motivate the usage of decen-
tralised approaches to controlling multi-agent systems. In recent years, how-
ever, distributed control has become an end in itself: a signicant portion of
recent literature claims to be of merit primarily because it demonstrates the
application of such a technique. A separate community supports traditional
centralised approaches, where global knowledge of the system is assumed to be
indispensable. This is usually motivated by claims of veriability or optimality.
The schism between these opposing viewpoints is exacerbated by enthusiasts of
1This chapter is based on work that was accepted to the Workshop on Self-Adaptive
Networks at the IEEE International Conference on Self-Adaptive and Self-Organising Systems
(van der Horst and Noble, 2010).
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either approach constructing problems that suit their preferred control archi-
tectures.
Distributed algorithms are implicitly designed for innitely large systems
(e.g., Shehory and Kraus, 1998), but practical demonstrations of self-organising
control methodologies frequently only employ a modest number of agents. For
example Tripp and Palmer (2010) use up to eighteen satellites, while Krieger
et al. (2000) look at foraging with up to twelve robots. The performance of these
agents is extrapolated to make optimistic claims about large-scale behaviour.
While this approach is valid in a purely mathematical sense, the practicalities
of dealing with increased complexity are being neglected (Durfee, 2004).
At the same time there is an assumption that small systems will be ade-
quately addressed using centralised control. But this raises an important ques-
tion: when should a system be regarded as \small", and when is it \large"? In
other words, when should we use centralised control, and when is distributed
control better? We can easily categorise the extremes, but the central space is
much less clear. This hazy middle-ground is also where a number of real- world
systems can be found, including the problem of task allocation in distributed
satellite systems.
As satellites have traditionally been monolithic entities, the centralised con-
trol mindset dominates the design of these systems. Subsystems are largely
autonomous in function, but not in decision making: for example the attitude
and orbit determination subsystem independently measures and computes the
spacecraft's attitude and orbit parameters, but only when allowed to by the
central computer. This centralised mindset can easily be transferred to a dis-
tributed satellite system: a central \mother ship" monitors the other modules
and instructs them on what to do. While it oers attractive possibilities for ver-
ication and testing, we also know intuitively that this approach will struggle
to scale to thousands of modules. However, for the rst generation of dis-
tributed satellite systems, which is envisaged to be much smaller (ranging in
size from tens to hundreds), centralised control presents a viable approach for
these systems: the optimal task allocation methodology remains unclear.
In this chapter I therefore compare centralised and distributed task alloca-
tion with the goal of nding this transition zone and understanding how it is
inuenced by the scale of the system, the transmission cost, and robustness to
node failures.
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5.2 Centralised allocation
In this section I develop a centralised allocation mechanism to compare market-
based allocation against. This centralised approach is designed to serve as a
fair comparison: it is subject to the same transmission cost constraints as the
market-based allocation version, with reasonable fault-tolerance mechanisms.
A central controller uses global information to compute the best allocation.
The cost involved in building and maintaining the model used to calculate
allocations is of particular interest in this experiment. As stated previously,
the objective is not to prove one approach superior to the other, but rather
to nd the regions of parameter space where either approach dominates. Note
that this centralised allocation scheme was designed to be comparable to the
market-based approach in all aspects. It is therefore signicantly more detailed
and realistic than the approaches used to test robustness in Section 4.2. The
key distinction between the two implementations is that the previous one did
not take the communication cost of maintaining a system model into account;
instead it was assumed that this information was freely available to the manager
node. As I will demonstrate in this experiment, this cost can be signicant if a
certain level of robustness is required in a system with failures.
The network consists of a manager that calculates allocations using a model
of the network, and a number of worker agents that execute tasks on command
from the manager. The workers have the same capabilities as for market-based
allocation: each has a specic skill and limited energy, some of which will be
spent on communication. The manager polls agents to keep track of the avail-
able energy of nodes, their respective skills, and the connections between them.
These messages are ooded through the network at regular status polling inter-
vals (status); every worker responds with its status information. These packets
set up routes between the manager and all workers, and provides the manager
with the necessary information to update its network map, which includes the
capacity of nodes. As the manager knows the eect of all communication and
allocation in the network, it can accurately adjust its view of the network as it
progressively allocates tasks. However, external inuences on the system, such
as node failures, cannot be predicted and require detection. Workers do not
maintain a map of the network: instead they only need to know how to reach
the manager, who will in turn provide them with routing instructions for a task
when they need it.
In describing the allocation process, we will rely on four classes of agents,
distinguished by the roles they full. The originating agent is the one that
detects a new task and initiates the allocation process; the manager agent
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Ground Station
Node1
Node1
Manager
Manager
Node2
Node2
New task upload
New task notification
Calculate allocation
Task transfer instructions
Task transfer
Task received notification
Transfer success notification
Figure 5.1: Message sequence diagram describing the task allocation ow for
centralised control. Node 1 acts as originating node in this task allocation
sequence, while node 2 is the recipient. All messages are addressed messages, no
broadcast messages are sent. Messages can be relayed via intermediate agents
(not shown). The manager is updated at every step of the allocation ow to
maintain an accurate network model. Time increases from top to bottom.
maintains a model of the network topology and node states, which it uses to
determine allocations; the recipient agent is the agent that the task is allo-
cated to; while intermediate agents primarily relay messages between the other
agents.
As with market-based allocation, tasks are initially injected into the system
by the ground station. In the case of compound tasks, new task components
appear in the system when the preceding task element has been completed. The
relevant agent noties the manager via intermediate agents upon detection of
a new task component that needs allocation. The manager then uses its model
of the network to determine the best allocation. The allocation instruction is
then transmitted back to the originating agent. The agent proceeds to transfer
the task to the receiving agent along a route specied by the manager. The
receiving agent acknowledges receipt by transmitting a task-received message
to the manager. The manager .now updates its model to reect the energy
used in transmission and allocation, before relaying the acknowledgement to
the originating node, thereby closing the allocation loop. If the originating
node does not receive the allocation acknowledgement message within a pre-
determined time, it will repeat the allocation process. A message sequence
diagram describing this exchange is shown in Figure 5.1.
The manager agent relies on its model of the network, agent energies, and
resources to determine the best allocation. Upon receipt of a task allocation
request, the manager calculates, for every agent that possesses the necessary
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skills and sucient energy, a gure of merit (Bcc):
Bcc = z
emax
erem
(1 + k)
dtf (5.2.1)
where z is the task size, emax the maximum energy of the node, erem the re-
maining energy, k is the commission and dtf is the distance a potential task
transferral will have to travel. The manager selects the agent with the lowest
Bcc value for task allocation. As in the market-based control case, the allo-
cation therefore favours agents that are relatively underutilised and are close
to the originating agent. Note the similarity between this function and Equa-
tion 3.4.2, although Equation 5.2.1 does not estimate future outsourcing costs.
The elements of compound tasks are allocated one at a time on an ad hoc basis,
with the manager searching for the next suitable worker upon completion of
the preceding task element.
The ability to allocate tasks successfully in a changing environment depends
on the accuracy of the manager's network model and on the workers knowing the
correct route to the manager. Both these factors are determined by the interval
between status polling messages (status) sent by the manager agent. These
messages refresh workers' routes and update the manager's network model.
With a large status the manager is eectively implementing open-loop control,
because it relies purely on its model of the system to allocate tasks. Smaller
values of status provide more feedback, which improves the accuracy of the
model, but it also requires more energy for communication. status therefore
acts as a robustness parameter, which should be adjusted to t the node failure
rate.
The packet time-to-live distance (dttl) plays a similar role when using market-
based allocation. Large dttl values increase the size of the auction community,
which in turn improves the resilience of the allocation mechanism to failures. I
will use these two parameters to draw robustness comparisons in Section 5.5.
5.3 Bounds on task allocation cost
Calculating upper and lower bounds for the task allocation costs of the dierent
approaches allows us to make some predictions on where they might be relevant.
5.3.1 Market-based allocation
I start by developing an analytic description of the energy cost required to
allocate a single task component when using the market-based allocation ap-
proach. The most expensive allocation case occurs when all the nodes in the
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auction community place bids and the winning node is the maximum distance
away from the auctioneer. From the message sequence diagram (Figure 3.9),
we see that this will result in n0 auction announcement messages being broad-
cast. If all nodes in the auction community place bids, this will also result in
n0 bid messages, because each node only forwards the best bid it receives. To
allocate to the most distant node requires dttl messages for each of the alloca-
tion, acknowledgement, task transferral and task acknowledgement steps. The
worst-case total communication cost (cauc), measured on system level, required
to allocate a single task element is therefore:
cauc = 2n0ctx + 3dttlctx + dttlctf (5.3.1)
As discussed in Chapter 3, the transferral of tasks between nodes usually
requires more information, and therefore energy, than the transmission of ne-
gotiation packets (i.e., auction announcement, bid and acknowledgement pack-
ets). We can express the task transfer cost (ctf) in terms of the transmission
cost (ctx), by scaling ctx by a constant factor ():
ctf = ctx (5.3.2)
The auction cost can than therefore be expressed in terms of ctx:
cauc = 2n0ctx + 3dttlctx + dttlctx (5.3.3)
= ctx

2n0 + dttl( + 3)

(5.3.4)
In Equation 5.3.3, the rst two terms represent the negotiation overhead,
while the last term describes the task transferral cost.
If nt tasks consisting of nk components each are allocated, an upper bound
on the total system cost over the duration of the experiment is given by:
cmbcmax = ntnkcauc (5.3.5)
= ntnkctx

2n0 + dttl( + 3)

(5.3.6)
We can see from this expression that the total cost of allocating tasks grows
linearly with the number of tasks (nt), and linearly with the number of agents
in the auction community (n0). The auction community is in turn a function
of the size of the auction community and the network topology | this will be
explored in more detail in Chapter 6. For a constant dttl and a xed topology, n0
will also be constant: the system cost of task allocation is therefore independent
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from the number of nodes in the system. Communication cost ctx has a linear
relationship to cmbcmax, making it a signicant driver of overall system eciency.
Note that this analysis disregards the decrease in auction community size due
to the edges of the network. If this is taken into account, Equation 5.3.6 will
decrease further. This eect will be more signicant for small networks, where
dttl is comparable to the network radius.
We can similarly nd the lower bound on allocation cost by considering the
case where the auctioneer allocates the task to an immediate neighbour, who is
also the only bidder. This decreases the number of bid messages to one, while
the task transferral distance in Equation 5.3.6 is also reduced to 1. A lower
bound on the system level allocation cost is therefore:
cmbcmin = ntnkctx(n0 + 4 + ) (5.3.7)
We can therefore conclude that this market-based task allocation mech-
anism will scale well, because the number of nodes in the network does not
determine the system level allocation cost. Instead, the size of the auction
community is the primary driver of the allocation cost, and this parameter is
frequently controllable by the system designer.
5.3.2 Centralised allocation
The worst-case cost for centralised allocation consists of two parts: an alloca-
tion component, and the cost of updating the model of the system used for
allocation.
The allocation component can be derived from Figure 5.1. The worst-case
cost will occur in a linear network topology, where a task needs to be transferred
from one end to another, and the auctioneer is located next to the receiving
node (Figure 5.2). For a single allocation, this conguration maximises the task
transferral distance (n), as well as the distance between the originating and the
manager nodes (n-1). The allocation cost is therefore given by:
calloc = ctx(n   1) + ctx(n   1) + ctfn + ctx + ctx(n   1) (5.3.8)
= ctx[3(n   1) + n + 1] (5.3.9)
= ctx [n( + 3)   2] (5.3.10)
If nt tasks of nk components each are allocated, an upper bound on the
total allocation cost over the course of an experiment is given by:
calloctotal = ntnkctx [n( + 3)   2] (5.3.11)
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1 2
Manager
(n-1) hops 1 hop
Figure 5.2: Worst-case topology when using centralised allocation. The shaded
node acts a manager, node 1 is the originating node, and node 2 is the recipient.
This topology maximises the task transferral distance (n) and the communica-
tion distance between the manager and the originating node.
The centralised manager also requires status updates to maintain its model
of the system. A polling packet is ooded from the manager through the
network to update routes between nodes and the manager | this requires up
to n transmissions. Nodes reply to the manager with their skills and energy
levels which provide the data for updating the network model. The worst-case
update scenario again occurs in a linear topology, where the number of status
packets is given by n2 n
2 . If we assume the update packets are the same size as
negotiation packets, the energy cost of a single update (cstatus) is:
cstatus = nctx + ctx
n2   n
2
(5.3.12)
= ctx

n +
n2   n
2

(5.3.13)
=
1
2
ctx(n2 + n) (5.3.14)
The fact that these status updates occurs at intervals of status, allows us to
calculate an upper bound on the total energy spent on updates of the course of
an experiment with duration T:
T X
t=0
cstatus =
ctxT(n2 + n)
2status
(5.3.15)
When combined with the total allocation cost (Equation 5.3.11), this gives
the worst-case, system-level communication expenditure:
ccc = calloctotal +
T X
t=0
cstatus (5.3.16)
) cccmax = ntnkctx [n( + 3)   2] +
ctxT(n2 + n)
2status
(5.3.17)
Note that cccmax is dominated by the n2 term that results from status up-
dates. This means that in systems with large n a great deal of energy will be
expended on maintaining the manager's system model. In the case of open-loop
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control (status ! 1), the allocation cost is linear with respect to all the pa-
rameters in the allocation term, including the number of nodes in the system.
As with market-based allocation, the system is also sensitive to the value of
ctx | in fact it will be even more sensitive due to the linear relationship with
system size (n) rather than the with the constant n0. For a small number of
nodes and a signicant , the rst term of the expression will dominate, but as
the network scales the maintenance cost grows quadratically.
The centralised approach is also signicantly more sensitive to the value
of  than market-based allocation. For centralised control,  is multiplied
by n, while market-based control is limited by dttl. In other words, the task
transferral distance is bounded by network size in the centralised case, instead
of being capped by the packet time-to-live distance.
For the lower bound, we consider the case where the originating node, man-
ager node and recipient node are all direct neighbours of each other. All com-
munication happens between these nodes, which results in an allocation cost
of:
calloc = 4ctx + ctf (5.3.18)
= ctx( + 4) (5.3.19)
The lowest status update cost results when the network is fully connected
| no relaying of status packets is necessary. In this case, as status update will
consist of n status request messages, and n responses, giving the status update
cost as:
T X
t=0
cstatus =
2ctxTn
status
(5.3.20)
A lower bound on the system-level cost is therefore given by the sum of
Equations 5.3.19 and 5.3.20:
cccmin = ntnkctx( + 4) +
2ctxTn
status
(5.3.21)
This results in a much smaller allocation cost, but the maintenance cost remains
dependent on the number of nodes in the system, regardless of where tasks are
allocated. Note that this is a rather loose lower bound | in realistic scenarios,
allocation and communication will never be conned to the space immediately
surrounding the manager node. If the characteristics of a particular network
topology are known, the status update cost can be estimated more accurately.
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Table 5.1: Compound task structure used in experiments. The execution of
task elements (left-hand column) results in another task element (right-hand
column) that must be executed. Tasks are only considered complete if all the
task elements are successfully executed. Nodes have skills that are randomly
selected from the set a;b;c;d;e.
A ! aB
B ! bC
C ! cD
D ! dE
E ! e
5.4 Experimental setup
The above analysis provides us with some insight on system performance under
ideal conditions, with a stable network topology. To measure the response
of the respective allocation strategies to node failure, I use simulation.2 The
objective of the experiment is to determine the relationship between robustness
and failure rate, and the system performance in terms of tasks allocated and
energy eciency. The intention is not to optimise for a specic scenario: it
is my opinion that the resulting map of trade-os parameters provides more
useful information to system designers, and oers a more complete view of the
problem space.
The test network initially consists of 225 agents in a 15 by 15 lattice topol-
ogy. Agents can communicate directly only with their immediate neighbours
to the north, south, east and west; communication to other agents must be re-
layed via these neighbours. Every agent has a skill or specialization randomly
selected with a uniform distribution from the set of types fa;b;c;d;eg. Two
compound tasks are injected into the network every 100 time steps, over a total
duration of 2000 time steps. These tasks consist of ve sequential components,
each of which requires one unit of energy to execute. The causal dependencies
between the components are shown in Table 5.1.
Transmission cost was xed at 0.01 units for a negotiation packet and 1
for a task transfer packet, i.e., the value of  was 100. Even though the basic
model includes the possibility that agents will run out of energy, agents in the
simulation runs described have eectively been supplied with innite energy.
This was done in order to separate the eects of node failure from node ex-
2For the simple network topology under discussion a analytical model of performance
could be built, with a stochastic element to capture failures, but it would be specic to the
network. The use of simulation allows multiple set-ups to be explored, and allows the dynamic
behaviour of the system to be captured.
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haustion, due to the large amount of energy used by the centralised allocation
approach. Thus the focus is eectively on the allocation overhead, rather than
the energy used in task execution.
5.4.1 Node failure
An agent is removed from the network when it fails: not only can it not perform
any work, but its connections with other nodes are broken, disrupting routing
and network topology. In this experiment an exponential distribution is used
to model agent failures, where the shape parameter () is the failure rate.
f(t;) =
(
e t t  0
0 t < 0
(5.4.1)
The failure rate () is varied from 0 for no failures, to 10 4 for a mean of 192
observed failures over a full run of 2000 time steps.
5.4.2 Robustness parameters
A higher failure rate requires greater robustness from the task allocation mech-
anism. With market-based allocation this is achieved by modifying the size
of the auction community. I therefore range dttl from 3 to 8, which results in
an auction community size ranging from 24 up to 144, although communities
limited by the edge of the network are smaller. Central allocation is more suc-
cessful if the model of the network is frequently updated when status is small. I
explore a range of values from 10 to 200, as well as the case where only an initial
update occurs and tasks are allocated in an open-loop fashion. The experiment
was repeated 50 times and the mean value of the results used.
5.5 Results
To compare the two allocation approaches, we look at the mean number of
tasks successfully allocated, and compare it against the energy used to allocate
the tasks.
5.5.1 Task allocation success
A contour plot of the mean number of tasks successfully completed is shown in
Figure 5.3a for market-based allocation and Figure 5.3b for centralised control.
This is shown for a range of failure rates and a signicant variation in the
robustness parameter (dttl for market-based allocation, status for centralised
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control). Standard error values range from 0, when  is small, to 0.951 for
market-based allocation and 0.707 for centralised allocation. Note the similarity
in the shape of the landscapes formed by the allocation schemes. Both exhibit
a strong deterioration as  increases, due to the higher number of failures. The
decrease in performance is more rapid for centralised control. A top to bottom
deterioration is also visible | in both graphs the greatest robustness is shown
at the top. We observe that for small values of dttl market-based allocation
fails to allocate successfully even when no failures occur. Centralised control is
always successful in a network where no nodes fail.
5.5.2 Energy consumption
In some networks the amount of energy used by the system (individually and
cumulatively) has a tangible impact on the system's performance and overall
cost. I have already described distributed satellite systems as having this char-
acteristic, as larger batteries and solar panels will increase launch mass and
mission cost. Although this experiment treats nodes as having innite energy,
we can use the measured energy consumption to predict where the respective
allocation approaches will perform well.
Figure 5.4a shows the total energy usage when using market-based alloca-
tion over the same values of node failure rate and time-to-live range as shown in
Figure 5.3a. Note that for a given failure rate, increasing robustness by increas-
ing dttl results in higher energy usage. Figure 5.4b shows the total energy usage
for a centrally controlled system over the same values of node failure rate and
status update interval as shown in Figure 5.3b. Standard error values range
from 0.11 to 8.17 for market-based allocation, and 0.67 to 140.15 for centralised
control, with the higher values found in the high energy consumption area. As
expected, an increase in robustness comes at the expense of higher energy con-
sumption. In both of these gures it may appear at rst glance that a higher
failure rate is good news. However, this decrease in energy usage only occurs
because fewer tasks are successfully allocated. The main distinction between
the two gures is that high levels of robustness in the centralised control case
are associated with extreme levels of energy consumption, nearly an order of
magnitude greater than for market-based control.
5.5.3 Conditions favouring either approach
When designing a task allocation system, some of the above parameters are im-
posed on the system designer, while others have to be selected. The cumulative
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Figure 5.3: Mean number of tasks successfully allocated over 50 runs using
market-based and centralised control, plotted for a range of node failure rates
(). The measurements are plotted against dttl for market-based control and
status for centralised allocation, i.e., their respective robustness parameters,
with higher robustness at the top of the graph.
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Figure 5.4: Mean energy used in allocating tasks over 50 runs using market-
based control (Figure 5.3a) and centralised control (Figure 5.3b) for a range of
node failure rates (). The measurements are plotted against dttl for market-
based control and status for centralised allocation, i.e., their respective robust-
ness parameters. Note the large amount of energy required for frequent status
updates.
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eect of these parameters will determine whether a market-based or centralised
approach is to be preferred.
For example, suppose the above system is implemented in an environment
where the node failure rate is 1:5  10 4 and we require an average allocation
success of 97:5% (39 out of 40 tasks). Referring to the task allocation graphs
(Figures 5.3a and 5.3b), we nd that a market-based allocation approach re-
quires dttl  5 while the centralised approach requires status  50. On the en-
ergy consumption graphs (Figures 5.4a and 5.4b), these points show expected
energy consumption of 610 units for market-based allocation and 1500 for cen-
tralised allocation. In this particular case, market-based allocation is clearly
the preferred approach.
However, this is not always so: we can use Equations 5.3.6 and 5.3.17 to
estimate the network size for which centralised control and market-based con-
trol will be equivalent in performance. It follows that for smaller networks
centralised control will be favoured. Note that this is an approximate thresh-
old based on the expressions we derived for the bounds on allocation cost in
Section 5.3. For the two-dimensional lattice topology in this experiment, the
Manhattan geometry gives the number of nodes in the auction community as:
n0 =
dttl X
i=0
4i (5.5.1)
For a given time-to-live distance, we can express this sum as:
n0 = 2
 
d2
ttl   dttl

(5.5.2)
As a result, the upper bound on the total allocation cost when using market-
based control (Equation 5.3.6) changes to:
cmbcmax = ntnkcauc (5.5.3)
= ntnkctx

2(d2
ttl   dttl) + dttl( + 3)

(5.5.4)
= ntnkctx

2d2
ttl   2dttl + dttl + 3dttl)

(5.5.5)
= ntnkctx

2d2
ttl + dttl( + 1)

(5.5.6)
while the lower bound can be derived from Equation 5.3.7:
cmbcmin = ntnkctx

2
 
d2
ttl   dttl

+ 4 + 

(5.5.7)
= ntnkctx

2d2
ttl   2dttl + 4 + 

(5.5.8)
The upper bound on allocation cost in a system with centralised control
can be similarly modied to incorporate the eect of the lattice topology. The
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maximum distance between the manager node and any worker node is
p
n,
while the maximum transfer distance is 2
p
n. This gives the upper bound on
allocation cost as:
calloctotal = ntnkctx
p
n(2 + 4) (5.5.9)
The lower bound is still given by Equation 5.3.19:
calloctotal = ntnk(4ctx + ctf) (5.5.10)
= ntnkctx( + 4) (5.5.11)
The total status update cost can be determined much more accurately than
in Section 5.3.2, because the topology of the network is known, and does not
change. For a square lattice, (n 1) status request messages are ooded through
the network. If all nodes send a response, all the messages need to be relayed
back to the manager. For a two-dimensional lattice, the total number of mes-
sages is given by the sum of the Manhattan-distances between the manager
and every worker node in the network. In the case of a square lattice with the
manager located at the centre, the number of packets transmitted for a status
update can be expressed as:
nstatus =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
(n   1) +
p
n X
i=0
4i2  
p
n 1
2 X
i=0
2(2i + 1)
 p
n + 2i + 1

if n is odd
(n   1) +
p
n+1 X
i=0
4i2  
p
n
2 X
i=0
2(2i + 1)
 p
n + 2i + 2

 
p
n 1 X
i=
p
n
2
(4i + 4)   4
p
n
if n is even
(5.5.12)
An upper bound on the energy overhead when using centralised control is
therefore given by:
cccmax = ntnkctx
p
n(2 + 4) +
ctxnstatusT
2status
(5.5.13)
while the lower bound becomes:
cccmin = ntnkctx( + 4) +
ctxnstatusT
2status
(5.5.14)
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Figure 5.5: The expected energy overhead for market-based (red) and cen-
tralised allocation (blue) as a function of network size. The shaded areas indi-
cate the dierence between the upper and lower bounds. In large networks (the
area marked C), market-based allocation will be more energy ecient than
a centralised approach. For small networks (A) nodes, centralised allocation
will probably be preferred. The area where the ranges overlap (B) is more
ambiguous, and simulation will be required to determine the best strategy.
To visualise the eect of network size on the performance of the dierent
allocation mechanisms, I plotted the areas between the upper and lower bounds
for an example conguration in Figure 5.5. In the market-based allocation case
dttl is set to 5, while the centralised approach uses a status update interval of
50. In both cases  is 10 | this relatively small value puts the predicted energy
overhead in a relatively narrow band. All other parameters are kept as in the
experiment above. The intersection of the bounds for the dierent approaches
show where each would be preferred.
The scalability of the market-based approach is clearly demonstrated in the
gure: the energy overhead remains constant for all network sizes.3 In contrast,
the energy required by the centralised approach grows at approximately n
3
2,
primarily due to the increase in the number of status update packets.
For large networks, in the area marked C in Figure 5.5, the market-based
approach is clearly preferred. In contrast, small networks (A) are more suited
3The bound calculations do not take the eects of network edges into account; we can
therefore expect the overhead for the market-based approach to decrease in small networks.
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to centralised control. The area where the two approaches overlap (B) is am-
biguous as to which one would be preferred. In this area simulation is required
to determine the best task allocation mechanism. No special meaning should
be attached to these numbers: they are the result of the parameters of the
scenario and as the parameters change, the intersection will also shift.
An increase in node failures will increase the required energy for both allo-
cation approaches. However, as the previous section indicated, the centralised
approach is much more sensitive and therefore requires more energy. As a
result, the intersection area in Figure 5.5 will move to the left. A very sta-
ble network topology will similarly shift the point of ambivalence to the right,
making centralised control attractive on larger systems.
The eect of the topology is also demonstrated in this example: the
p
n and
d2
ttl terms are determined by the lattice topology. For alternative topologies,
e.g., scale-free networks, these terms would be dierent, again shifting the point
of ambivalence. I will investigate the costs associated with dierent topologies
in more depth in Chapter 6.
For both allocation approaches, total energy usage scales linearly with com-
munication cost (ctx). This means that there will be no point of ambivalence
with respect to this dimension, except when ctx = 0. However, low ctx values
will make the energy dierence between the two approaches less signicant,
potentially allowing other parameters to dictate the best approach.
These calculations only apply to a specic failure rate ( = 1:5  10 4).
For systems with a dierent , the required values for dttl and status will follow
the contours in Figures 5.3a and 5.3b, which will in turn shift the curves in
Figure 5.5 up for increased communication, and down for decreased commu-
nication. A lower failure rate will increase parameter range where centralised
control would be preferred, while a more dynamic network will tend to favour
market-based allocation.
5.6 Discussion
Centralised control is traditionally used for controlling small systems, while self-
organising approaches, such as market-based control, have been proposed for
large systems. In this chapter I explored some of the parameters that determine
whether we should regard a system as \small", or suited to central control; or
\large", where distributed approaches will be better. The results conrm that
both distributed market-based control and centralised control have a place in
the tool kit of a system designer.
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In terms of distributed satellite systems, this chapter demonstrated the
scalability and robustness of the market-based task allocation mechanism. In
situations where the network is volatile, a larger auction community is required
to ensure successful allocation. The system-level allocation cost is largely de-
termined by the packet time-to-live value. From a mission analysis perspective,
this implies that money can either be spent to decrease the failure rate of indi-
vidual satellites, thus decreasing the size of the required auction community; or
on larger power systems to accommodate the increased communication needed
for higher robustness on the level of the allocation mechanism.
An analysis of allocation costs was used along with simulation to map the
trade-o between successful task allocation and energy consumption for a range
of failure rates. This allows for unbiased selection of the most ecient allocation
approach. In addition, I demonstrated a method for estimating the boundaries
in parameter space that divide regions where one architecture or the other is
the most attractive.
Which parameters turned out to be the most important in determining the
appropriateness of each approach? The size of the network is a critical factor,
because the allocation costs of centrally controlled systems scale at a rate of up
to n2. In contrast, the market-based allocation approach is independent from
the number of nodes in the network, as it is primarily determined by the size of
the auction community. In this example system, I found that 10 to 150 agents
(zone B in Figure 5.5) was the zone of ambivalence between market-based and
centralised approaches. However, there is no suggestion that these gures are
any sort of magic number dividing small from large systems. The point is only
to demonstrate that it is possible to nd this threshold for any given problem.
Network volatility, in the form of node failures, is also an important pa-
rameter, because the robustness measures required to deal with high volatility
consume a signicant amount of energy. This is especially true for centrally
controlled systems. On the other hand, if the system is very stable, e.g., agents
are extremely reliable, robustness measures are not required which changes the
point of ambivalence dramatically: centrally controlled systems become much
more competitive. This is not only applicable to agent failures, but also to
changes in topology, or nodes changing their capabilities in a manner that
is unpredictable to the manager node. For market-based control, the packet
time-to-live determines the size of the auction community, and as a result the
system's robustness to failure.
Whether communication cost should be regarded as signicant depends on
the relative size of tasks and communication costs. If the total communication
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cost is orders of magnitude less than task sizes, or communicating does not
directly impact the ability of an agent to do work, the choice of allocation system
will be determined by other factors, such as implementation and verication
eort. When communication comes at some cost we will prefer one approach
to the other, but increases in communication cost will never lead to a switch in
the preferred option.
What does this tell us about related systems? It is clear that relatively
small and stable systems are best controlled using a centralised approach. Small
groups of mobile robots and smart electricity meters, where the communica-
tion topology doesn't change dramatically, fall into this category. Although
other design constraints can inuence the point of ambivalence between ap-
proaches, I would treat claims about the importance of distributed control for
these applications with caution. On the other hand, wireless sensor networks,
for example, are clearly better addressed using distributed control, due to the
scale and volatility of the system.
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Topology and communication cost
Communication cost is a persistent theme in this thesis. I use it to distinguish
distributed satellite systems from other networked computing systems, and to
relate them to wireless sensor networks. The cost of communication impacts
on the management of the system by making information expensive. Tasks
are preferentially allocated to local nodes, to minimise the cost associated with
multi-hop transfers. The propagation characteristics of radio waves mean that
multi-hop routing is more energy ecient than direct, long-distance communi-
cation; therefore I focus on communication networks that consist mostly of local
links. Communication cost forces us to take topology into account, but at the
same time the network topology also determines the impact of communication
cost on the system's performance.
But what does this mean for a system designer? How connected should
a network be? When dealing with physical systems, how should nodes be
distributed? And how does the task allocation mechanism deal with a changing
topology? In cases where the topology is controllable, the design decisions
revolve around choosing a suitable topology for the system at hand. If the
topology is not under control it acts as a design constraint; the system designer
then faces the question of what the best management approach for a given
topology will be.
To be able to judge when a task allocation mechanism suits a particular
network topology, we need a better understanding of the interplay between
communication cost and topology. At one extreme we have fully-connected
networks, where information can be exchanged directly between any two nodes
without signicant impact on the whole system. Networks with a large diam-
eter, where many hops are required to traverse from one end to the other, are
potentially much more sensitive to communication cost. Note also that in sys-
tems where communication is eectively free, e.g., the internet, the underlying
topology ceases to matter and all nodes appear equally accessible. In systems
with expensive communication, such as road transport networks, the topology
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becomes the dominant concern.
To eectively answer these questions I investigate the relationship between
communication cost and topology in this chapter, with the focus on systems
managed using the task allocation mechanism described in Chapter 3. In the
case of distributed satellite systems, managing the system is challenging because
of the constant change in topology: not only are links continuously made and
broken, but the characteristics of the topology can vary greatly over the course
of an orbit. In the rst section I measure the performance of dierent topologies
to identify the characteristics that contribute to system-level cost. The follow-
ing section investigates the trade-o in communication power against network
connectivity to determine how connected a network should be. Finally, I focus
more closely on distributed satellite systems: how can we accurately describe
the dynamic topology of such a system, and how does the constantly changing
topology impact the market-based task allocation mechanism developed in the
previous chapters.
6.1 The cost of dierent topologies
The topology of a network determines the number of packets transmitted dur-
ing allocation. For dierent topologies, the size of the auction community and
average task transferral distance vary. To better understand what makes some
topologies more attractive than others, I compare the allocation cost of four
dierent topologies and analyse their dierences in performance. I specically
focus on networks that are embedded in space, and where communication links
depend on this space, as this corresponds closely with the wireless communi-
cation model used by the distributed satellite system. The objective of this
section is to develop an understanding of why dierent topologies result in
dierent system-level allocation costs. This is used to explain the observed
behaviour in subsequent sections.
6.1.1 Candidate topologies
I will consider four topologies: a fully-connected network, a cubic lattice, and
two random geometric graphs, one in a cubic space and the other in an elon-
gated rectangular prism. The rst two topologies are very regular, resulting in
allocation patterns that are easy to visualise and verify. The choice of networks
is determined by the fact that nodes are embedded in a three-dimensional space,
and that their connections are a function of this space, as will be discussed in
more detail in Section 6.2. This constraint render many other topologies ir-
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Figure 6.1: Dierent static network topologies used. For clarity networks con-
sisting of only 27 nodes are shown.
relevant: the networks that frequently receive attention in the graph theory
community, such as random graphs, scale-free and small-world networks, are
often impossible to realize in a pure three-dimensional space.
One reference case is provided by a fully-connected network. In this topol-
ogy all nodes are directly connected to all other nodes, i.e., the network diameter
is equal to one. For a network with n nodes, this results in
n(n 1)
2 links, while
all nodes have a degree of n   1. The system-level allocation cost is there-
fore constant: all negotiation packets reach their destination in one hop; the
task transferral similarly happens directly between the auctioneer and success-
ful bidder. An example of such a network consisting of 27 nodes is shown in
Figure 6.1a.
In a physical system, this represents a scenario where all nodes are within
direct communication range of each other. For nodes using broadcast communi-
cation, such as the radios used in a distributed satellite system, the one-to-many
nature of communication adds no extra cost to the transmitter. Communicating
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with one node is therefore just as expensive as communicating with everyone.
However, the increase in trac volume can require signicant processing on the
part of the receivers, and can cause congestion due to the shared bandwidth.
The second network under consideration is the three-dimensional analogue
of the lattice formation used in previous experiments. This cubic lattice struc-
ture approximates a situation where only local communication is possible. The
lattice structure results in a network diameter of
p
3
3 p
n, while the degree of
most nodes is six, with only node degrees on the edges of the lattice being
smaller. The formation has many redundant routes, making it relatively ro-
bust to topological disruption. Figure 6.1b shows the topology.
The above networks present two cases at opposite ends of the parameter
space: one is densely connected, while the other is much more distributed
but still ordered enough for the dynamics to be understandable. A better
approximation of the topology of distributed satellite systems is given by a
random geometric graph (RGG, Dall and Christensen, 2002). The network
is constructed by placing a number of nodes at random locations in three-
dimensional space; two nodes are connected if the distance between them is not
greater than some threshold communication distance Rth. Connections in this
spatially distributed network are therefore deterministic and symmetric.
The network characteristics are determined by the node distribution and
communication range. For a large Rth, the network will resemble the fully-
connected network above, while the case where nodes are barely connected is
much more similar to the cubic lattice. Decreasing Rth further will result in
a sparse network, with a low number of connections and a high sensitivity to
topological change. Random geometric graphs can therefore be seen to traverse
the space between the fully-connected and three-dimensional lattice networks.
This topology is of course not restricted to distributed satellite systems | it can
also be applied to other distributed systems where the ability to communicate
is determined primarily by the spatial distance between nodes.
I consider two instances of random geometric networks: in the one, nodes
are distributed with a uniform probability in a cubic space (Figure 6.1c), while
in the other nodes are contained in an elongated rectangular prism, as shown in
Figure 6.1d. The rst network is relatively well connected, with a large degree
and small diameter. In the elongated case the diameter increases signicantly,
while the number of redundant paths in the network decreases. As I will show in
section 6.3, these networks reect actual topologies encountered in distributed
satellite systems.
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6.1.2 Performance comparison
The eciencies of the dierent topologies are compared by simulating task allo-
cation. A xed number of tasks are allocated and the energy used is measured.
The allocation overhead, i.e., the energy that was spent on message-passing
instead of task execution, is used to compare the dierent topologies.
For every run, a network consisting of 125 nodes was used to allocate 500
tasks using the market-based mechanism described in previous chapters. Each
task consists of 5 sequential components, where every component requires 1
unit of energy. Node skills are chosen uniformly at random from the 5 possible
task types at the start of a run.
The cost of transmitting a packet is 0.001 units of energy, while transferral
of a task requires 0.1 units. If a node relays a bid from a neighbour, it adds
10% commission to the bid value. Node energy regenerates at a rate of 0.006
units per time step, with every node capable of storing up to 10 units of energy.
These values were selected to represent a system where task execution requires a
signicant amount of energy, task transferral is an order of magnitude cheaper,
and sending a negotiation packet is cheaper still. The energy regeneration rate
is enough to make node exhaustion unlikely, which allows us to focus solely on
topological eects.
For the cubic random geometric graph, nodes are positioned uniformly at
random in a cube with side lengths 1. The elongated random geometric graph
is generated by distributing the nodes randomly throughout a prism with di-
mensions 0.5:0.5:4 (compared to the unit cube). The volume is the same in
both cases, giving a uniform node density. A communication range (Rth) of
0.3 units determines which nodes are connected: this is large enough to ensure
the network usually consists of a single component. In the rare cases where a
single component did not result, a dierent network was generated.
An experiment consists of 50 runs, where each run has a dierent set of
node skills and, for the random topologies, node positions. The experiment
was repeated using transmission time-to-live (dttl) values ranging from 3 to 6
hops.
6.1.3 Discussion
The energy overheads for task allocation in the dierent topologies are shown
in the box and whiskers plots in Figure 6.2. The boxes extend from the lower
to the upper quartile of the data, with the red line indicating the median.
The whiskers show the extent of the data, with outliers marked separately.
The average allocation overhead is around 550 units. Note the compounding
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(d) dttl = 6
Figure 6.2: Energy used for dierent topologies over 50 runs. The box extends
from the lower to the upper quartile of the data, with the red line indicating
the median. The whiskers show the extent of the data, with outliers marked
separately. Increasing dttl increases the size of the auction community, which
causes the allocation overhead to go up. The cost of the fully-connected network
stays constant, because the entire auction community is directly connected to
the auctioneer.
eect of repeated communication: an apparently small ctx value adds up to a
signicant amount when compared to the energy used in task execution.
The fully-connected network shows a narrow band of energy usage which
does not change with dttl. This distribution reects the fact that the size of the
auction community remains the same across runs. The small variation that can
be observed in the allocation cost is due to the dierent compositions of the
networks used for test runs, which in turn changes the number of bid messages.
If we consider the other topologies, the allocation cost for the elongated
RGG is the lowest, while the cubic RGG is the most expensive. The lattice
topology performs somewhere in-between. For dttl = 3, allocation in all three
networks is less expensive than in the fully-connected case, but increasing dttl
1166.2. Communication range and connectivity
raises the cost, especially for the lattice and cubic RGG. By increasing dttl, the
size of the auction community is increased for the lattice and RGGs. This in
turn causes an increase in the number of negotiation messages, which makes
up the bulk of the increase in allocation cost. The task transfer cost similarly
shows an increase, but the vast majority of allocations are still close to the
auctioneer. This is characteristic of the relatively small set of node types in
this network | a node with the required skill can usually be found in the
vicinity of the auctioneer.
The elongated RGG exhibits a small increase in cost for increased dttl. This
is the result of the large diameter and small radius of this topology: an increase
in dttl adds a relatively small number of nodes to the size of the auction commu-
nity when compared to the other topologies. The high cost of well-connected
topologies should come as no surprise | the task allocation mechanism was
after all designed for sparse networks. The primary culprits for the sensitivity
to auction community size are the ooding of auction announcement messages
and the large number of bids that result.
In conclusion, these results demonstrate how dierent parameters determine
the allocation overhead. For random geometric graphs, the connection range
(Rth) and node density determine the connectivity. The network connectivity,
combined with the packet time-to-live (dttl), in turn governs the size of the auc-
tion community, which ultimately decides the allocation overhead. By taking
these parameters into account, a system designer can inuence the allocation
overhead. While a network needs to be suciently connected to allow success-
ful task allocation and to be robust to changes, excessive connectivity will use
a signicant portion of the available energy. The high allocation overhead in
well-connected networks suggests that a dierent approach may result in better
performance; however, the market-based allocation mechanism is well adapted
to sparse topologies.
6.2 Communication range and connectivity
When dealing with spatial networks, communication range aects the network
in three ways. Firstly, the communication range needs to be large enough to
ensure a reliable network is formed, on which tasks can be eectively allocated.
Secondly, the communication range is determined by the transmission power:
increasing the range in radio networks requires an increase in the transmis-
sion power, which in turn increases the energy cost of communication. Finally,
as shown in the previous section, networks that are well-connected generate a
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large number of negotiation packets which aects the system's performance neg-
atively. Previous work on optimising communication distance between satellites
(Wu et al., 2008) primarily focused on balancing transmission delays induced
by packet relay against the communication cost of direct communication. In
this section, the focus is instead on the topological implications of optimis-
ing communication distance.1 What is an appropriate communication range,
given that range is determined by the transmission power and that the network
requires a sucient degree of connectivity to function?
I use a simplied deterministic radio propagation model to decide when two
nodes can communicate. In this model transmission is isotropic and symmetric,
i.e., insensitive to direction and the same for all nodes. Communication can
therefore be visualised as taking place in a sphere with radius Rth around a
transmitting node. If the transmitting node transmits with power Ptx, the
power received by the second node (Prx) is dependent on the distance between
the nodes (r):
Prx =
Ptx
r2 (6.2.1)
If we assume that the receiving node has a threshold power level (Pth) below
which it cannot reliably communicate, the communication range of a node is
given by:
Rth =
r
Ptx
Pth
(6.2.2)
Furthermore, the energy expended in communication is proportional to the
transmission power; and as communication cost (ctx) describes the energy con-
sumed to transmit a packet, we nd:
Rth /
p
ctx (6.2.3)
The resulting network topology is a random geometric graph, with the con-
nectivity determined by the communication power. This relationship between
communication cost and distance means that the energy impact of long distance
communication between nodes can become signicant, while shorter distance,
multi-hop routing provides a more ecient option. However, if the communi-
cation distance is too small, the network will consist of multiple components
which will aect performance adversely. I use simulation to nd the balance
between these two extremes. Although analytic methods could in theory be
used to derive stochastic models of connectivity, when additional constraints
such as compound tasks and orbital dynamics are considered, mathematical
1For a detailed discussion on communication architectures and link design in satellite
systems, refer to Chapter 13, Larson and Wertz (1999).
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Table 6.1: Compound task structure used in topology experiments. The ex-
ecution of task elements (left-hand column) results in another task element
(right-hand column) that must be executed. All components must be executed
before the task is complete.
A ! aB
B ! bC
C ! cD
D ! dE
E ! e
methods quickly become unwieldy and often seemingly intractable. Simulation
oers an attractive way to capture the messy nature of real-world systems.
6.2.1 Experimental setup
In this experiment I map the eect of communication range by measuring the
allocation cost and the number of tasks completed for a range of Rth values.
An increase in Rth causes a corresponding increase in ctx, as described above.
A three-dimensional cubic space is used for this experiment; all dimensions
are scaled to t in a unit cube. 125 nodes are placed uniformly at random in
this space, and connected based on their spatial proximity. A range of commu-
nication distances (Rth) from 0 to 1.7 units is used: at the lower end, no nodes
will be connected, while the upper end results in a fully-connected network.
The energy capacity of all nodes is 10 units. Batches of 10 tasks are uploaded
every 100 time steps, with 50 batches (500 tasks or 2500 task components)
submitted over the course of one simulation run. System performance is mea-
sured by the number of tasks completed. The tasks consist of ve components,
executing in a linear fashion, as dened in Table 6.1. Node skills are selected
from this set of possible task elements with a uniform distribution; we therefore
have approximately 25 of each of the ve types of nodes.
Transmission cost is calculated by using the communication range according
to the inverse square relationship described above. Pth is set to 10 4, and Rth
ranges from 0 to 1.7 units (the length of the diagonal of a unit cube), so the
transmission power can be calculated as:
Ptx = Pth  R2
th (6.2.4)
To relate Ptx to the transmission cost ctx, we scale it to so that the maximum
task transfer cost is equal to the cost of executing a single task component (1
unit), thus making these costs comparable. This gives:
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Figure 6.3: Communication cost (ctx) as a function of communication distance
(Rth). ctx is proportional to the square of R2
th, due to the underlying radio
propagation characteristics.
1 = ctx   (6.2.5)
) ctx =
Ptx
  Ptxmax
(6.2.6)
The transfer packet size () is set to 100 and Ptxmax to 2.89 to ensure coverage of
the entire space. The value of ctx therefore ranges from 0 to 0.01, proportional
to the square of the communication distance, as shown in Figure 6.3.
Nodes' energy levels increase by 0.006 units per time step. The maximum
amount of energy the system can therefore gain per time step is 0.75 units.
In comparison, the submitted tasks on average use 510
100 = 0:5 units of energy
per time step. We therefore expect the system to successfully allocate tasks
in cases with low communication cost (if the topology allows it), but higher
communication costs will exhaust nodes and cause task allocation to fail.
As the node positions are random, the resulting network topology and
system-level communication cost will vary between networks. Fifty runs were
used to generate the results presented below.
6.2.2 Experimental results
I measure global system performance by the number of tasks completed. The
box plot in Figure 6.4 shows how the communication range inuences the
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Figure 6.4: Box plot of the number of tasks allocated for a range of commu-
nication distances (Rth) over 50 cubic random geometric graphs. The boxes
show the range of the lower to the upper quartile of the data, with the red line
indicating the median. The whiskers show the spread of the data within 1.5
quartiles of the median, while the markers indicate outliers. For low communi-
cation range values, no tasks are allocated. At Rth  0:25 the network reaches
the required degree of connectivity to successfully allocate almost all tasks. For
values of Rth > 0:8, the task allocation performance again starts to deteriorate.
In between these values we nd a plateau of good performance.
number of completed tasks. The median is marked in red, the boxes indi-
cate the 25th and 75th percentiles, the whiskers show the lowest and highest
data within 1.5 times the interquartile range, with the markers showing outly-
ing data points. For very low values of Rth, no tasks are allocated, due to the
network being too disconnected. At an Rth of around 0.2 units, the network
connectivity reaches the threshold where many tasks can be allocated. Task
allocation quickly reaches a plateau where all 500 tasks are completed; this
stretches from 0.25 to 0.8. The allocation performance then deteriorates for
larger values of Rth.
To better understand this deterioration, we inspect the allocation overhead
graph over the same range of Rth (Figure 6.5). The allocation cost (calloc) is
calculated by subtracting the energy spent on successful task execution from
the total energy used by the network over the course of a run. At low values
of Rth we observe a small bulge in the allocation cost. This is due to task
components being allocated, but tasks not being completed. Although work is
being done, the energy expended does not contribute towards completed tasks.
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Figure 6.5: Mean allocation cost for range of communication distances (Rth).
For Rth < 0:3, some energy is spent on executing task components, but the
network is too sparse to successfully complete tasks, hence the small bump.
From Rth = 0:3 to Rth = 0:8, the network is connected enough to reliably
allocate tasks, but the increase in transmission power causes growth of the
allocation cost. For Rth > 1, the available energy in the system is exceeded,
decreasing the number of tasks completed and attening the allocation overhead
graph. The error bars show the standard error over 50 runs.
From Rth = 0:25 onwards, the system enters the plateau where all tasks are
allocated. At this point the energy overhead is only 100 units, compared to
the 2500 units expended performing the 500 tasks. However, with increasing
Rth, this overhead continues to grow, until the energy used in task allocation
and execution exceeds the total incoming energy in the system, around Rth =
0:8. This results in the decrease in task allocation visible for large Rth values
in Figure 6.4. Once again, this behaviour can be ascribed to the allocation
mechanism not assuming a well-connected network, which results in a very
large auction community. The correspondingly large number of bids, as well as
nodes' attempts at propagating auction announcements, result in a signicant
amount of trac. For a well-connected network (large Rth), the growth in the
size of the auction community for an increase in communication range decreases,
resulting in the attening out of the allocation energy curve for Rth > 1.
In terms of the network topologies discussed in the previous section, large
values of Rth correspond to the fully-connected network topology. Low values
of Rth result in barely connected components, making the system more similar
to the elongated RGG.
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Figure 6.6: Mean number of connected components against the communication
distance (Rth) for the 50 networks under test. Note the rapid change in con-
nectedness for Rth < 0:3: the network usually consists of only one component
for Rth greater values.
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Figure 6.7: Mean node degree against communication distance (Rth) for the 50
networks under test. Note that for Rth < 0:2 nodes have very few neighbours,
while for Rth > 1:1 the system is eectively fully connected.
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Figure 6.8: Box plot of the number of tasks allocated for a range of communi-
cation distances (Rth) over 50 cubic random geometric graphs with an increased
task load. The boxes show the range of the lower to the upper quartile of the
data, with the red line indicating the median. The whiskers show the spread of
the data within 1.5 quartiles of the median, while the markers indicate outliers.
For low communication range values, no tasks are allocated. The best alloca-
tion can be found at Rth  0:25, as the required level connectivity has been
reached, but communication cost is still minimal. For larger values of Rth, the
task allocation performance deteriorates rapidly, due to the increased size of
the auction community. Beyond Rth = 1, performance deteriorates more slowly
because the size of the auction community stops growing.
If we investigate the changes in the network structure across the range of
Rth, we nd that for the 125 nodes randomly positioned in space, the topology
changes from being fully disconnected when Rth is 0, to fully connected for large
values of Rth. By looking at the number of connected components (Figure 6.6),
we see that the system achieves good allocation because of multiple, distributed
auctioneers, even if the network consists of more than one component, as is the
case for 0:15  Rth  0:25. From the distribution of mean degrees (Figure 6.7)
we can deduce that the network has a large diameter for these values of Rth.
We can also see that for values of Rth > 1:1, the network is fully connected |
the size of the auction community therefore approaches the size of the system.
These topologies are conrmed by the network diameter measurements (not
shown).
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6.2.3 Increased task load
The plateau in Figure 6.4 is due to a total load of 500 tasks being submitted
in the experiment. We can gain a better perspective on the true shape of
the allocation success graph by increasing the task load to exceed the system's
capacity. An example of this is shown in the box plot in Figure 6.8 for the same
experimental set-up as before, but with the 40 tasks (instead of 10) uploaded
to the system every 100 time steps, for a total of 2000 tasks. The experiment
was repeated 50 times, with dierent node positions for each iteration.
The best system performance can be found at Rth = 0:25, as indicated by
the peak in the curve. The wide range of measurements in this area is due to
the prominent role played by the network topology, as discussed in the previous
section. A rapid decrease in performance follows for 0:3  Rth  1, again due
to the increasing size of the auction community. The curve attens out for
Rth  1, because the growth in the auction community stops, with only the cost
of transmission still increasing. Note that, because of the overhead associated
with the large task load, the system capacity is worse than in Figure 6.4.
6.2.4 Discussion
These results clearly demonstrate the importance of determining a suitable
communication range for radio networks where communication has a signi-
cant cost, specically in the context of market-based task allocation. There
is clearly a range of Rth where good allocation can be achieved with minimal
overhead. If Rth is too small, the network will be too fragmented to allow suc-
cessful task allocation. On the other hand, very large values of Rth require too
much power for transmission, and cause the increase in the number of negoti-
ation packets demonstrated in the previous section. The combination of these
factors results in exhausted nodes and more allocation failures. In between
these extremes we nd an area where allocation succeeds, without spending
too much on communication. If we look at the total system capacity, a clear
peak can be observed where the network is connected enough for successful
allocation, and the communication cost is still minimal | this represents the
optimal communication distance.
As the lower end of this zone is determined by the connections between
nodes, we observe a rapid transition from poor allocation to excellent allocation.
The fall-o on the upper end is more gradual because it is a result of the system
running out of energy.
The exact location of this zone depends on a number of variables. The start
of this zone is determined by the spatial distribution of the nodes, which in turn
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inuences how easily they can communicate. The upper limit is dependent on
the dierence between the amount of energy entering the network and the
energy used by the workload and the communication overhead. Multi-hop
communication means that this zone starts well before the network is fully
connected. The distributed nature of allocation means that the allocation can
succeed, even if the network is split into multiple components. These results
reconrm the suitability of the market-based task allocation system for sparse
or disconnected topologies.
System designers would want to adjust communication range to position
the system on the plateau of good allocation. The ideal position is just inside
the successful allocation zone, towards the end with smaller communication
range. In this position the communication overhead is limited, resulting in the
most ecient system conguration. Of course, this opens up the possibility in
future work of using the nodes themselves to nd their individually optimal
communication ranges by exploring the task allocation success graph. The dis-
tinct dierence in allocation success when the communication range is sucient
for good allocation, in comparison with too little or too much distance, lends
itself to adaptation on a local level. By adaptively searching for the smallest
communication distance where allocation still succeeds, a node could further
conserve energy.
6.3 Dynamic topologies
The above experiments describe the behaviour of dierent network topologies
and the eect of communication range on system-level eciency. However,
all of these networks are still static. In this section I build a more accurate
picture of a realistic distributed satellite system by introducing a model of the
nodes' movements. The mobility model is then used in simulation to show that
the task allocation mechanism is resilient to the changes in the network, i.e.,
allocation in a dynamic environment does not show a decrease in eectiveness
from the static case.2
In the discussion of node failure (Chapter 5) we also encountered a chang-
ing network, which may lead the reader to ask how this scenario diers. When
dealing with node failure, the network was eroded by failing nodes, resulting in
decreased connectivity and reduced capacity. In contrast, with orbital mechan-
ics the network capacity stays the same, but structural changes are much more
2The work in this section was presented at the AI in Space workshop at the International
Joint Conference on Articial Intelligence (van der Horst and Noble, 2011); an updated and
extended version was subsequently published in Acta Futura (van der Horst and Noble, 2012).
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frequent. Previously, the focus was on the eective utilisation of a shrinking
pool of resources; in this section I look at large-scale topological change.
6.3.1 Keplerian mobility model
Mobility models are widely used in mobile ad hoc network (MANET) research
to represent the dynamic behaviour of a communication network composed of
mobile agents (Bai and Helmy, 2004; Camp et al., 2002). As the agents move
around, communication channels are formed between individuals in physical
proximity to each other; these links are broken again if they move apart. The
mobility model allows researchers to map the physical system to an abstract
communication network that changes over time.
Existing mobility models frequently rely on random movement to generate
a dynamic environment (e.g., Johnson and Maltz, 1996; Chones and Busta-
mante, 2005; Bandyopadhyay et al., 2007). In the case of a distributed satellite
system, however, we have good models that describe the dynamic behaviour of
objects in orbit: although the formation changes over time, it is not random.
Roughly co-orbiting satellites are subject to similar forces, with the variation
in their orbital parameters determining their respective trajectories. As a re-
sult, we can expect a greater spatial correlation between satellites than can
be expected for random movement. Their interactions are also periodic, with
approximately the same formation occurring once per orbit.
My mobility model solves the Keplerian equations to obtain the positions of
all satellites at a specic point in time; the relative distances between satellites
are then used to nd the adjacency matrix of the communication network.
This adjacency matrix denes how nodes are connected to each other. It is
convenient to use an imaginary point on the reference orbit to position the
satellites around. This reference point orbits around the planet along with the
satellites and serves as an origin for a local Cartesian reference frame. The
use of this reference point is primarily a conceptual and visualisation aid, as
it focuses the attention on the position of the satellites relative to each other,
instead of the planet they are orbiting. The similarity in the satellites' orbital
parameters means they orbit in a cluster, but that formation is not actively
maintained. The small dierences in individual orbits will cause the satellites
to drift apart over time, which will require correction if the group is to stay
connected. On shorter time-scales the relative positions change dramatically,
thereby potentially posing a signicant challenge to packet routing and task
allocation.
The steps required to determine the connectivity matrix at time t are the
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following:
1. Calculate the earth-centred Cartesian position uref of the reference point
at time t.
2. Calculate the Cartesian position ui for all satellites at time t.
3. Centre the coordinate system around the reference point by translating
all the satellite positions by  uref.
4. Calculate the distances between all satellites to obtain the distance ma-
trix.
5. Apply the connection function to the distance matrix to nd the adjacency
matrix for the communication network.
The connection function captures the propagation characteristics for the
underlying communication medium. I will restrict myself to a deterministic
radio communication model: if two nodes are within a specied range of each
other, we assume they can communicate successfully. To use a more realistic
propagation model that incorporates noise and interference, only the connection
function needs to be changed.
By repeating these calculations over the course of an experiment, we nd
the dynamical communication network topology. Note that steps 1 and 3 can be
skipped to optimise the calculation of only the communication network topol-
ogy.
From Chobotov (2002), the position of a satellite can be described in terms
of the Keplerian elements as:
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Figure 6.9: Illustration of the orbital plane with Keplerian elements. The or-
bital plane (blue) intersects the Earth's equatorial plane (pink) with inclination
i. The right ascension of the ascending node (
) is the longitude of the equa-
torial crossing measured from the First Point of Aries (à); while the argument
of perigee (!) indicates the closest point to earth. The position of the satellite
is given by the true anomaly ().
with
R11 = cos
cos!   sin
sin! cosi
R12 =  cos
sin!   sin
cos! cosi
R13 = sin
sini
R21 = sin
cos! + cos
sin! cosi
R22 =  sin
sin! + cos
cos! cosi (6.3.3)
R23 =  cos
sini
R31 = sin! sini
R32 = cos! sini
R33 = cosi
where  is the true anomaly, i the inclination, 
 the right ascension of the
ascending node (RAAN) and ! the argument of perigee. The sine term in
equation 6.3.1 describes the position of the satellite in its orbital plane (the
blue area in Figure 6.9), while equation 6.3.3 denes the orientation of the
orbital plane. The size of the semi-major axis (a) and eccentricity (e) of the
orbit determines the path circumscribed on the orbital plane.
As the Keplerian elements of the satellites vary slightly, they all have dif-
ferent orbital planes which intersect at the centre of the earth. A detailed
description on how to calculate the position of a satellite as a function of time
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Figure 6.10: Network topology over the course of one orbit for a system of 125
satellites. Note the drastic change in topology, ranging from tightly clustered
to sparse and elongated. The colour of nodes indicate specic satellites. P is
the orbital period. The parameters used to generate these gures are the same
as used for the simulation in Section 6.3.2.
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is given in Chobotov (2002), Chapter 4. For the purpose of this discussion, it
is sucient to note the sine and cosine terms in equation 6.3.3. As these terms
dier between satellites, their relative positions will change periodically over
the course of an orbit.
6.3.1.1 Non-Keplerian disturbances
The above model assumes a spherical potential eld, with no external distur-
bances, which is not strictly true. External disturbance torques, such as geopo-
tential, solar pressure, atmospheric drag, and electro-magnetic forces cause or-
bits to drift over time. The impact of these forces depends on both the orbits
and the physical properties of the satellites. Although these forces have an
important eect on the orbits of real satellites, I am primarily interested in the
short-term interactions between satellites, over time periods of less than one
orbit: how frequently are communication links formed between satellites, and
for how long do these links persist? On this scale, the dynamics that result from
Kepler's equations dominate the relative positions exhibited by the individual
spacecraft.
The Keplerian model therefore captures the communication network dy-
namics with sucient accuracy for our purposes; the non-Keplerian perturba-
tions are deliberately ignored.
6.3.1.2 Dynamics
The mobility model displays a complex oscillatory movement of satellites around
the reference point, due to the sine and cosine terms in equation 6.3.3. The
exact behaviour depends on the orbital parameters and variance thereof for
individual satellites. For specic parameter values that suppress the oscillatory
terms, stable relationships between satellites can be found, but the dynamic
connections dominate the communication network.
The resulting local communication network displays continuous variation in
topology and physical scale as spacecraft orbit around the earth, ranging from
well-connected to sparse and even disjointed. When the communication range
is small compared to the average inter-satellite distance, the network fragments.
On the other hand, if the communication range is comparable to the spatial
diameter of the satellite cluster, a well-connected network results.
In many cases the network topology ranges between these two extremes
within one orbit, as is demonstrated by the network resulting from a slightly
elliptical orbit in Figure 6.10. This clearly shows how the satellite formation
ranges from tightly clustered, as shown in Figure 6.10a, to being spread over
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Figure 6.11: Orbital dynamics result in continual change of the local neigh-
bourhood of a node, both in terms of the types of nodes and the topology. The
auctioneer is represented by the diamond, while nodes are coloured and labelled
according to their capabilities. If the network was static, the community would
instead remain constant.
a wide area (Figure 6.10c). Note the similarity between these topologies and
the random geometric graphs in Section 6.1 | from this we can deduce that a
signicant variation in communication cost will be observed at dierent times
during the orbit.
Due to the shifting topology, the local network around a node allocating a
task changes continuously in terms of structure and composition, as shown in
Figure 6.11. To successfully allocate tasks, these changes need to be detected, or
the network mapped, at regular intervals. By using auctions to allocate tasks,
and relying on task-centric routing, these changes are transparently detected
and the latest network information taken into account.
This mobility model provides the test case for verifying our task allocation
mechanism, but it can also serve as a standalone mobility model for researchers
in mobile ad hoc networking to test dierent management and routing algo-
rithms.
6.3.2 Dynamic performance
I am interested in maximising the task allocation and allocation eciency of
the system, because the more ecient the allocation mechanism is, the more
energy can be spent on performing payload operations. For this experimental
setup, all tasks can be successfully allocated, but the energy overhead due to
communication varies. By measuring the communication overhead, i.e., the
total energy consumed by the system over time, minus the energy spent on
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Table 6.2: Orbital parameters for the simulated distributed satellite system.
The reference orbit of the system has the parameters in the reference column,
while the values for individual satellites are calculated by adding a uniformly
distributed noise with the range shown in the error column.
Parameter Reference Error
Semimajor axis a 6878140 100 m
Eccentricity e 0:001 10 6 rad
Inclination i 
4 0:001 rad
RAAN 
 0 0:001 rad
Argument of perigee ! 0 
4 rad
Initial true anomaly 0  ! 0:01 rad
Orbital period P 5677 0:1 s
tasks, I can measure the impact of network dynamics.
To interpret the simulation results, a fair reference to compare against is
required. As the cost of allocation is strongly inuenced by the network topol-
ogy, we need to select a topology that provides a fair comparison, even though
the dynamic network changes signicantly over time. I therefore determine the
topology of the dynamic network at a random time t, then use that as a static
network for simulating allocation. If this is repeated for multiple t values, over
a number of networks, the mean of the results should give a good indication
of the performance without the eects caused by dynamics. This provides the
static case.
For additional references I also measure the allocation overhead in two ex-
treme cases: one when the satellites are spread out to the maximum extent to
form the sparse case, and the connected case, where they are clustered together
and well connected.
6.3.3 Experimental setup
A slightly elliptical, 500km reference orbit is used to dene the orbits of 125
satellites, using the orbital parameters in Table 6.2. The initial positions and
orbits of the satellites are calculated by adding a uniformly distributed error to
the orbital parameters, as listed in the error column in Table 6.2. At t = 0, the
satellites are clustered around the perigee of the reference orbit, but as they
travel around the earth they spread out before clustering together again one
orbit later, as shown in Figure 6.10. The connection function uses a simple
thresholding comparison: if two satellites are within four kilometres of each
other, it is assumed that both parties can communicate with each other, i.e.,
Rth = 4000m. A communication delay of 100 milliseconds is assumed: this is
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generous enough to include a realistic transmission and processing time, even for
busy or low-bandwidth nodes. Note that the use of physical orbital parameters
necessitates the use of a real time value as well; I therefore depart from the
abstract time units used in previous experiments.
Five new tasks are introduced to the system every 100 seconds; each task
consists of ve components that are executed sequentially by dierent types of
satellites. All ve components need to be executed for the task to be considered
complete. The system is simulated for one orbit, during which 280 tasks (1400
task components) are allocated. Executing a task component uses 1 unit of
energy, transmitting negotiation packets uses 0.005 units, while transferring
a task between two nodes requires 0.5 units. Satellites' energy regenerates
at an average rate of 0.005 units per second, to represent the recharging of
spacecraft batteries from solar panels. The maximum energy that can be stored
by any spacecraft is 10 units. These energy values represent a scenario where
communication is cheaper than task execution, but the cumulative energy cost
of communication forms a signicant portion of the total energy expenditure.
The skills of the satellites are selected with a uniform probability from the
set of 5 task component types. Every satellite has only one skill, so the system
consists of approximately 25 satellites of each class.
The dynamic case uses the Keplerian movement model to modify the net-
work topology over time. The static case uses 20 dierent time values to gen-
erate dierent topologies for every run. As the orbits of individual satellites
are elliptical and satellites are clustered together at the start, the connected
case is found by using the network at t = 0. The sparse topology is found
halfway through the orbit, at t = 2883. Fifty runs were used to generate the
results presented below. Note that both the composition of the network and
the positions of individual satellites were varied between runs.
6.3.4 Results
The total energy used in every run is measured, and the amount of energy
spent on successful task execution is subtracted. This allows the calculation of
the mean energy used in allocation by the negotiation and transfer packets, as
shown in Figure 6.12. The dynamic case required 1323 units of energy, while
the static case required 1347 units, approximately the same amount. The
sparse network used only 1164 units, while the well-connected case required
1512 units. The standard error on the measurements ranges from 1.6 to 2.8.
For comparison, task execution required 1400 units of energy. Approximately
half the allocation energy is used for transferring tasks, while the remainder is
1346.3. Dynamic topologies
Dynamic Static Sparse Connected 0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
A
l
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
o
v
e
r
h
e
a
d
Figure 6.12: Mean allocation overhead using dynamic, averaged static, sparse
and well-connected topologies over one orbital period. The dynamic network
requires approximately the same amount of energy to allocate as the average
static case,indicating that the . Standard error on the measurements ranges
from 1.6 to 6.2 (errors bars are not plotted due to their negligible size).
required by the large number of negotiation packets.
The results show that the market-based task allocation mechanism is not
adversely aected by the changing communication network; in fact, it slightly
outperforms the averaged static case. The reference cases clearly demonstrate
how the cost of allocation can vary within one orbit. The high cost associated
with the well-connected case can be ascribed to the large auction community
resulting from the small network diameter, as discussed in Section 6.1.
To understand how the allocation mechanism manages to maintain perfor-
mance in spite of the changes in the network, it helps to look at the lifetimes
of connections in the system. Figure 6.13b shows a histogram of connection
lifetimes: connections between nodes generally last on the order of hundreds
of seconds, orders of magnitude more than the auctions require. The network
state information is therefore valid for the duration of the auction, allowing
allocation to succeed. For comparison, the connection lifetimes for Rth values
of 1000m and 8000m were also calculated, and are displayed in Figure 6.13.
For smaller values of Rth the peak of the histogram moves to the left: there
are fewer connections made and most only last for a short period, resulting in
a relatively volatile network. As Rth increases the number of links and their
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Figure 6.13: Histogram of connection lifetimes for a group of 125 satellites
with 1km, 4km and 8km communication ranges, over the course of one orbit.
Note that the vast majority of connections in the 4km case last for hundreds
of seconds or more, thereby allowing auctions to succeed. For a smaller Rth
value, the number of connections and their lifetimes decrease. For larger values
of Rth we observe an increase in the average connection lifetime, to the point
where some connections persist for the duration of an orbit or longer.
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stability increase too, shifting the distribution to the right, even resulting in
links that persist for longer than the duration of an orbit. If the communication
range is increased even further the network will become fully connected.
Tests using a dierent number of satellites, or placing them in other orbits,
show similar results, as long as the component satellites have approximately
similar orbits. The network volatility is a result of the error with respect to
the reference orbit, which determines how far satellites move apart, and the
communication distance, which determines for how long connections can be
maintained.
6.3.5 Discussion
This experiment demonstrates that ad hoc, decentralised task allocation and
task-centric routing allow us to successfully manage task allocation in dis-
tributed satellite systems with realistic network dynamics.
The similarity in performance between the static and dynamic cases can
be ascribed to the ad hoc nature of the task allocation mechanism, as well
as the dierences in time scales between allocation and network changes. In
addition, the allocation mechanism has limited memory about the system state
(only an average price for a task type), therefore it can adapt much faster than
the network changes. By holding an auction for every task component, the
current state of the local network is always used to determine allocation. This
approach is best suited to scenarios where the network changes more frequently
than tasks are allocated | the cost of holding an auction should be less than
the cost of incrementally tracking changes in the local community.
Despite the continuous movement of satellites, the average connection life-
time between two nodes in the communication network is signicantly longer
than the duration of an auction. From the point of view of the auctioneer,
the local network is therefore eectively static during an auction, thus allow-
ing successful allocation. If network changes were to disrupt an auction, the
auctioneer can restart the auction to retry, with a high probability of success.
6.4 Discussion
This chapter investigated the impact of topological structure and dynamics on
system-level performance. I measured the allocation cost associated with dif-
ferent network topologies and explored the trade-o in communication range
versus allocation overhead. Finally, a mobility model of a multi-satellite sys-
tem was developed to measure the impact of realistic orbital dynamics on the
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communication network topology and the task allocation mechanism.
The experiments demonstrate the signicant role played by the size of the
auction community in determining the total allocation cost | this is a direct
result of the ooding of auction announcement packets through the network.
Systems with a large auction community will be more expensive in terms of
task allocation, while sparsely-connected systems exhibit a signicant saving in
communication cost, which leaves more energy for completing tasks. In terms
of communication range, we observe a distinct plateau of good allocation of a
range of Rth values, where all the tasks in the experiment could be allocated.
The lower end of this plateau is determined by the physical properties of the
network, while the upper end is largely a result of the energy used by the task
allocation mechanism. The system capacity shows a prominent peak at the
point where the network is connected enough to achieve good allocation, yet
still has low communication cost. The mobility model shows that the commu-
nication topology for a distributed satellite system can vary greatly over the
course of an orbit. The dierences in orbital parameters result in a continuous
but cyclic change in the network. Despite the constant change, the task allo-
cation mechanism shows no deterioration in performance when compared to a
static equivalent. This result seems counter-intuitive, but makes sense when we
consider that there is no model of the network that might become outdated,
and the time scale of each auction is short enough that it eectively occurs on
a static network.
These experiments demonstrate how a system designer can go about mea-
suring the trade-os in terms of topology and communication cost. Ideally, the
communication range and auction community size should be just large enough
to ensure reliable allocation. The lower bound on the zone of good allocation is
clearly visible as you move along the axis of increasing communication power;
increasing it signicantly further will not result in an improvement in system
performance.
From a satellite engineering perspective, the primary result is that my task
allocation mechanism copes very well with the dynamic topologies that result
from realistic orbital mechanics: no negative impact is observed. Furthermore,
this resilience of the allocation mechanism to a changing network topology
implies that the requirements for ne-grained control of individual spacecraft
can partially be addressed on a network management level: instead of accurate
formation maintenance, coarse positioning of spacecraft to stay part of the
network is sucient. This makes the use of smaller, simpler spacecraft viable
in distributed satellite scenarios, making it a more aordable enterprise. For
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system design, the ease with which the task allocation mechanism manages
network dynamics suggests that a large part of the modelling can be done
using a representative set of random geometric graphs as topologies. These will
provide a signicant saving in computational cost if heuristic optimisations are
performed.
The above results also relate to other distributed system problems. The ex-
plicit focus on communication cost as a result of topology also features promi-
nently in wireless sensor networks, where similar trade-os are required. The
adaptability to a changing network topology that stems from the use of ad hoc
information should apply equally to dynamic networks in WSNs. This raises
the question of when the benets of ad hoc information are outweighed by the
cost of repeatedly gathering this information. The other relevant link is to
work on mobile ad hoc networks. The mobility model for distributed satellite
systems now provides us with a test platform to compare dierent routing and
control protocols developed specically for terrestrial MANETs in our system.
The high cost observed for well-connected topologies suggests that the allo-
cation mechanism can be made more ecient by using an adaptive time-to-live
range { this will however require a mechanism to learn more about the net-
work on a node level. Monitoring the number of successfully allocated tasks, or
the volume of auction announcements received should provide a useful starting
point. The periodic nature of topologies produced by the Keplerian mobility
model also raises the question of whether the periodicity can be exploited to
optimise management of the system.
Although I believe that it is premature to draw rm conclusions, the slight
improvement observed in the task allocation cost of the dynamic network could
be a benecial eect of systems with a constantly changing topology. Although
dynamics are usually regarded as a complicating factor in system management
(Durfee, 2004), the resulting change in the auction community means that failed
auctions are retried on a new set of nodes. Therefore, retried auctions can utilise
dierent nodes on every attempt, instead of waiting for nodes to recover to a
usable level. Further investigation is however required to determine whether
this phenomenon will have a signicant eect on system performance.
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The preceding chapters are primarily concerned with the specics of the pro-
posed market-based task allocation mechanism; in this chapter the focus shifts
to address broader questions around market-based control as a methodology.
The allocation mechanism in previous chapters is very much under the control
of the system designer, and can be seen as a rather articial market. The de-
signer denes the utility function of individual nodes, and forces them to bid in
an informative manner. Although this results in the desired allocation, it also
raises the question of how a more \open" market with true competition would
perform. If agents could determine their own bidding strategy, would this result
in a better or worse allocation when compared to the utilisation-based approach
explored in previous chapters?
Proponents of the free market would suggest that a competitive market
could lead to further optimisation and increased adaptability. However, markets
can under certain conditions exhibit behaviours that are undesirable from a
control point of view (Hogg and Huberman, 2002). The simulation platform
developed over the course of this thesis allows us to put this to the test: how
does the management of a system using \enforced socialism" compare to self-
interested capitalism?1
The objective of this chapter is to compare the behaviour of a competitive
market to one using utilisation-based bidding. I am interested in how and why
they dier, and what the methodological implications are for market-based
control in general. To achieve this I develop an adaptive agent for a rst-price
sealed-bid auction with common-value goods. The agent is subject to the same
communication constraints and auction mechanics used in previous chapters.
To investigate the relative performances of the two approaches, the number of
tasks allocated is measured for a fully-connected communication topology, as
well as for a range of less well-connected networks.
1In recent years this question has received an increasing amount of attention as \the
price of anarchy", especially in the context of network routing and congestion games, e.g.,
Roughgarden (2005)
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To distinguish between the task allocation mechanism presented in previous
chapters and the competitive agents presented in this chapter, I introduce the
terms competitive and cooperative. Competitive or prot-based allocation indi-
cates a market where agents adapt their prices to maximise their own revenue,
within the bounds allowed by the available energy. If, however, agents use only
their energy levels to calculate bid values, as discussed in previous chapters, I
will refer to cooperative or utilisation-based markets.
7.1 Motivation
My exploration of competitive systems has two distinct motivations, which are
discussed in turn below. Firstly, from a pragmatic, engineering point of view,
open systems are sometimes unavoidable: they are a fact of life. Secondly, as
part of a methodological investigation, competitive systems represent a natural
conclusion as we move along the axis of increasingly distributed control.
There are cases where the system designer does not have the level of con-
trol required to dene the interactions, motivation, strategies and behaviour of
individuals in his system. As part of the qualication eort that ows through
this thesis, I am therefore forced to ask how this constraint of limited con-
trol impacts on the design. More specically, how does using a competitive
market to allocate tasks dier from a cooperative one in terms of performance
and suitability to dierent parts of the problem space? For example, it is
quite possible that multiple stakeholders might collaborate in constructing and
managing a distributed satellite system. As the size of the system increases,
the likelihood of dierent, self-interested parties joining it increases too. For
these multi-stakeholder scenarios a system of fair compensation according to
the work done must exist. A natural way to express agents' contributions,
while still allowing for individual strategies, is to relate the bid values to actual
revenue for their owners. Compensation is therefore related to the demand
for certain skills, and the eciency with which agents convert energy to work.
Because stake-holders are self-interested we can expect them to optimise their
agents' bidding behaviour to maximise the revenue they earn, while presumably
minimising their contribution to the welfare of others. This is in contrast to
cooperative markets where bidding is used purely as a signalling mechanism to
coordinate system-level behaviour.
The second motivation stems from a view of open systems as the natural
conclusion to distributed control. If we have a multi-component system we want
to control, the most centralised solution involves a single controller directly
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managing all the other agents in the system. A more distributed approach
allows local decision making, but with a clearly dened global objective. If
we continue along this axis, we nd open systems, where individuals have no
unied goal, but instead everyone \is continually making to better his own
condition", to use Adam Smith's phrasing (1776). Individuals decide how to
bid, and have their own private incentives that they optimise for. I therefore
compare competitive to cooperative markets to determine whether some parts
of the parameter space are more suited to one system or another.
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7.2 The structure of a competitive market
To convert the previously described market-based task allocation mechanism
to a competitive market, the bid calculation function needs to change to al-
low agents to actively try to win tasks, instead of conveying their degree of
utilisation. To keep the two systems comparable in terms of performance, the
types and number of communication packets allowed must remain the same.
I therefore retain the structure of the utilisation-based market, including the
rst-price auction structure, communication constraints and optimisation fea-
tures such as bid aggregation; the only change is in how agents decide how
much to bid.
The auction structure remains the same as before: an agent with a task an-
nounces it to his immediate neighbours, who relay it to their neighbours until
the time-to-live of the announcement packet is exceeded. Agents with enough
energy and the necessary skills submit bids back towards the auctioneer. At ev-
ery node along the way, bids are aggregated and the best bid forwarded. With
every relay of a bid message, the bid value is multiplied by a xed commission
value. The auctioneer selects the lowest bid, and assigns the task to the cor-
responding agent, and the same sequence as before follows: task acceptance,
task transferral and acknowledgement packets. If the task consists of multiple
components, they are once again outsourced to other agents in subsequent auc-
tions. The commission structure and distributed winner calculation is therefore
still applicable, and allows the dierent approaches to be compared. I restrict
the discussion to tasks of a constant size for all agents, which results in par-
ticular market dynamics | I will point these out through the course of this
chapter. The same measures of success as before are used again: how many
tasks are successfully completed, and how much energy is required to achieve
the allocation?
One signicant implication of this market structure is that very little infor-
mation is available for agents to base their bids on. In most other work using
sealed-bid auctions all agents are informed of the closing price of the auction
(e.g., Bagnall and Toft, 2006), but due to the communication cost associated
with notifying the network, this information is not available in my system.
Agents are paid for contributing to completing tasks; in other words, con-
verting energy to work. As explained in the previous section, these payments
are used to calculate the revenue of the agents' owners. Energy is replenished
at a constant rate, but the agent can only store a nite amount. There is no
incentive to store energy for future use, or to abstain from bidding in the hope
that prices will rise. The best strategy is to win as many jobs as possible, as
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long as an agent still makes a prot completing them.2
Instead of distributing tasks to evenly share the load, a competitive market
favours the agent most adept at winning jobs. Due to competition and constant
task sizes for all agents, we expect the competitive market to converge to an
equilibrium price, with eectively no prot for the agents involved. For identical
agents in the equilibrium condition, the allocation should be random with a
uniform distribution, as no agent has a competitive advantage over anyone
else.
Note that I am primarily interested in the performance of the system as
a whole (measured in terms of task completion) for the purposes of decen-
tralised control. This is in contrast to a focus on agent strategies, auction
revenues, or social welfare measurements that frequently dominate in agent-
based economics. The performance of the system is dened in terms of the
work completed, not the utilities of the individual agents.
The competitive agents focus on maximising their own prot, which can
result in sub-optimal system-level performance. For example, if a successful
bidder exhausts itself by winning a series of jobs to the point where it has
insucient energy to transfer tasks, it can prevent access to a part of the
network that could otherwise be used, thus reducing the total system capacity.
This behaviour is discouraged in the utilisation-based allocation mechanism by
having agents increase their bids to reect decreased energy levels. In economic
terms this decrease in performance can be seen as an externality, i.e., a cost
that is not captured in the allocation prices. This incentive structure, where
selsh behaviour is incentivised, possibly to the detriment of the global system,
is reminiscent of the \tragedy of the commons" described by Hardin (1968), and
much analysed in the economic literature (e.g., Marwell and Ames, 1979; Mason
and Phillips, 1997) and evolutionary biology (e.g., Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981;
Killingback et al., 2006) since then.
In economic terms, the competitive market is analogous to a hyper-capitalist
system with purely self-interested actors, where no-one is responsible for the
global good, yet everyone's actions determine it. In contrast, the utilisation-
based market is close to a socialist utopia, where everyone contributes according
to their abilities. In both cases the system uses local information for decision
making, but in the socialist system, everyone has the global good at heart.
2This approach views the energy used in completing tasks as a cost, because the same
energy could in theory have been spent on a dierent task for which the agent would have
been paid.
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7.2.1 Why not mechanism design?
A reader with a background in market design may at this point wonder: \Why
not simply use mechanism design to achieve the desired allocation?" While
mechanism design is undoubtedly a valid approach to the problem, it is not
the objective of this chapter. A mechanism design approach would focus on
incentivising desirable behaviours, usually by changing the rules of interaction.
However, this is not always possible, for example in established systems, or in
the case of distributed satellite systems, where we want to minimize commu-
nication. While mechanism design could be used to nd a market-structure
that incentivises the desired behaviour, I am more interested in how the per-
formance of the utilisation-based allocation mechanism dened in Chapter 3
changes when we move to an open market, and whether specic dynamic prop-
erties emerge as a result.
This chapter should therefore be seen as an investigation into the nature
of auctions for market-based control, specically when taking place in spatial
networks. The following statement by Milgrom (1985) neatly summarises my
intent with this chapter:
Too much recent research eort in auctions has been simply apply-
ing the latest techniques (principally \mechanism design") to ever
more complicated models; too little has been devoted to the very
real and important economic questions that auctions raise.
If we were to pursue a mechanism design approach, one possible solution
would be to rely on a payment structure similar to the bid calculation used
by the utilisation-based agents. To maximise the number of tasks allocated
across the system, a payment rule is required that will couple the global system
performance to local performance, by scaling the amount of money an agent
receives by the total number of tasks completed by the system. One way of
estimating the system-level utilisation using only local information, is to take
the agent's own energy-levels into account which leads us back to a utilisation-
based bidding approach.
7.2.2 Desired allocation behaviour
The desired allocation behaviour requires the careful balancing of three dierent
objectives. The most obvious one is to minimise the allocation cost by allocating
tasks close to the auctioneer. Secondly, the system simultaneously needs to
prevent node exhaustion by spreading the allocation of tasks across a number
of agents. Finally, we need to maximise the incident energy in the system.
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Recall that agents have a limited energy storage capacity: once their batteries
are fully charged, they cannot store any more energy. In order to maximise the
incident energy on a system level, we therefore want as many agents as possible
to be capable of storing the incoming energy. In other words, it is preferable
to have two partially-used agents to a situation where one is fully-utilised and
one not at all, because when both are used, the system as a whole can receive
more incoming energy. Note that this condition only plays a role while some
of the agents are not utilised | when all agents are in use, they can all receive
incoming energy.
7.3 Trading agent design
The majority of work on adaptive agents focuses on continuous double auctions,
where both the buyers and the sellers adjust their prices (e.g, Vytelingum et al.,
2004; Chaggar et al., 2008). These auctions are ecient at allocating resources,
and are widely used in the real world. For the purposes of task allocation in dis-
tributed satellite systems however, the combination of communication cost and
task structure makes the use of a single-sided auction more attractive. As de-
scribed in Chapter 3, a reverse, rst-price, sealed-bid auction allows allocation
with minimal communication.
While a large number of agents with varying degrees of complexity have
been developed for continuous double auctions, single-sided auctions have re-
ceived much less attention. Brandt and Weiss (2002) investigated the eects of
antisocial agents in a simple task allocation scenario to demonstrate the vul-
nerability of second-price sealed-bid auctions to competitors whose main goal
is not maximising prot, but inicting losses on the other agents in the system.
In work that is highly relevant to this chapter Bagnall and Toft (2004,
2006) adapted agent learning strategies used in continuous double auctions to
sealed-bid auctions. Their implementations of ZIP-traders (Cli and Bruten,
1997, 1998) and the history-based agents proposed by Gjerstad and Dickhaut
(1998) take the dierent information revelation and allocation processes for
single-sided auctions into account.
As the focus of this chapter is on market dynamics, rather than the strategies
of individual agents, I restrict my attention to reactive agents. More speci-
cally, I adapt the single-sided ZIP-traders in Bagnall and Toft (2006) to my
task allocation scenario in order to accommodate three signicant changes in
the market structure. Firstly, for task allocation, we are dealing with interde-
pendent goods, because agents have to outsource subsequent task components.
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Agents therefore need to learn an appropriate outsourcing cost in addition to
the market price, i.e., what other agents are bidding. Bagnall and Toft looked at
sealed-bid auctions where all agents could participate in auctions. In contrast,
my own focus on communication costs has led to transactions that execute on a
network with a specic topology, which decreases the information available to
agents. Furthermore, agents in the task allocation auction are not informed of
the winning bid price, which complicates the learning process. Instead of using
an estimated optimal bid to update their prot margins, they have to search
for the price point where their bids succeed.
Our competitive market should exhibit similar dynamics as would be ex-
pected from a real-world market consisting of self-interested individuals. Rel-
evant behaviours include learning of the market price; competition between
agents by varying bid prices; sensitivity to changes in the cost of task com-
ponents over time; and, on a macro-level, price behaviour that corresponds to
that predicted by competition economics. When the workload is less than what
could potentially be performed by the system, i.e., supply exceeds demand, we
expect the market-price to converge to a zero-prot state. Conversely, an over-
loaded system will be characterised by bid values and task costs increasing until
agents run out of energy.
7.3.1 Learning strategy
This study employs a reactive agent that uses only its internal state and the
state of the network to determine bid values, without any strategic planning.
The trading agent strategy is similar to that used by ZIP-traders, but needs to
be adapted for single-sided sealed-bid auctions in which the winning bid value
is unknown.
An agent knows its internal energy cost to execute a unit task (cint), but it
has to learn the outsourcing cost (cos) and a suitable prot margin () for its
position in the network. As the true outsourcing cost is highly dependent on
the behaviour of other agents in the market and only observable through actual
outsourcing of task components, the agent maintains an estimated outsourcing
cost (^ cos), which it uses to calculate the bid value (B):
B = cint +  + ^ cos (7.3.1)
The only environmental information available to an agent is its own bid-
ding history, whether a particular bid was successful, and the outsourcing cost
associated with previous task allocations. It must use this information to learn
suitable values for  and ^ cos, while these values are changing due to interaction
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with other agents. For convenience of analysis I retain the xed commission
factors used in previous chapters: although agents earn money from relaying
tasks, they do not have to learn a suitable commission value.
I assume agents to be rational, i.e., they will not knowingly bid values that
will cause them to make a loss. They will therefore not bid below their internal
cost (B > cint) and they will never lower their outsourcing cost estimate to be
negative (^ cos  0). Finally, I also stipulate that the prot margin likewise can
never be negative (  0).
The learning problem can be illustrated by considering an auction from the
perspective of an agent. A new task is announced, so the agent calculates a
bid that takes its internal cost and estimated outsourcing cost into account,
and adds some prot margin to the bid. It then waits for a response from the
auctioneer. After a predetermined period of time the agent still has not heard
from the auctioneer, and must therefore assume that its bid has failed. In the
next auction, it will try a lower bid, but should this be done by decreasing its
prot margin, or its outsourcing estimate? One way to get an estimate of the
market price and outsourcing costs is to aggressively submit a low bid that can
win the auction, but there is always a danger the outsourcing costs may be high
enough to cause the agent to make a loss on the transaction.
ZIP traders face a similar challenge, but only in one dimension. They
retrospectively estimate an optimal bid for the precious auction, then update
their prot margin by the dierence between their actual margin and the desired
margin. The margin updates are smoothed by an exponential innite impulse
response lter (the momentum coecient used by Cli and Bruten, 1998),
which determines the learning rate of agents. For Bagnall and Toft's single-
sided-auction ZIP traders, the optimal bid is derived from the publicly known
winning bid value.
As my agents do not have this information available, they have to rely on a
probing strategy to nd a suitable bid value over multiple auctions. A simple
gradient descent rule allows them to nd and converge upon the market price.
This process can be visualised as the traversal of a two-dimensional space,
as graphically represented in Figure 7.1. The horizontal axis corresponds to
the sum of the agent's internal cost and prot margin, while the vertical axis
represents the estimated outsourcing cost. The bid value is given by the sum of
the x and y coordinates. If the bid is lower than the other bids in the auction,
the agent wins the task. The market value of the task is represented by the
blue line in Figure 7.1: it represents the combinations of values for (cint + )
and ^ cos that would result in the agent winning an auction. Bids above the line
1497. Competitive markets
Lose
Win
Start
Figure 7.1: Visualisation of the learning strategy used by competitive agents.
The horizontal axis represents the sum of the internal cost (cint) and the prot
margin (), while the vertical axis represents the estimated outsourcing cost
(^ cos). The bid value is the sum of the x and y coordinates. The market price is
indicated by the blue line: if the bid value is lower than the market price, the
agent will win the job, while bids above the line will lose. The arrows indicate
a series of changes to  and ^ cos while an agent searches for the market price.
In the zero-prot condition, the market price is the sum of cint and the true
outsourcing cost cos.
will lose.
For every auction, the agent computes a bid value based on its previous
experiences. At the end of the auction, the agent updates the variables based
on whether it managed to win the task or not, thereby moving to another point
in parameter space. As this process is repeated over a sequence of auctions,
the agent approaches the market equilibrium price. The market-price line will
gradually also move downwards until it reaches a zero-prot state ( = 0), as
the agents are forced to bid below the previous market prices.
How can the agent go about learning the correct values? I will start with
a simple margin update rule borrowed from ZIP traders adapted to reverse
auctions: if an agent wins an auction, it knows it has bid less than all other
agents; it therefore increases its bid value in the next auction to increase its
prot margin. Similarly, if an agent loses an auction, it knows that it should
bid somewhere between its internal cost and its previous bid, i.e., it should bid
less in the subsequent auction.
The prot margin  is used as the primary parameter for adjustment: it
is changed more rapidly and is used to explore the space, while ^ cos changes
relatively slowly. This is because, although both ^ cos and  contribute equally
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to the bid value, the information we have about the variables is asymmetric.
The prot margin is expected to uctuate as agents converge on the equilibrium
price, while ^ cos is based on observations of actual task outsourcing. However,
if  is 0, it cannot be decreased any further and therefore the agent adjusts ^ cos.
The outsourcing cost estimate is updated whenever an agent allocates a
task. If we regard the allocation cost as a noisy signal of the true outsourcing
cost once the allocation prices have converged, repeated observations will allow
us to nd a good estimate of the outsourcing cost. The agent lters the out-
sourcing cost estimate using a rst-order innite impulse response lter with
coecient os 2 [0;1]. For os = 1, the agent has no memory, and always uses
the most recent outsourcing cost value as ^ cos.
If we look at Figure 7.1, it is clear that the quickest path to the market price
is not to be found by moving in a horizontal direction by decreasing the margin
and then down by decreasing the outsourcing cost. Instead, it would be found
by directly to the nearest point on the win-lose line. This would imply that both
 and ^ cos are decreased simultaneously. However, the relative magnitude of the
decrease is unknown. To accommodate this, I therefore introduce a timeout
nos which also triggers an update of ^ cos: if the agent has failed to win a job
in more than nos successive auctions, it decreases ^ cos. This is to compensate
for the unfortunate state of aairs where the agent has a wildly inaccurate ^ cos
value, as it has won no auctions. It therefore has not had the opportunity to
conduct an outsourcing auction and thus has no outsourcing cost information.
Finally, to describe the magnitudes of updates, every agent has its own ad-
justment size variables, one for the prot margin () and one for the outsourc-
ing cost estimate (os). These are used to generate random values with which
to increase or decrease the parameters. The magnitudes of the adjustment vari-
ables determine how quickly an agent will traverse the parameter space, but
larger values can also result in noisy bid values, with signicant under-bidding.
As this is a purely reactive agent, it is necessarily simple (and sometimes naive)
in how it calculates bids. More advanced strategies are certainly possible, but
they fall beyond the scope of this chapter.
Note that an agent will only place a bid if it has enough energy to complete
the task; its energy level does not contribute to the calculation of its bid value.
Once an agent has committed to a task, it has to complete the relevant task
components and outsource the others. If it cannot outsource the remaining
task components, the agent will suer the energy penalty of completing a task
component and it will not receive any payment, as the task was not completed.3
3This assumes that an accounting layer exists that tracks where tasks are executed, which
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The update rules can be summarised as follows:
1. If the agent wins an auction,  is increased by a value generated uniformly
at random from the range of [0;].
2. If the agent loses an auction,  is decreased by a value generated uniformly
at random from the range of [0;].
3. If  < 0, decrease ^ cos by jj and set  = 0.
4. When allocating a task, update ^ cos with the amount paid (P) to outsource
the task:
^ cos (t + 1) = ^ cos (t)  (1   os) + P(t)  os
5. If the agent has not won any auctions in the last nos auctions, decrease
^ cos by a value generated uniformly at random from the range [0;os]. Set
nos = 0.
6. If ^ cos < 0, let ^ cos = 0.
7.3.2 Dynamic behaviour
With the auction structure and learning strategy of the competitive agents
dened, we can now consider the dynamics that result from their interaction.
If a population of these agents are pitted against each other, they exhibit a
market-like dynamic that can serve as a valid model of a competitive market.
The winning bid prices for an example market using competitive agents are
shown in Figure 7.2.
If a group of agents were to start with random values for  and ^ cos, those
with low bid prices will initially win. As they outsource subsequent task compo-
nents, they learn the outsourcing prices charged by other agents. More accurate
estimates of the outsourcing cost therefore propagate from the agents at the
end of the outsourcing chain, back up to the rst agents. Agents essentially
converge to an accurate estimate of the outsourcing cost (^ cos ! cos), while also
competing to win jobs by lowering their margins ( ! 0).
As a result, the bid prices are driven towards a zero-prot condition, where
agents bid the sum of their internal cost and the subsequent outsourcing costs.
This is shown in Figure 7.1 where the market price line intersects cos and cint.
The imperfect information about the outsourcing cost means that agents will
regularly underestimate the market price, and bid too low. Although this allows
the agent to learn the correct outsourcing cost, the agent may make a small
agent owners should be compensated, and by what amount.
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Figure 7.2: Winning bid prices over time for an example market of competitive
agents. Tasks consist of four sequential components; the price for each is shown
in a dierent colour. The blue component requires a green one to be outsourced,
which in turn results in a yellow one, and nally a red component, at which
point the task can be regarded as complete. Competition between agents drives
market prices from initially random values to the zero-prot condition, where
the bid price is the sum of an agent's internal cost (1 in this case) and the
subsequent outsourcing costs. The nal component has no outsourcing costs,
and therefore converges on a cost of 1. The prices for other components are
noisier, due to uncertainty about the outsourcing cost.
loss in the process. As a result of this uncertainty, the bid prices for task
components with outsourcing requirements vary around the convergence point.
The prices of task components with a longer outsourcing chain will vary more,
because of the accumulated uncertainty in the prices of subsequent components.
This phenomenon is clearly visible in Figure 7.2. Note that the convergence to
the zero-prot condition results from all agents having the same cint values.
If all agents have the same internal costs we nd that allocation is randomly
spread between them in a round-robin-like fashion, as no agent holds a compet-
itive advantage. This convergence condition is promising from a task allocation
perspective because it provides a mechanism for distributing labour between
similar agents.
The rate at which the market learns the zero-prot price is determined by
the magnitude of  and os, as well as the value of nos. The latter variable
is however dependent on the number of agents in the system: it reects the
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probability that the agent will win a task in the zero-prot state. Once the
market has converged to an equilibrium price, for n0 in the auction community,
the agent should win on average 1
n0 of the auctions. However, as the number of
nodes in the network and the size of the auction community are both unknown,
a good value for nos can only be found on very long time scales.
Agents make most of their money by how well they respond to major
changes in the market: if they are good at adapting to a new market price,
they can use that information to increase their revenue. The bidding success
of an individual is determined by the values of its learning parameters as well
as its initial guesses for  and ^ cos. A large prot adjustment step, for example,
will enable the node to quickly adapt to the market price, but it may also cause
aggressive underestimation of the price once prices have converged, decreasing
the earnings of the agent. Furthermore, winning a task will give an agent up-
to-date information about the market price and outsourcing costs, thus giving
it a competitive advantage over agents who have not recently won a task.
There is much scope for optimising the parameters of individual agents to
perform well in a market, as done by Cli (1998). My interest is however with
system-level behaviour, so I will limit my discussion to pointing out that some
parameter values will obviously result in poorly performing agents. Too much
memory (os ! 0) means that agents will be very slow to learn outsourcing
costs. Similarly, if the adjustment parameters ( and os) are too small,
converge will take many auctions. If, however, the adjustment steps are large,
a noisy convergence state will result, with signicant underestimation of the
market price and oscillation around it. Finally, if the outsourcing timeout nos
is too small, agents will aggressively lower their outsourcing estimates, until the
market price converges on cint because ^ cos approaches zero. In the following
experiments parameter values are randomly generated from ranges that result
in suitable behaviour, but they are not actively optimised, as the system-level
behaviour does not change signicantly.
7.4 Fully-connected market
In the rst experiment I compare the behaviour of utilisation-based allocation
against competitive bidding. A control case where bidders bid random values is
used as a reference. The experiment measures the energy levels in the system
over time for the three dierent allocation approaches and relates it to the
number of tasks allocated.
To remove possible topological eects, the allocation takes place on a fully-
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connected network. This forms a single marketplace, where all agents can be
equally involved in bidding, thus maximising the competition. As a result of the
fully-connected topology, all agents have equal access to all the information in
the system. We therefore expect allocation to be better (globally more ecient)
than it will be in a distributed market.
The dierences in bid calculation mean that the agents cannot be compared
by pitting them directly against each other in a single market: the utilisation-
based agents are not competitive at all, and will easily be under-bid by the
competitive agents. I therefore investigate their performance by using separate
markets, each consisting of only one type of agent.
7.4.1 Setup
The system consists of 50 agents in total: 10 individuals are drawn from ve
dierent skill types. Tasks are uploaded to the system from a ground station at
a rate of 5 per 100 time steps for the rst part of the experiment, representing
a lightly loaded system. At t = 10000, after 100 uploads, the workload is
doubled to 10 tasks per 100 time steps. Tasks consist of 5 components that are
sequentially executed, as shown in Table 7.1. The run terminates at t = 20000.
All agents have the same task execution cost (cint) of 1 energy unit per task.
Negotiation packets (ctx) cost 0.001 units and task transferral (ctf) packets 0.1
units.
The incoming energy (Einc) is set to 0.01 per agent per time step, which is
sucient for the lightly loaded part of the experiment, but not enough for the
overload condition. Agents can store up to 10 units of energy, and they start the
experiment fully charged. All agents can communicate directly with all other
agents, as the communication network is fully connected. The commission and
packet time-to-live values therefore do not have any eect.
The competitive agents bid as described in Section 7.3, using a randomly
generated set of values for their parameters. The initial values for  and ^ cos were
chosen uniformly at random from [0;10], while  was selected from [0;0:2].
The values for os and os were randomly selected from [0;1] and nos ranged
from 15 to 25. These values result in the bidding behaviour seen in Figure 7.2.
The utilisation-based agents use their energy levels and expected outsourcing
cost to compute bids, as described in previous chapters. The random bidders
respond to an auction announcement with a value picked uniformly at random
from the range [cint;10]. They do not calculate outsourcing estimates, nor
do they take their energy levels into account beyond checking that they have
sucient energy for task execution. Note that the dierent types of agents
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Table 7.1: Compound task structure used in competitive allocation experiment.
The execution of task elements (left-hand column) results in another task el-
ement (right-hand column) that must be executed. All components must be
executed before the task is complete.
A ! aB
B ! bC
C ! cD
D ! dE
E ! e
never compete against each other: every type interacts only with a community
of the same type.
7.4.2 Energy measurements
The energy levels of all agents are captured over the duration of a run, and
repeated for 50 runs. Figure 7.3 shows a percentile plot of the cumulative
results for competitive, utilisation-based and random bidding. The minimum
to maximum energy range over all runs is given by the lightly-shaded band,
while the darker zone ranges from the 25th to 75th percentiles. The median
energy is indicated by the solid blue line.
The graphs display four distinct phases over the course of the experiment.
At the start of a run there is a transient initial phase, until allocation settles into
the steady-state pattern for a light task load. When the task load is doubled
at t = 10000, another large transient is observed, before the system settles
into a new steady state with substantially lower energy. The initial transient
is most visible for the competitive market in Figure 7.3a, peaking at t = 2000.
This response reects the period during which the competitive agents converge
on the market price. From t = 2000 to t = 10000 we see the 25th percentile
recover while the median stays the same. This period corresponds to the zero-
prot state in the market. The increase in workload at t = 10000 causes the
median energy in the market to decrease, along with the 25th to 75th percentile
band. The decrease is due to the workload exceeding the incoming energy in the
system, thus forcing agents to use their stored energy to complete tasks. The
decrease stops around t = 13000 when the stored energy is depleted, before the
network settles into the new steady-state condition, where some tasks cannot
be completed, due to insucient energy.
In this overloaded phase, the type A agents from Table 7.1 are always ex-
hausted, and sometimes incapable of executing a task. The subsequent task
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(c) Random
Figure 7.3: Energy over time using three dierent bidding approaches. The
task load is doubled at t = 10000. The solid line shows the median energy of
fty agents over 50 runs. The lightly shaded area indicates the minimum and
maximum range of agents' energy, while the darker zone shows the range from
the 25th to 75th percentile. Note the narrow energy range for utilisation-based
bidding in comparison to competitive bidding.
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components are therefore not executed, thereby decreasing the load on the
agents responsible for task components B to E. As a result, the energy of these
agents will increase, as can be seen in the gradual upwards curve of the median
energy. Experiments where task allocation was run for longer showed the me-
dian energy settling at around 4 units, with a minimum of 0 and a maximum
of 10, for all three cases. When the system is overloaded, tasks are allocated
more on node availability than the value of their bids, because there is so little
network capacity available. As a result, the behaviour of the three allocation
approaches looks rather similar for t > 15000.
A qualitative comparison of the graphs for dierent allocation approaches
reveal a number of obvious dierences. Broadly speaking, we observe a signi-
cant dierence between competitive and utilisation-based task allocation, while
the random market is somewhere in between.
Most signicantly, the median agent energy when using utilisation-based
allocation is always higher than for competitive allocation, conrming the hy-
pothesis that the utilisation-based approach would be more ecient. The be-
haviour of the 25th to 75th percentile band hints at how the improvement is
achieved. For utilisation-based allocation, the system acts to equalise the ener-
gies of agents. The relative similarity in node energies shows in the narrowness
of the 25th to 75th percentile band. For the competitive bidders, this band is
much wider, because node energy does not directly inuence bidding. When
using random bidders, the width of the band is between that of other two
cases. With agents choosing bid values from the same range, allocation will be
uniformly distributed between agents, in eect approximating a round-robin al-
location. It should therefore come as no surprise to see energy dynamics which
are somewhat similar to the utilisation-based approach.
The minimum-maximum ranges of the dierent approaches reinforce what
the 25th to 75th percentile band shows. In the competitive market we can
see that for almost the entire duration of the experiment, at least one node
has no energy, while another is fully charged. For utilisation-based allocation,
the minimum energy hovers around 7 units for the lightly loaded part of the
experiment, only decreasing signicantly when the workload doubles. However,
at the same time we also see the maximum energy decrease, from 10 to 7.5 at
t = 15000. Random bidding results in a minimum node energy around 2 for the
rst half of the experiment, decreasing to 0 when the task load increases. The
maximum energy, however, stays at 10, suggesting that the energy distribution
is not as equal as with utilisation-based allocation.
Another notable feature is the overshoot visible on the 25th percentile of the
1587.4. Fully-connected market
initial transient of the competitive market; the other approaches do not display
this phenomenon. The overshoot is due to a combination of agent competition
and their learning of the network price. Initially, at t < 1000, only a few agents
have succeeded in winning a job. They then use the knowledge of the market
price to win more jobs, thus reducing their own energy even further causing
the dramatic decrease in both minimum and 25th percentile values. Over time,
other agents eventually lower their bids enough to also win tasks, causing work
to be distributed more evenly. This can be seen in the recovery of the 25th
percentile from t = 2000 to t = 5000.
Finally, note that the rate of decrease in the median energy (i.e., the slope of
the transient at t = 10000) is the steepest for the competitive market, followed
by the random market, while the magnitude of the slope in the utilisation-
based case is smaller still. The dierence can most clearly be seen in the
steepness of the slope of the energy median in Figure 7.3a when compared to
Figure 7.3b. For a xed task load and incoming energy level (Einc), the slope
is determined by the number of agents that can store more energy. The narrow
energy distribution in the utilisation-based system means that a greater number
of agents have spare capacity to store more energy. For the competitive system,
however, some agents are almost empty while others are full: as a result the
system cannot store as much of the incoming energy, causing a signicantly
steeper slope. The random market is, once again, between these two extremes.
7.4.3 Tasks allocated
If we look at the number of tasks allocated, we nd that the utilisation-based
network outperforms the other two approaches with a mean of 1419.16 tasks
per run (standard error = 0.22) out of a possible 1500. The random bidder is
next with 1401.62 tasks (standard error = 0.64); followed by the competitive
market with 1371.84 (standard error = 0.65). The small standard error values
can be ascribed to this experiment using a fully connected network, i.e., there
are no topological eects that inuence task allocation success.
If we investigate where performance diverged for the dierent cases, we nd
that their performances in the steady-state regimes are the same. However, in
the second transient, where the networks move from having sucient energy
for task allocation to not having enough, the competitive approach depletes
its stored energy rst. This is partly due to it having a slightly lower median
energy at the start of the transient, but primarily because its energy decreases
much faster than either the utilisation-based market or the one with random
bidders. From this we can deduce that, although the performance dierences
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are small for this scenario, for a highly dynamic workload the utilisation-based
allocation approach will do signicantly better than the competitive one.
7.5 Spatially distributed markets
In this section I investigate what happens when we move from a fully-connected
to a spatially distributed market where network topology plays a signicant role.
While the previous section provides a useful reference for understanding the dy-
namics of the system, distributed markets are directly relevant to distributed
satellite systems as the high cost of communication makes fully-connected mar-
kets undesirable.
To determine the eect of topology I measure the number of tasks allocated
for a range of network topologies with dierent degrees of connectivity. By
keeping the workload constant and varying the incoming energy, the response
of the system to dierent levels of utilisation can be measured. A utilisation-
based market is simulated under the same conditions to serve as a comparison
and allow identication of the part of parameter space where one approach
would be preferred to the other.
7.5.1 Setup
This experiment uses a very similar conguration as that of the previous section:
50 agents consisting of 10 individuals for each one of 5 task component types.
Tasks arrive at a ground station at a constant rate of 5 per 100 time steps,
using the same task structure as in Table 7.1, resulting in 25 task components
per 100 time steps. All task components cost 1 energy unit to execute. Agents
can store up to 10 units of energy, and they start the experiment fully charged.
For every competitive agent, the parameter values were randomly generated
using the same ranges as in the previous section.
The agents are distributed uniformly at random in a three-dimensional cube
with sides of length one. If two agents are closer than the communication range
(Rth), they are connected. This forms a random geometric network similar to
the topologies used in the previous chapter. The three-dimensional position of
the agents does not change throughout the simulation to avoid eects due to a
dynamic topology. A network that consists of a single connected component is
used in all cases.
By varying the communication distance the network changes from barely
connected to almost fully connected, allowing us to measure the performance
across a range of network connectivity values. A minimum Rth of 0.2 results
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in networks with a mean diameter of 9 and mean degree of 5.09, while the
maximum Rth gives a mean diameter of 2.96, and a mean degree of 30.23. The
packet time-to-live distance (dttl) is xed at 4 for all network topologies, while
the commission value is xed at 0.1 per message repeat. Negotiation packets
cost 0.001 while task transfer packets cost 0.1, i.e.,  = 100.
The incoming energy (Einc) ranges from 0.001 to 0.01 per agent per time
step. Note that increasing Einc is analogous to decreasing the workload as more
energy becomes available to complete the required tasks. Keeping the workload
constant, however, simplies the interpretation of the experimental results, as
no additional scaling is required.
The experiment is repeated 50 times for all values of Rth and Einc, each
time with new agent positions and new agent parameter values. I measure the
number of tasks successfully completed and the energy remaining in the system
at the end of the simulation.
Based on the previous experiment, we expect to observe an area where
the system is under-utilised, i.e., the incoming energy exceeds the workload,
allowing all tasks to be completed. At the other extreme, we will observe an
overloaded system, where there simply is not enough energy available to satisfy
all task requests. We are interested in where the transition between these
zones occurs, and how it is inuenced by the communication network topology.
We can calculate the expected transition point for an idealised system, without
topology or communication cost, by setting the energy used per time step equal
to the maximum incoming energy per time step, and solving for Einc:
(tasks)  (task components)  (incoming energy)  (agents)
5
100
 5  Einc  50
) Einc = 0:005
For an ideal system, we therefore expect to see the transition between all
tasks being allocated and allocation failing around Einc = 0:005. A more re-
alistic model that takes into account the energy spent on communication in a
network should therefore show a transition point at a slightly higher value of
Einc.
7.5.2 Results
We start by keeping the amount of incoming energy xed, and focusing on
the eect of changing the connectedness of the market. The dierence in the
number of tasks allocated for competitive and utilisation-based bidding is shown
in Figure 7.4. The incoming energy (Einc) was kept at 0.006, while the allocation
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success was measured for a number of increasingly connected networks. As
expected, the number of tasks allocated by both approaches increases as the
network becomes more connected. For Rth > 0:35, both approaches succeed
in allocating all tasks, but the focus of this experiment lies at the lower values
of Rth. We see that both allocation approaches deteriorate when connectivity
decreases, but that the competitive system fares signicantly worse.
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Figure 7.4: Comparison of task allocation using utilisation-based (blue) and
competitive (green) task allocation. The connectivity of the network increases
along the axis, from relatively sparse to almost fully connected. The y-axis
shows the number of task completed. It is clear that using utilisation-based
market results in more successful task allocation for less well-connected net-
works. The error bars indicate the standard error.
This represents but one point on the incoming energy axis | we gain a
much better view of the larger landscape if we also consider a range of Einc
values, from 0.001 to 0.009. Figure 7.5a shows heat maps of the resulting task
allocation; Figure 7.4 should be seen as horizontal section across these graphs
at Einc = 0:006. Note once again that a small Einc value is analogous to a large
workload, because the amount of work required from the system exceeds the
available energy. Conversely, a large Einc value represents a system with a light
task load and enough energy to complete all tasks.
At rst glance the task allocation results for both approaches look very
similar: when Einc is low, very few tasks are completed, and when it is high all
tasks are completed. However, the performance at the transition between these
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(a) Competitive bidding
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(b) Utilisation-based bidding
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(c) Dierence
Figure 7.5: Number of tasks allocated for competitive (a) and utilisation-based
bidding (b) over a range of communication distance (Rth) and incoming energy
(Einc) values. The dierence between (a) and (b) is shown in (c), which high-
lights the superior performance of the utilisation-based approach for systems
with limited energy and low connectivity.
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zones diers, as does the behaviour when the network topology becomes less
connected. The expected limit of perfect allocation for an idealised system lies
at Einc = 0:005, and we can observe that the performance of the competitive
market starts to deteriorate at Einc = 0:006. For the utilisation-based market
it ranges from about 0:005 to 0:006, very close to the ideal-case performance.
Figure 7.5c literally plots the dierence between the two approaches: it
shows number of tasks allocated using a utilisation-based market less the num-
ber tasks allocated using the competitive approach. This plot clearly demon-
strates that utilisation-based allocation performs well in a larger part of the
parameter space than the competitive market, because it allocates a larger
number of tasks for lower energy and decreased connectivity.
If we look at the 0 contour, we see that the number of tasks allocated is
the same for high energy, high connectivity scenarios. With decreasing energy
and a relatively high connectivity (Rth > 0:35), there is a distinct change and
a rapid increase in the dierence, peaking at Einc = 0:005. In this area the
number of tasks allocated through competitive bidding starts to decrease, while
the utilisation-based allocation still performs well. If we decrease the incoming
energy even more, the dierence between the two approaches also gradually
decreases, reaching 0 for Einc = 0:001. At very low values of Einc the majority
of the tasks completed successfully used energy that agents had at the start of
the simulation.
If we traverse the plot from highly connected to sparse, we start in a zone
(Rth > 0:35) where the connectivity does not inuence the performance of
either allocation approach signicantly. This indicates that the networks are
connected enough that more connections do not improve it. For lower connec-
tivity, however, performance does change: relatively slowly for utilisation-based
allocation, and faster for the prot-based bidders. This can be ascribed to crit-
ical nodes, which provide bridges between dierent clusters in the network,
being over-utilised causing network fragmentation.
By looking at the average energy levels at the end of the simulation, as
shown in Figure 7.6, we can better understand the reasons behind the perfor-
mance results. Competitive allocation shows a gradual decrease from Einc =
0:01 to Einc = 0:006, which corresponds to the area where the system manages
to allocate all tasks.
There is a slight increase in the amount of energy remaining in the system as
Rth increases, due to the lower task transferral costs associated with a better
connected network. In comparison, the utilisation-based allocation shows a
plateau of high energy which drops rapidly from Einc = 0:006 to Einc = 0:005.
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(a) Competitive task allocation
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(b) Cooperative task allocation
Figure 7.6: The mean energy levels after allocating 500 tasks for a range of
incoming energy (Einc) and communication distance (Rth) values. Competitive
bidding shows a gradual decrease as Einc decreases, reaching a minimum around
Einc = 0:006. When a cooperative market is used, the transition between having
enough energy (Einc > 0:005) and not having enough is very sudden, due to
the eciency of this mechanism.
This transition demarcates the point where the incoming energy shifts from
being sucient for the workload, to being not enough. The abruptness of the
change is again an indication of the eciency of the utilisation-based approach
| it maximises the total incoming energy to allow the largest number of tasks
to be allocated.
In both allocation cases, the slightly higher energy at Rth = 0:2 indicates
that allocation failed, although enough energy was available. From this we
can conclude that the decrease in task allocation in this zone can be directly
ascribed to the sparse network topology.
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7.6 Discussion
In this chapter I investigated the dierence in performance between utilisation-
based and prot-based task allocation. By adapting ZIP-traders to reverse,
rst-price, sealed-bid auctions, I could compare competitive agents to the co-
operative ones developed in previous chapters. Simulation results demonstrate
that the cooperative agents are always at least as good or better than the com-
petitive ones in terms of the number of tasks allocated. While the allocation
success is similar for well-connected markets with sucient energy, the dier-
ence is especially noticeable when we move to less well-connected networks, or
limit the energy available to agents in the system. This should come as no
surprise: the incentives for the cooperative agents were dened to be aligned
with a good global allocation, while the competitive agents were selsh and
short-sighted. What is signicant, however, are the reasons for the dierent
behaviour, as it can tell us a lot about how we can use market-based control
and why it works.
7.6.1 Competitive vs. cooperative markets
Based on these results, we can now return to the questions that motivated this
chapter. Firstly, the engineering perspective: how does introducing a com-
petitive market change the system performance? The above results show that
the competitive market is comparable to cooperative allocation, as long as the
market is well-connected and has sucient energy. For less well-connected mar-
kets, or scenarios where the incoming energy is not signicantly more than the
work load, the performance of the competitive market decreases conspicuously
faster than the cooperative market. The decrease in performance is primarily
due to the inability of the competitive market to maximise the incoming en-
ergy, as can clearly be seen in the energy measurements. We can expect the
dierence in performance to be increased by a dynamic task load, which will
make the cooperative approach superior in a larger part of the parameter space.
A more sophisticated utility function for the competitive agents may improve
their performance, but it will require some predictive ability to anticipate future
workloads.
One might ask: is this part of parameter space signicant? For distributed
satellite systems and wireless sensor networks, we nd ourselves faced with
lower connectivity and critical energy | exactly the part of parameter space
where cooperative allocation performs better. I would therefore argue that,
where possible, cooperative allocation mechanisms are preferred to competi-
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tive markets in distributed satellite systems. However, it should also be noted
that many applications do not fall into this part of parameter space, and can
therefore be adequately addressed by either approach.
The key characteristic of the cooperative market that allows it to perform
better is its tendency to distribute tasks across the network in response to
the utilisation of individual agents. This can happen because of the informa-
tion content in the bid values: high bids indicate agents that are undesirable
from a global perspective. In contrast, the information content in the bids of
competitive agents is relatively low, because they are bidding to win, not to
communicate their state.
Fundamentally, the dierence in performance is due to the dierent feed-
back loops associated with the allocation approaches. When a competitive
bidder wins a job, its information about the system increases relative to the
other agents because it learns the market price, which the others do not know.
Knowing the market price increases the likelihood that our focal agent will win
future tasks, because it can place more accurate bids. As a result of the posi-
tive feedback loop, the energy of the winning agents will rapidly be depleted.
For a fully-connected network, the primary eect will be that the system-level
energy increase is suboptimal. However, for a more distributed communica-
tion topology the exhaustion of connecting nodes is also signicant, as it leads
to network fragmentation. This explains the deterioration observed for low-
connectivity networks shown in Figure 7.5.
In contrast, allocation in the utilisation-based market is subject to a clearly
dened negative feedback loop: winning a task decreases an agent's energy.
The decreased energy means that the agent's next bid will be more expensive,
making it less likely to win a subsequent task. As a result, tasks are distributed
in such a way as to equalise the energy levels across the system. This can be
seen in the narrow energy distribution in Figure 7.3. Furthermore, because
the utilisation-based market distributes tasks between the available agents, the
number of tasks completed by an agent is related to the state of the network.
This forms another informational feedback loop, linking the behaviour of the
agent to the system.
7.6.2 Implications for market-based control
What are the implications for us, as users of market-based control? For con-
trolling technical systems, if we have a choice between a cooperative and com-
petitive market, I would recommend using the cooperative conguration. Com-
petitive markets contain no magic: instead they are noisy, subject to positive
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feedback, and generally hard to control. We are however inundated with good
news about competitive markets and their seemingly mystical properties to
achieve good allocations. Optimistically believing that all the properties of
real markets will save your system is similar to the naive view that evolution-
ary algorithms are anything more that a special case of stochastic search. While
competitive markets certainly have promising features, ideological motivations
for their use should be avoided: the system-level behaviour will only ever be as
good as we design it to be.
However, sometimes the use of a competitive market is warranted: markets
can determine the value of goods or services, oer open-ended incentives to
agents in the market, or the system designer might not be in a position to
specify all the behaviour. In these cases we should proceed with caution, while
paying special attention to the feedback loops in the system. A combination of
regulations and incentive engineering approaches, such as mechanism design,
have to be used to manage the system. Broadly speaking, we need ways of
coupling the utilities of individual agents to the system-level performance.
We should be careful to distinguish between the dierent features of market-
based systems; we can here identify two distinct components relevant to control
problems. The rst component is the information ow in the system: what is
revealed and how it is communicated. This component was identical for the
competitive and cooperative markets in this chapter. The second component
is the incentive structure used by agents: this determines what decisions they
make. Here the two markets diered, with a corresponding dierence in the
global performance.
Market-like mechanisms are very good at the rst component, as they pro-
vide highly ecient means to disseminate information for decision making. The
amount of information can vary, from the information-poor auctions used above,
to continuous double auctions that contain considerably more information. I
believe this is one of the most attractive features of using markets for control.
The incentive component uses the information ow component to determine
the system-level behaviour. Are agents trying to optimise their own prot, or
do they have a system-level goal as a target? For competitive systems, we have
seen that this can result in stable equilibria, but that the system's performance
would probably have been better had a cooperative mechanism been used. In
my opinion, a large number of distributed control problems can be adequately
addressed without relying on competitive incentives.
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7.6.3 Final considerations
The models of agents and markets used in this chapter have several limitations,
some of which point the way to questions for further exploration.
The number of agents in the system and their skills were xed throughout
the experiments. In real-world markets a new agent, with a new skill, can ll a
niche at any time if a need is not met suciently. This provides an adaptation
mechanism that would make the market more exible than the one described
above, and may improve performance.
The cost of task execution (cint) was the same for all agents in the experi-
ments. While this is a reasonable assumption for a man-made system, it does
not apply to real-world markets. A variance in the cost would be reected
in the bid values, and it could therefore inuence the task distribution. The
parameters used by the adaptive agents were not optimised to nd the \best"
values for the learning algorithm. It would be particularly interesting to see if
the optimal parameter values are determined by the other individuals in the
market, or whether some depend on the structure of the market.
My usage of a market on a network made me aware of how little research has
been done on economies on networks, where communication between agents is
determined by the topology. Apart from some work on graph-based economies
(e.g., Kakade et al., 2004; Judd and Kearns, 2008; Goyal, 2009) and a few
publications on spatial economies (e.g. Fujita et al., 2001; Ladley and Bullock,
2005), the eld is strangely empty if we consider the importance of trade links
and distribution networks. If information ow in the economy is determined by
the topology, the economy eectively consists of a series of overlapping markets.
How do prices propagate through this system, what are the implications for
convergence, and how do agents cope with the decreased information available
to them? Further investigation on spatially distributed auctions and auctions
with limited communication is required.
On the market-based control front, it would be interesting to explore the
trade-o in increasing the amount of information in a market against the im-
provement in system performance. In my work I focused on a minimal infor-
mation scenario, but it is possible that higher information markets exist where
the cost of the information is outweighed by the improvement in system per-
formance. An increase in information would also allow for more sophisticated
agent strategies, which will in turn modify the performance curves observed
above. Finally, in work that is closely related to the evolution of cooperation,
the space between the competitive and cooperative markets can be explored.
Is it possible to have stable cooperative or hybrid strategies or will markets,
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when given the opportunity, always tend towards a competitive state?
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Conclusions
This thesis started with the question of how to best manage a group of inter-
dependent satellites that are constrained in their energy and communication
abilities. Instead of focusing on the details of satellite design, however, I ap-
proached it as a multi-agent task allocation problem: a problem that can be
addressed by using a market metaphor. I quickly came to the conclusion that
much of the current work in task allocation in multi-agent systems can be di-
vided into two distinct groups, one general and one specic, with very little
work providing a bridge between these extremes. The design process can be
viewed as a traversal of this problem space, progressively narrowing the scope
of the model we are working with as we move from the general to the specic.
At the highest level, the primary objectives of this thesis can therefore be
dened as:
 Development of a task allocation mechanism that takes the constraints of
the distributed satellite system environment into account.
 Mapping a section of the problem space of task allocation in multi-agent
systems through the above design process.
The rst of these involves an engineering problem, and provides a tool which
can be used to design and manage multi-satellite systems. The second objective
is concerned with the broader space of task allocation, and tries to provide some
structure to the segment of the problem space relating to multi-satellite systems
and similar applications.
The rst objective is met by the market-based task allocation mechanism
I developed and veried over the course of this thesis. I not only present the
allocation mechanism, but also describe where it should be used, and perhaps
more importantly, where it should not be used. As part of the development
process, my experiments led to a number of guidelines that should help designers
of distributed systems cover the gap between the abstract and applied ends of
the spectrum of multi-agent systems, thereby addressing the second objective.
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8.1 Overview
I started by proposing a task allocation mechanism that takes multi-component
tasks, dynamic topologies, and expensive communication into account (Chap-
ter 3). This mechanism was developed from a reference mission scenario which
allowed the identication of constraints and requirements. By applying a model
of a human labour market to the abstracted system, an allocation mechanism
was derived. The mechanism was then mapped back to the distributed satellite
application to dene the implementation details of the task allocation mecha-
nism in the rest of the thesis. The mechanism denes the routing and com-
munication layer required to successfully allocate tasks. Agents calculate their
bids by taking their own utilisation and skills into account. By adding a com-
mission percentage to bid values, topological information about the state of the
network is included in the prices. Routing information is generated on an ad
hoc basis as part of the auction. Winner calculation is distributed across the
network to minimise communication processing requirements.
In Chapter 4 I veried the suitability of the allocation mechanism by simu-
lating it in a few basic scenarios. The simplicity of these test cases also helped
us to develop a better understanding of the system-level behaviour of the mech-
anism.
The next three chapters broadly examined at where the market-based task
allocation mechanism should be used by focusing on the design decisions and
constraints related to specic parameters. The behaviour of the allocation
mechanism was explored in more detail in Chapter 5. An analytical descrip-
tion of the allocation mechanism was developed to show that the system-level
communication cost is constant with respect to the number of nodes in the sys-
tem, while it grows linearly with the size of the auction community. Simulation
was used to compare the allocation mechanism to a reference implementation
using a centralised allocator in the context of node failures. The robustness of
the mechanism can be adjusted by changing the size of the auction commu-
nity: the market-based approach performs signicantly better in terms of the
number of tasks allocated and energy used for large systems where nodes can
fail. In smaller systems, or where the nodes and links are suciently reliable,
an accurate model can be maintained by a centralised controller, thus making
it a better solution for that section of parameter space.
Chapter 6 investigated the interplay between communication cost and net-
work topology. This was done by measuring the system-level cost associated
with dierent topologies: results show the potential detrimental impact of hav-
ing an unnecessarily large auction community. If the transmission power re-
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quired to create better-connected networks is taken into account, we observe
a clear zone of good allocation, bounded on the lower end by nodes' connect-
edness, and on the upper end by the increasing energy cost associated with a
well-connected network. A mobility model that describes the Keplerian trajec-
tories of a group of satellites was developed to measure the eect of realistic
orbital mechanics. Due to the short time scales at which auctions happen, the
allocation mechanism functions at least as well for the dynamic case as when
using a static network.
Finally, in Chapter 7, I investigated the dierence between the established
cooperative task allocation mechanism and a competitive market. This involved
the development of a competitive adaptive agent related to ZIP-traders, but
modied to single-sided auctions with outsourced, multi-component tasks. The
dynamics of these competitive agents show strong positive feedback in task
allocation: nodes that win some jobs tend to win more. This leads to an
uneven spreading of tasks and suboptimal system-level energy consumption.
When compared to the cooperative agents on a range of network topologies, the
cooperative solution outperforms the competitive one in networks with lower
connectivity and limited energy. This can be ascribed to the increased eciency
of the cooperative markets because the task distribution is better from a global
perspective.
8.2 Traversing the problem space
The preceding chapters dealt with the motivation and design of a market-
based task allocation mechanism, followed by the exploration of signicant
parameters. The focus on the specics of the application, however, makes it
easy to lose sight of the larger problem space. In this section I therefore review
the path followed from a general model of task allocation, to the specics of
the distributed satellite system application, with the objective of identifying
related systems.
In Chapter 3, I started with a high-level model of labour market. The use
of a market mechanism is based on economical theory about the suitability of
markets for distributed coordination problems. The use of a price mechanism
abstracts information, and allows ecient communication between agents. It
should be noted that at this point, the model could be applied to a range of
allocation problems, not just distributed satellite systems. By applying system
characteristics, either as design decisions or constraints, the general model is
pruned to the specics of the application, as illustrated in Figure 1.2. However,
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these parameters also provide links to related systems, which allow us to situate
distributed satellite systems in a larger problem space.
Communication cost is the most prominent parameter I explored. Dis-
tributed satellite systems have high communication costs, but communication
is still possible: communication should therefore be minimised. If communi-
cation had a negligible impact on performance, factors such as topology and
system volatility could easily be detected and compensated for, assuming su-
cient computational power was available. System management is thus simplied
by the availability of up-to-date state information. One example is networked
computer systems with fast, reliable communication between nodes. On the
other hand, if communication was very expensive, it would be better to main-
tain a model of the system instead. However, this assumes that a suciently
accurate model can be built, and that modelling it is computationally feasible.
For systems with a signicant level of unpredictable noise (e.g., node failures or
a dynamic topology), modelling is simply not practical, and some form of state
feedback is required. If the labour market model is applied to a system with
inexpensive communication, it moves much closer to work on the interaction of
agents in a single marketplace: more information is available, a greater number
of agents are involved and multiple bidding rounds become feasible. This is
signicantly dierent from my allocation model, yet closely related through the
communication cost parameter.
In terms of scale, my allocation mechanism is targeted at large systems.
As discussed in Chapter 5, smaller systems can usually be better addressed
using traditional approaches such as centralised control. In my opinion, many
distributed robotics applications can safely be described as \small", and are
therefore best not controlled using market-based or emergent mechanisms |
factors such as validation and verication makes centralised approaches partic-
ularly attractive. For large systems such as wireless sensor networks, however,
distributed approaches can oer the required level of performance, but often
without formal guarantees on quality. The boundaries between large and small
is often not clear, because other parameters, such as communication cost or
volatility, contribute to determine how manageable a system is.
If a network is very stable, a static model can usually be constructed to
assist in navigating or managing it. However, network volatility requires a
mechanism to detect and adjust to changes, whether it is due to failures or to
mobile nodes. My use of an auction provided this network information, other
approaches such as intermittently polling nodes for their status full the same
function. If access to the system is fast enough, and only partial information
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is required, as in the case of distributed satellite systems, ad hoc measurement
should be sucient. Slower access and limitations on observability will instead
require more sophisticated models | examples include telephone directories
and road maps.
Topology plays a role when communication has a signicant cost. A system
with higher connectivity is more robust to changes in the network, but fre-
quently also requires increased computation on the part of nodes to deal with
the increased information. Less well-connected systems are more sensitive to
changes: topology therefore plays a more signicant role in overall system per-
formance, as illustrated in Chapter 6. Wireless sensor networks are similarly
sensitive to topology, as it determines both global performance and how much
information is available to manage the system. Electricity distribution grids
are also sensitive to changes in topology, but note that their information ow
is not dependent on the network structure.
The nal parameter I considered was the dierence in cooperative and com-
petitive markets. While the former relates the desired global behaviour directly
to local utility functions, it requires total control of the system. If we move
towards competitive scenarios, such as necessitated by multi-stake holder sys-
tems, systems become harder to control and require additional mechanisms to
elicit the correct behaviour. These types of systems are naturally much more
closely related to real-world social systems.
The above systems all share an axis in parameter space with distributed
satellite systems. By applying the discussed constraints to my generic model,
I arrived at a specic application. However, the proximity of the other sys-
tems is also important: only by mapping out the areas surrounding our design
trajectories can we gain the necessary understanding how dierent systems are
related. A thorough map of this space is required to allow us to progress to
constructing methodologies for designing multi-agent systems.
8.3 Contributions and implications
This thesis has led to the following contributions:
 For the satellite engineer community, I have demonstrated the suitability
of a market-based task allocation mechanism for managing distributed
satellite systems. This represents a point on the specic end of the design
space. The allocation mechanism is fully distributed, energy ecient,
scalable, and robust to node failure and changes in topology. A novel
commission parameter was devised in order to take expensive communi-
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cation into account, while recursive outsourcing is used to address com-
pound tasks. My verication eorts identied the relationships between
design constraints and system parameters in order to show the part of
the problem space where the allocation mechanism should be used. To
allow system designers to navigate through the multiple interdependent
parameters, I have provided a map of their interaction in Figure 8.1.
 In terms of market-based control, my comparison of cooperative and com-
petitive markets demonstrated the cost of selsh agents. Although in
some parts of parameter space we observe similar performance between
the two methods, selsh bidding is prone to suboptimal task allocation
due to the positive feedback loops inherent in the market. In contrast,
the utilisation-based approach uses negative feedback to distribute tasks
evenly, thereby improving the global system performance.
 For those interested in task allocation in distributed systems in general,
this thesis provides an analysis of the parameter space in which task al-
location mechanisms are embedded. By exploring the eects of network
size, robustness, communication parameters, and topology, the area in
which the proposed mechanism should be applicable has been identied.
This extends beyond the satellite problem to related systems ranging from
mobile robotics to wireless sensor networks | this can best be interpreted
as a large-scale map of the design space surrounding these systems. A
clear message throughout this thesis is that the best management ap-
proach is highly dependent on the parameters of the system at hand: a
number of dierent approaches all have a role to play.
 I also argue that there is a gulf between our high-level task allocation
knowledge and the actual mapping of it to specic problems. Our domain-
specic knowledge is generally tightly coupled to a specic application |
as a eld, we need a bridge to span the gap. Responsible engineering
allows us to use the design process to address this problem, as I demon-
strated in this thesis, but persistent eort is required if we want to reach
the point where we have a principled methodology for controlling these
systems.
8.4 Limitations
As with any work of this nature, a number of limitations exist. Most of these
have been pointed out previously, but a brief review helps to dene the space
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where my contributions are relevant, and the areas where this is not necessarily
the case.
 A specic type of task allocation was considered: task elements are allo-
cated to individuals. Alternative mission scenarios may require dierent
task structures, for example that all satellites execute a certain function
at a specic moment. While many of these scenarios can be realised with
the current system, it is possible that other protocols may provide higher
eciency in these cases.
 It was assumed that the execution costs for task elements can be accu-
rately specied. In reality, a signicant amount of modelling and mea-
surement is required to determine these values; however, I suspect it is
possible to characterise these values for specic systems, especially if a
task element model is used.
 In building the abstracted model in Chapter 3, I dealt primarily with
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small, heterogeneous spacecraft. If larger spacecraft are considered, specif-
ically ones where the available power is less of a constraint, we move to
a dierent position in problem space. From my exploration of the space
I believe that the market-based mechanism proposed here will still work
for this new case, but I suspect optimisations exist that can better exploit
the parameters of the new target system.
 A simple wireless communication model was used for packet transmis-
sion. Communication was considered to be deterministic and symmetric,
with no accounting for interference, bandwidth, signal-to-noise ratios or
asymmetric links. Although this model was sucient for modelling the
network dynamics, much renement is needed before accurate predictions
on the absolute cost of communication can be made.
 In my investigation of competitive markets, I only addressed reactive
agents. This does not encompass the entire scope of possible agent strate-
gies.
 Finally, the design process only traversed a relatively small segment of
the entire design space, thereby only relating a few problems by means
of a limited parameter set. This process needs to be repeated with many
dierent designs to obtain a better view of the family of distributed control
problems, and build a bridge that links them with our abstract models.
8.5 Future work
Although my research answered some questions, it also made me aware of a
number of ways in which it can still be extended. In keeping with the primary
objectives of the thesis, the future work can be divided into avenues that relate
to the engineering of multi-satellite systems, and into work that deals with task
allocation in general.
On the spacecraft engineering side, an increase in simulation detail and
eventual implementation on a hardware platform is required as the next steps
in the verication of the task allocation mechanism. This will also allow the
limitations around communication cost and task execution cost, as outlined
above, to be better understood. From a network management perspective,
mechanisms that verify the execution of allocated tasks are also required before
the system can be deployed. Adaptive protocols that optimistically conserve
energy by limiting communication distance should also be investigated, as they
can provide a signicant improvement in the performance of the system. All
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of the above will naturally also impact upon mission design processes, most of
which are currently largely untested in this arena.
For readers primarily interested in task allocation, I believe that further in-
vestigation of spatially distributed auctions and negotiation with costly commu-
nication can lead to valuable contributions. In current literature most auctions
are assumed to be localised to a mostly common space, with the associated
theory developed for this case. In comparison, both the intelligent agents and
mechanism design communities have paid relatively little attention to eective
strategies and system dynamics for the case where nodes are distributed across
a network. The eects of costly communication in negotiation scenarios have
similarly not been adequately addressed. As demonstrated in this thesis, ex-
pensive communication changes the utility of agents in the system; sometimes
even for those agents not actively bidding or allocating tasks. A formal analysis
of how communication cost should inuence decision making will be a signi-
cant contribution to the eld. The belief that similar environments will result
in similar allocation mechanisms is a core assumption underlying my work, but
it raises the question of how environmental parameters determine which type of
market or other allocation system is best suited to a specic allocation problem.
At a more abstract level, I believe further work is also required by all parties
to improve the state of the eld of task allocation. As argued in Chapter 2,
a large gap currently exists between our abstract ideas of task allocation and
actual implementations, leading me to believe that we still do not know how
to eciently map from our high-level knowledge to a specic solution. In the
work presented here I have contributed by relating some points in the problem
space, but to overcome this problem everyone in the eld needs to contribute.
Why does this gap exist? In my mind it is to some extent symptomatic of
the dynamics of the system in which we research task allocation. Those dealing
with the engineering of applications are pushed to deliver working systems, as
it is the metric against which they are measured. A compounding factor the
large number of elds in which task (and resource) allocation is encountered.
Allocation is therefore seen as part of a dierent problem, not a problem in
itself. Those contributing to the general theories frequently come from more
abstract elds, which can make it hard to relate their work to applications,
especially the problems encountered in realistic settings. Individuals tend to
stay in their respective elds | they are required to be eld specialists, not
task allocation specialists.
However, we cannot be absolved of all blame; we are still rational, inde-
pendent beings. I believe an important contribution can be made through
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responsible engineering, where the focus is not only on delivering a product,
but also learning about the space in which the problem is solved along the
way, as I demonstrated in this thesis. The dissemination of this knowledge is
crucial. Similarly, I believe greater emphasis is required on the commonality of
task allocation across number of elds. A broad perspective is required; blind
allegiance to approaches that are either long established or currently fashion-
able does not result in fair comparisons, nor does it increase our knowledge of
the eld.
This thesis applied the ideas initially developed by Adam Smith, and ex-
tended by others, to manage our increasingly complex technological systems.
However, work like my own exists in parallel with another literature in which
those same ideas are combined with computational models to further our un-
derstanding of existing social systems. It seems both likely and desirable that
the two elds will benet from greater cross-fertilisation in the years to come.
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